

CMC Finland YEARBOOK 2009 on Civilian Crisis Management Studies

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Kirsi Henriksson
(editor)

CMC Finland Civilian Crisis Management Studies

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ACFOA	Australian Council for Overseas Aid	DPA	United Nations Department of Political Affairs
ACCORD	African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes	DPKO	United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations
AMM	Aceh Monitoring Mission	DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
AMM HQ	Aceh Monitoring Mission Headquarters	DSF	Decentralization Support Facility
Decomm Office	Decommissioning Office	DSRSG	Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General (UN)
ASEAN	The Association of Southeast Asian Nations	EBAO	Effects Based Approach to Operations
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia	EC/ECHO	European Commission/European Commission Humanitarian Aid Department
ASF	African Standby Force	ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
AU	African Union	EGT	European Group on Training
AUREU	Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit	ESDP	European Union Security and Defence Policy
AUSA	Association of the United States Army	EU	European Union
BRA	Badan Reintegrasi dan damai Aceh	EUBAM	European Union Border Assistance Mission
CAP	Consolidated Appeals Process	EUFOR	European Union Force
CCA	Common Country Assessment	EULEX	European Union Rule of Law Mission
CCM	Civilian Crisis Management	Feminist IR	Feminist International Relations
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union	GAM	Aceh Freedom Movement, Gerakan Aceh Merdeka
CHAP	Common Humanitarian Action Plan	GDP	Gross Domestic Product
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency	GTZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit
CIMIC	Civil-Military Coordination	HC	Humanitarian Coordinator
CMC	Crisis Management Centre Finland	HoM	Head of Mission
CMCO	EU Civil-Military Coordination Tool	HQ	Headquarters
CMI	Crisis Management Initiative	HVO	Croatian Defence Council
COHA	Cessation of Hostilities Framework Agreement	ICC	International Criminal Court
CSIS	Center for Strategic and International Studies	ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
DCAF	Democratic Control of Armed Forces	ICRW	International Center for Research on Women
3D Concept	Diplomacy, Development and Defence Concept	ICTR	International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration	ICTY	International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
DDRRR	Disarmament, Demobilisation, Repatriation, Reintegration, and Resettlement	IDP	Internally Displaced Person
DFID	Department for International Development	IFI	International Financial Institutions
DFS	United Nations Department of Field Support	IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
DOA/CAO	Director of Administration/Chief Administrative Officer (UN)	IHL	International Humanitarian Law
DOM	Daerah Operasi Militer (Military Operations Zone)	IMF	International Monetary Fund
		IMFT	International Military Tribunal, Tokyo Tribunal
		IMPP	Integrated Mission Planning Process

INGO	International Non-Governmental Organisation	SSR	Security Sector Reform
IPA	International Peace Academy	SMSG	Special Representative of Secretary-General (UN)
IPTF	Integrated Planning Task Force	SV	Sexual Violence
JAMA	Journal of the American Medical Association	TNI	Tentara Nasional Indonesia (The armed forces of Indonesia)
JICA	Japan International Cooperation Agency	UK	United Kingdom
JMAC	Joint Mission Analysis Cell	UN	United Nations
KATU	Kansalaisjärjestöjen Konfliktinehkäisyverkosto (Civil Society Conflict Prevention Network)	UNAMID	African Union/United Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur
Kit-PEP	Post-Exposure Prophylaxis kit (aka. PEP-kit)	UNCT	United Nations Country Team
LLM	Master of Laws	UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
MFA	Ministry for Foreign Affairs	UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
MSF	Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors without Borders)	UNDP RBEC	United Nations Development Programme/Regional Bureau for Europe and the CIS
MINURCAT	United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad	UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
MoI	Ministry of the Interior	UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding	UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner of Refugees
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization	UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
NAP	National Action Plan	UNIFEM	United Nations Development Fund for Women
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development	UNMIK	United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation	UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
NORAD	Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation	UN-INSTRAW	United Nations International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women
NUPI	Norwegian Institute of International Affairs	UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs	USAID	United States Agency for International Development
ODCCP	United Nations Office of Drug Control and Crime Prevention	UNU	United Nations University
ODIHR	Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights	WB	World Bank
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development	WFP	World Food Programme
ONUB	United Nations Mission in Burundi	WHO	World Health Organization
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe		
PCIA	Post-Conflict Impact Assessment		
PCRU	Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit		
PDSMSG	Principal Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General (UN)		
PEP	Post-Exposure Prophylaxis		
Polamk	Poliisiammattikorkeakoulu (The Police College of Finland)		
PRS	Poverty Reduction Strategy		
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper		
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team		
RC	Resident Coordinator		
RoL	Rule of Law		
RR	Resident Representative		
RUF/SL	Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone		
SADC	Southern African Development Community		
S/CRS	Office for the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization		
SIDA	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency		

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The past year has been at the same time rewarding as well as demanding. Much has been achieved thanks to the committed staff of the Crisis Management Centre Finland (CMC Finland). The rapid pace of evolution related to the civilian crisis management at the national level and the learning by doing process within CMC Finland itself have required motivation, flexibility as well as continuous readiness to absorb novel tasks. Besides the CMC Finland staff there exists a growing number of people who are linked to CMC Finland activities and their support has been a valuable asset to all of us. I owe a special debt of gratitude to some of them on the occasion of this publication.

First of all, I would like to express my gratitude to those partners and experts with whom we have been able to increase our understanding especially in gender issues. The NGOs under the umbrella of the Finnish 1325 Network and the members of the CMC Finland 1325 Steering Committee have helped us to implement the UNSCR 1325 in our everyday work. Ms. *Lesley Abdela* from Eyecatcher Associates Shevolution and Ms. *Leena Schmidt* from the Finnish UNIFEM were the first ones to show us how to put on the "gender spectacles". In April 2009, the CMC Finland 1325 Steering Committee organised a Roundtable in Pristina, Kosovo on "Gender-Based Violence: Investigation and Prosecution – Sharing experiences between Finland and Kosovo". The Roundtable would not have been realised without the help of the staff in the Human Rights and Gender Office at EULEX Kosovo or without the active participation of Kosovo ministries, authorities and NGOs.

I am also thankful to the authors who have been patiently revising their texts. And my warm greetings go to Mr. *John Mills*, Ms. *Tiina Kanninen* and Ms. *Meghan Riley* for having assured the quality of the language.

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Finally, I would like to dedicate this Yearbook to the 155 Finnish civilian crisis management experts who are currently working in different operations all around the world. They are "doing peace" in practice together with the people at the crisis settings while we are pondering over more abstract issues in our research here in Kuopio. Still, we need both theory and practice to prevent future conflicts as well as to solve the current ones.

Kuopio, Finland, 6 November 2009

Kirsi Henriksson, Editor

Foreword

The EU has gradually become an important actor in international crisis management. This year we celebrate the tenth anniversary of the launch of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Ten years ago, during the German and Finnish EU presidencies of 1999, the key decisions were taken on the incorporation of military and civilian capabilities under the EU political leadership. Since those decisions more than twenty missions in four continents have been carried out.

In general, the EU has been seen to cope well with the demanding tasks that are related to peacemaking and post-conflict stabilisation. The EU seems to have a number of clear assets as an international actor in this field. The first of them relates to the very comprehensive character of the European Union. Unlike most other actors, the EU crisis management policy forms a part of its wider Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which covers all the external relations. The EU should therefore be able to use the whole set of different instruments – its policies as well as different types of political and economic instruments – in support of its goals in a crisis affected region. Sometimes the coordination of policies and instruments is not that easy. The Lisbon treaty will, however, function in the very right direction as it will provide the EU with a much more coherent setting for external policies. Common policy objectives plus a more unitary system for policy preparation and leadership throughout the whole field of external relations are most welcome in this respect.

Another asset can be found in the EU's character as a union of twenty-seven democratic member states. The unity needed behind the EU operations is sometimes seen to make its decisions slow and its policies incoherent. It has also been argued to contribute to the lack of a strategic vision and problems in long-term planning. But on the other hand, the EU's character is itself the best safeguard to the democratic control of its international missions: the fact that they have to be approved by twenty-seven democratic audiences gives the missions a very solid basis. The same applies also to the commitment to the UN charter and its principles in the EU's international activities. The EU's possibilities for a strengthened political credibility as a crisis management actor seem to be good.

There are, however, critical voices as well. There are those who argue that the EU has been underperforming particularly in military crisis management as it has only been in charge of small or middle-size operations. While NATO is responsible for demanding global operations, the EU missions have neither been growing in size nor level of risk. Another critical observation relates to the successes of the EU capability processes. There are important member states that pay decreasing, rather than increasing, attention to the EU in this respect.

In spite of all challenges the ESDP has still been the fastest new policy dimension to have ever been added to the EU's political system. A common culture and more unified ways of thinking about crisis management and security policy in general are only in the process of emerging. It's time to congratulate the ten year old ESDP and look into its future with hope.

Teija Tiilikainen

Director (from 1 January 2010)

The Finnish Institute of International Affairs

Introduction

Ari Kerkkänen – Kirsi Henriksson

There are promising signs that the United Nations will embark on a new and enhanced era, and role, in peacekeeping, peacebuilding and crisis management. The new horizon is in sight as the UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) 'New Horizon' non-paper on peacekeeping suggests¹. These developments deserve a strong embrace as the UN is still and will be the only genuine global actor representing the majority of states in the World. Who, if not the UN, can better provide an overall and comprehensive architecture and appropriate action in conflict transformation and peacebuilding faced within challenges surrounding us? The caveats, bureaucracy, and limitations of the UN are known and acknowledged. This, however, should not direct the international community to deviate from UN policy and take action in seeking alternative ways and organisations to replace the role of the UN but rather it should generate the determination and the will to overcome the built-in bureaucratic and conceptual challenges of the UN.

The UN has a long history in peacekeeping. Its methods, mechanisms and instruments utilised have undergone a long process of development and deliberation, gradually evolving into the so-called UN Integrated Approach. Within the integrated framework of peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations, UN assets are clarity and resourcefulness. This is the case at least on paper; putting it into practice is often a different matter. The UN has already conceptually developed a comprehensive approach in peacebuilding; a process which is highly sought after by the regional organisations like the EU and NATO. The UN concept of the integration does not mean meddling and mixing the roles of different stakeholders, police remain in their own role and retain their chain of command as much as military remains within its chain of command.

Both, however, are inside the same larger framework of an integrated operation. This framework includes a co-ordinated action by a large variety of other UN agencies dealing with conflict regions which can include the United Nations Development Programme's (UNDP) development programmes as well as humanitarian and emergency aid channelled through the Organisation for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). Human security evolved within the UNDP already in the 1990s as it directed the planning activities as well as actual work on the ground. Looking good on paper is already a good start, and this is where the other regional organisations are significantly behind in their development.

The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) has just marked its first decade and the pace of developing EU crisis management capabilities has been breath-taking. The conflict in the middle of Europe, in the former Yugoslavia, showed both the lack and the need of Europe's capability to deal with peacekeeping and peacebuilding. The European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM), transferred into the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) in the former Yugoslavia, set precedence for current European civilian capabilities in crisis management. Since then, more than 20 ESDP missions have been or are being carried out in such far-away regions like Afghanistan (EUPOL Afghanistan) and the Democratic Republic of Congo in Africa (EUPOL RD Congo). In fact, it could be said that the largest EU civilian mission, the EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX Kosovo), pays a sort of tribute to the birth of the EU civilian crisis management capability.

The EU is a front-runner in developing civilian capabilities in stabilising and supporting recovery of conflict ridden regions. Structures have been created and national capacities enhanced. The EU has indeed made a great service for developing the UN capabilities by setting an example of utilising civilian dimensions in a comprehensive and structured way. It has given impetus for more enlightened understanding within the UN of the use of civilian instruments as is witnessed in the UN Rule of Law strengthening actions. In return, many UN

¹ Executive Brief DPKO/DFS 'New Horizon' non-paper on United Nations Peacekeeping, 24 June 2009. <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/newhorizon.pdf>, last accessed 9.11.2009.

best practises and concepts should be more willingly adopted by EU crisis management – once again, there is no need to re-invent the wheel. The EU is and will remain a regional organisation, irrespective of its global reach. Therefore, in crisis management the EU's role is complementary to the UN and the EU will continue to derive its mandates from UN Security Council Resolutions. For the UN, the EU is an indispensable asset that can and should be utilised.²

Civilian assets will be the key in the international support of stabilising and reconstructing Afghanistan. Engagement in Afghanistan will take years, if not decades. Crisis management and peacebuilding models are being designed based on experience gained from Afghanistan and more often than not, these have had a very limited influence and success. At the same time, it should be kept in mind that Afghanistan is not necessarily the only model to be followed in the future. Building only on Afghanistan scenario may lead, at its worst, to developing strategies and concepts that are not suited for challenges faced in other parts of the World. What Afghanistan, however, shows clearly is the very much needed synergy between development co-operation and peacebuilding. Parochialism and partisanship in peacebuilding belongs in the past.

Two significant strategies have been produced in Finland during the last two years. The Government of Finland approved the National Strategy on Civilian Crisis Management in August 2008³ and the Comprehensive Crisis Management Strategy will be approved during the autumn in 2009. These strategies are intended to enhance national strategic guidance in participating in international crisis management and peacebuilding. Though international participation is reviewed, the main emphasis is on national capacity building. On the civilian side, the Crisis Management Centre Finland has solemnly been responsible for all operational aspects of Finland's participation in crisis management operations by civilian professionals and expertise. The strategies guide national capacity building, it is however noteworthy to mention the complications that arise in finding an approach that would reflect an overall consensus of different crisis management stakeholders, even in Finland. One national deficiency in this field has been a lack of research, specifically in research that concentrates on in-depth analyses and draw conclusions on the current state of affairs in crisis management and in all of its dimensions. The Crisis Management Centre Finland continues to emphasise research as one supporting pillar of its activities and this second CMC Finland Yearbook is the result of our research undertakings during the year of 2009. Of course, this contribution is not intended to serve professionals only

in the national domain but also in the international domain. Comprehensiveness cannot be attained without having a profound and research based knowledge and understanding of its full meaning. One of CMC Finland's priorities, reflected more in the Yearbook 2008, is human security. The publication of the second Yearbook is also to mark the launch of the CMC Finland Human Security Training Programme.

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While agreements and cooperation pursued by the international community sets the framework for national capacity building in the field of civilian crisis management and peacebuilding, the substance to "manage" and "build" must be there in the first place. There is a certain set of generally accepted principles for this process within the international community, but they are not always agreed upon with a consensus. To promote human rights in crisis management and peacebuilding requires tools, means and methodologies for the responsible designers at the planning level of the operations as well as for the individual experts who are implementing the mission/operation mandates in the field.

Gender, cultural awareness and a comprehensive approach, amongst others, are tools to manage crisis and build peace in a sustainable and coherent way. Of course, the major aim of all peacekeeping, peacebuilding and crisis management activities is the human security of people; the international community should work in different crisis settings only to promote the positive security of individuals towards freedom, to do no harm and to humbly listen while mentoring, monitoring and advising.

The majority of the articles in this Yearbook 2009 focus strongly on the gender thematic which has been a very important building block for CMC Finland as a whole during the past year. Ville-Veikko Pitkänen discovers the process of gender mainstreaming inside CMC Finland. While there is a strong political will to push the implementation of the UNSC Resolution 1325 nationally – due to the publishing of Finland's National Action Plan 1325 in September 2008⁴ – the trainers, human resources officers and researchers are pondering how to implement the Action Plan in CMC Finland's daily work. The article gives a number of recommendations to enhance the mainstreaming process at CMC Finland.

Elina Penttinen continues with an analysis of the implementation of the Action Plan while reflecting on the expertise of Finnish female police officers. In her study, Penttinen not only brings examples of everyday life in different crisis settings told by the female police officers but she also analyses the construction of the gendered expertise in civilian crisis management. What is more important, increasing the number of women in order to achieve quick results, at least in the statistics, or to increase awareness to understand the role of gender in civilian crisis management? In order to get things

2 A recent study by a pan-European think-tank, The European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) analyses the weaknesses and potentialities of the ESDP. Korski, Daniel & Richard Gowan (2009): *Can the EU Rebuild Failing States? A Review of Europe's Civilian Capacities*. <http://www.ecfr.eu>.

3 *The National Strategy* (2008) has been published in Finnish, Swedish and English, see <http://www.intermin.fi/intermin/home.nsf/pages/27C4038A35220CFCC22573AA0040E71D?opendocument>, last accessed 9.11.2009.

4 *Finland's National Action Plan 1325*, <http://formin-origin.finland.fi/public/download.aspx?ID=32702&GUID={6E789E51-2C81-4F67-B12D-23E7389922F4}>, last accessed 9.11.2009.

done properly, Finnish female police officers first rely on their professionalism, second on their cultural background, and last on their gender.

Maaria Ylänkö proceeds with UNSC Resolutions while analysing also the Resolution 1820 on sexual violence. While UNSCR 1820 strengthens the previous UNSCR 1325 on *Women, Peace and Security*, the article reveals the complexity of the sexual violence issue. Maaria Ylänkö goes beyond the normative, feminist, and developmentalist assumptions to reveal the cultural dimensions as well as social and physical consequences of sexual violence. In the end, it is a question of the reintegration of the victim – woman, man, boy, girl – back to the society, and the international community can aid reintegration in many concrete ways, not only by reporting the number of rape cases.

Maaria Ylänkö's and Tommi Niemi's articles analyse the same issue from different perspectives but the phenomenon is the same: reintegration, which is the most challenging phase in the DDR-chain after disarmament and demobilisation. Tommi Niemi's research is based on the interviews of the Finnish experts who worked in the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) from 2005 to 2006. The AMM has traditionally been regarded as a success in the history of ESDP operations; Tommi Niemi analyses quite profoundly the understanding of the Finnish experts with respect to the successes and failures of the mission, however, the most important outcome is the reflection on the reintegration process in civilian crisis management and peacebuilding.

As we started this introduction with references to the United Nations, it is a good moment to end the presentation with Cedric de Coning's text on the integrated approach. Different peacebuilding dimensions, including comprehensive and integrated approaches, are tools for those individuals who are working in the operations sometimes quite alone and occasionally with a mandate that does not always interact with the peacebuilding context. Cedric de Coning's article offers a profound and clear picture on the complex peacebuilding practises of the international community in the name of different strategies. While the comprehensiveness is an approach which guides all international actors in the crisis setting in a coherent manner towards human security, the ultimate goal, the journey is much easier when wearing gender spectacles.

The views expressed in the research articles are those of the authors and do not reflect the views of CMC Finland.

The gender perspective in the training and recruitment of Finnish civilian crisis management experts

Ville-Veikko Pitkänen

The urgency of promoting the gender perspective in international crisis management is a goal mandated globally through a number of resolutions, political activity programmes and recommendations. This article deals with the challenge of implementing the gender perspective in the work of the Crisis Management Centre, Finland (CMC). It examines the manifestation of the gender perspective within CMC's activities from two angles: the number of recruited women as emphasised by the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 and the implementation of the gender perspective in CMC training.

1 Introduction

Gender mainstreaming promotes the gender perspective in all the activities of a given structure, institution, or organisation. Gender mainstreaming, though widely promoted in Finnish public administration policy¹, is a relatively recent, and thus relatively restricted, strategy in the context of Finnish civilian crisis management. This article focuses on gender mainstreaming in the context of Finnish civilian crisis management, specifically at the Crisis Management Centre Finland (CMC), based at Kuopio in Eastern Finland.

Founded in February 2007, CMC is responsible for the training and recruitment of the Finnish citizens seconded to civilian crisis management tasks in international crisis management and peacebuilding operations. During its brief existence, CMC has experienced a rapid increase in personnel, responsibilities, training participants, and seconded experts². In this dynamic operational context, CMC has responded to the challenge to implement gender perspective in the training and recruitment of civilian crisis management experts in various ways.

In April 2008, CMC established its own 1325 Steering Committee consisting of specialists from Finnish ministries, universities and NGOs. The Committee coordinates and consolidates thematic work around the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 on *Women, Peace and Security* (2000). In addition, CMC cooperates actively with the Finnish NGOs involved with the implementation of the resolution³. Further, in order to secure the gender perspective

in the field work⁴ of Finnish experts, CMC has organised gender training sessions for its personnel, and started to develop ways to apply gender more consistently in the CMC training curriculum, as well as in the recruitment procedures of its experts⁵. In spite of these efforts, however, CMC's gender mainstreaming still remains limited.

Until now CMC has enforced the gender perspective in two ways: *firstly*, by balancing the numbers of women and men in the context of its own activities, and *secondly*, by facilitating the acquisition by recruited experts of the analytical, observational, and applied tools of the gender perspective in the experts' work in the field, or as commonly referred to, facilitating the acquisition by experts of *gender lenses*. However, the concentration on the numbers of women participating in Finnish civilian crisis management still dominates the efforts to implement the gender perspective in Finnish civilian crisis management, which may be explained by two reasons. Firstly, the numbers of female participants are easy to understand, and easily measurable, recordable and reportable, in comparison with evaluation of how the training or recruitment have progressed in paying attention to participants' or experts' understanding of gender issues. Secondly, the strong emphasis on numbers is due to CMC's determination to advance the implementation of the UNSCR 1325 and the Finnish National Action Plan on 1325⁶ in CMC's activities, both of which strongly emphasise the need to increase female participation in crisis management. In addition, the Government's National Action Plan on Gender Equality and the Finnish National Strategy of Civilian Crisis Management provide a strong mandate to increase the number of women in civilian crisis management. However, by promoting the fundamental idea of strengthening the role of women in civilian crisis management, these documents

1 The need for gender mainstreaming in Finnish public administration has been explicitly stated in the Government Program (Valtioneuvoston kanslia 2007) and the Government's National Action Plan on Equality 2008–2011 (Sosiaali- ja terveystieteiden ministeriö 2008).

2 The number of employees increased from ten in January 2008 to 32 in April 2009 (including trainees). The number of attendees at CMC training sessions was 1378 in 2007, increasing to 1629 in 2008. The number of seconded experts in December 2007 was 81, and one year later 138. In October 2009, CMC did reach its goal as stated in Finland's National Strategy for Civilian Crisis Management of 150 civilian crisis management experts in the operations.

3 E.g. CMC personnel actively participates in the events of the Finnish 1325 NGO network, and CMC organises regular joint seminars with Finnish NGOs to deal with wider questions related to civilian crisis management.

4 The term "field work" refers here to the civilian crisis management experts' work in crisis areas.

5 Interview 12 January 2009.

6 Finland's 1325 NGO network contributed strongly to the birth of the 1325 National action plan by lobbying the authorities concerned. Thus the importance of pushing for stronger 1325 thematic work at CMC Finland has been emphasised not only "from above" by the ministries, but forcefully also "from below" by the active civil society. Interview 16 March 2009.

result in a practice that calls rather for mainstreaming women in crisis management than for gender mainstreaming⁷. In consequence, the convention has naturally been that CMC's reporting on gender mainstreaming has consisted more of numbers describing the dichotomised biological balance of the sexes than, for example, of the evaluation of the comprehensive understanding of gender in the work of experts.

This study conducted during the first half of 2009 tackles the challenge of bringing the gender perspective into Finnish civilian crisis management by utilising the expertise of the CMC staff – *the gender mainstreamers themselves* – based on the logical premise that the most practical, meaningful, and committing methods of gender mainstreaming within any organisation must be sought inside the organisation itself. Ownership has been detected to be one of the prerequisites for the active application of the gender mainstreaming inside organisations⁸. In the case of CMC, the ownership belongs to the CMC staff involved in training and recruiting civilian crisis management experts.

As the strategy for implementing the gender policy in CMC's activities is still in its initial stages, at a time when the attention of the organisation has essentially been focused on the stabilisation of CMC's basic function, the training and recruitment of experts, the window of opportunity for early-phase development, alignment, and raising gender awareness remains promisingly open. In addition, the situation is fruitful because CMC's brief period of existence has nevertheless been sufficiently long to generate prospective ideas for the implementation of the gender perspective more profoundly within the organisation.

The researcher's aim was not to create a penetrating academic report on CMC's gender mainstreaming, nor to test how profoundly the theory of gender mainstreaming fits into civilian crisis management. The researcher's main target was to find concrete ways to implement the gender perspective in CMC's work, which would eventually lead to the application of gender lenses in the concrete work of experts in such fields as Afghanistan, Kosovo, or Georgia.

In the search for operational practices to connect the gender perspective with CMC activities, this study departed from the conception that challenges in gender mainstreaming have been linked to the failure to connect gender meaningfully and naturally with individuals' daily work and practices, or to the routine of seeing gender issues in too technical terms, mainly used by the *unknown gender experts* rather than by uninitiated individuals⁹. It is often forgotten that organisations'

mainstreaming gender are often very different in relation to their managing- and operational structures, to say nothing of their goals, and as a result there exists a variety of descriptions for effective gender mainstreaming. Thus, a workable method of mainstreaming gender in one organisation may not be workable in another. The study seeks to utilise the expertise of the staff, inviting them to reflect and find best practices to implement gender in civilian crisis management, so that in this framework the gender perspective is first detected and familiarised before being applied. The bottom-up approach of this study brings the reflection down to the CMC staff themselves.

The empirical findings presented in this article are based on a combination of observations and thematic interviews. The observations were made during a variety of CMC events (seminars, training sessions, daily work). Individual interviews (CMC staff, CMC Finland's 1324 Steering Committee members, experts and officials) were carried out during January-June 2009. The main goals of the interviews were to bring out the challenges in implementing the gender perspective in CMC activities, and to find meaningful recommendations to overcome these challenges.

The orientation of the study is normative: it involves evaluation of the present state of affairs with the aim of putting forward recommendations for the future. The goal here is to assist the organisation to understand both the potential and limitations involved in applying the gender perspective. The normativeness of the study creates some methodological challenges. One challenge is the reconciliation of the interviews; the differences in individual values and life experiences mean that the improvements proposed by individuals during the thematic interviews cannot be identical. In response to this challenge, the results of the study have been "verified" by the informants themselves, and the final reconciliation between the interviews has been solved by looking for the common ground.

Since the researcher resided inside the organisation studied, a substantial part of the study was conducted through observing and evaluating CMC activities and by informal interviews of the individuals involved in CMC's daily work. The non-formal part of the information gathering profoundly strengthened the study, since the researcher often gained these opportunities by "accident", during lunch and coffee breaks, in situations where gender came up naturally, rather than designedly, in the conversations. On reflection, these informal moments when gender was not designed to be the main focus of conversation provided perhaps the most profitable moments for gathering and testing information. Conducting the research on the actual premises of the organisation being studied, inside its actual work, was also very practical: if ideas

7 The numerical balance between men and women is given particular emphasis in Finland's National Action Plan on the UNSCR 1325 and in the Finnish Government Action Plan for Gender Equality 2008–2011. The common feature of both documents is the target of a percentage balance of 40/60 between women and men trained and recruited for civilian crisis management tasks (see Kokkarinen et al. 2009; see also corresponding guidelines from the Finnish Ministry of Defence: Puolustusministeriö 2009; cf. McKay 2007).

8 See Wells & McEwan 2004; Mikkelsen et al. 2002.

9 As e.g. Piálek (2008) argues, the explicit (over)use of the term *expert*, the endless production of *checklists* and

tools, and the continual creation of specific *acronyms* and *abbreviations*, result in a convention that gender is construed as something *technical*. As a result people may see the gender approach as being the exclusive domain of the [gender] "expert". "Gender thus becomes a knowledge enclave, with its own tools, operational frameworks, and jargon fortifying its walls". See also Porter & Smyth 1998.

needed double-checking, the researcher was able to knock on doors and ask the informants further questions. Above all, these occasions seldom left the researcher without answers, and the researched topic was all the time "kept fresh" under constant discussion. On the other hand, as the researcher came to realise, the door was opening both ways: frequently, the staff members themselves were encouraged to tell their ideas of practical gender mainstreaming. This again meant that the interviews "stayed alive" during the whole process, and the information was gathered, not only when recording, but also in times when the individuals had "ripened" their ideas. Hopefully, this process of reflection on gender will continue in the future in the work of CMC.

Apart from the limits of its normativeness, another limiting factor of the study comes with the abstract nature of gender mainstreaming. When dealing with clear-cut, measurable goals, such as numbers of men and women, which is part of gender mainstreaming, the evaluation is relatively uncomplicated: has CMC reached its appointed goal to appoint balanced numbers of women and men for its activities or not, and if not, why? Such an evaluation is undoubtedly simpler than the analysis of implementation of the gender perspective in areas where formal national and international policies and standards are unattainable, as for example when testing whether CMC has succeeded in bringing the gender perspective into the actual work of the civilian crisis management expert. The evaluation of the abstract application of the gender perspective is complex, since there exist no benchmarks for such an evaluation. On the other hand, while the very purpose of the study is to contribute to those operational standards that bring gender inside CMC's activities; it has to be remembered that gender mainstreaming is ultimately a process rather than a goal, as is commonly agreed. So the discussion of whether an organisation has succeeded or failed in gender mainstreaming in this sense is futile. Instead of concentrating on strict benchmarks, it is more valuable to look at existing methods of gender mainstreaming, and at the overall constraints on implementing a comprehensive gender strategy¹⁰.

10 Sandler 1997.

2 Gender mainstreaming in civilian crisis management

2.1 *Gender – too simplified or too complex a concept?*

How can a concept be mainstreamed unless it is fully understood? This question reveals one of the most significant challenges to the strategy of gender mainstreaming. Lack of conceptual understanding and/or lack of understanding of the importance of gender mainstreaming impede the serious implementation of gender mainstreaming strategies¹¹. While accepting the fact that some concepts tend to work best with rather blurred meanings – without being descriptively and restrictively defined – the concept of “gender mainstreaming” necessitates some elaboration.

As is common with innovative concepts, the adapters of the concept have to know what the concept stands for before its systematic application. Further, in order to avoid losing so-called “momentum” in adopting new concepts, this knowledge needs to be communicated as promptly as possible. In the case of introducing the gender perspective into the domain of crisis management, the challenge consists in maintaining the momentum of learning at the beginning, because the concept is defined either in too simplistic terms – as merely an issue of women vis-à-vis men – or in too complex terms, for example, through “gender training” which covers such a wide variety of experiences, topics and audiences that an agreed definition of gender becomes impossible¹². Eventually, both attempts to define the concept produce the same result: the adapters of the concept, the civilian crisis management experts, willingly abandon the concept either to those who want to see the issue primarily through women’s eyes, or to those who enjoy the conceptual jargon, but fail to link gender with the real world. It must be noted that the learning process on gender issues then remains superficial, and the prospects for adapting the concept in practice are ignored; the adapters of the concept then become inclined to shift their interest toward new terms in the constantly expanding conceptual jungle of crisis management¹³.

To make any sense of the concept of gender mainstreaming for the purposes of this study, it becomes obvious that the concept requires some explanation. As the executive branch of the EU, the European Commission has produced a definition of gender mainstreaming which offers a good conceptual starting point for mainstreaming efforts in Finland.

Gender mainstreaming is the integration of the gender perspective into every stage of policy processes – design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation – with a view to promoting equality between women and men. It means assessing how policies impact on the life and position of both women and men – and taking responsibility to re-address them if necessary. This is the way to make gender equality a concrete reality in the lives of women and men *creating space for everyone within the organisations as well as in communities* – to contribute to the process of articulating a shared vision of sustainable human development and translating it into reality.¹⁴

While the essence of “mainstreaming”, according to this definition, lies in integration, of the gender perspective in every stage of [policy] processes as explicitly in this definition, the term “gender” itself is left in ambiguity. At first glance, gender seems to be something associated with men and women. However, the real substance of the definition, it is argued here, lies in its ability to link the meaning of gender more equally to “everyone” – gender mainstreaming *creates space for everyone*. Thus, by referring to everyone the definition of gender mainstreaming shows a tendency to relocate the examination of gender beyond the dichotomy of the sexes with the understanding that the application of the gender perspective requires deeper comprehension of the relations between human beings.

After observing gender mainstreaming policies in Finland, visiting seminars and hearing everyday conversations, we

11 Hannan 2001.

12 Interview 2 June 2009.

13 One of the interviewees had attended a gender training session which had from the beginning adopted an

accusatory tone which eventually left the course participants with a very negative view of gender training. See also Wetterskog 2007. The simplification of gender is also identified in Moser & Moser 2005.

14 European Commission 2008. Author’s emphasis.

can conclude that Finns operate essentially with a simplified meaning of gender. One possible reason for this may be the Finnish translation, *sukupuolinäkökulman valtavirtaistaminen* referring essentially to one's biology, which fails to indicate any link with the socially constructed gender identity, which on the other hand, as has been pointed out, builds the very core of the understanding of gender¹⁵. It is very possible that the Finnish translation may steer people's minds to form a simplified picture of gender mainstreaming. However, as the common confusion between biological sex and social gender and the employment of these two terms interchangeably pose a fundamental challenge for gender mainstreaming outside Finland¹⁶, as well, the way how Finns translate the term may not be – after all – enough to explain the whole picture of the obstacles in effective gender mainstreaming.

For social scientists, "gender" refers to socially constructed masculine and feminine characteristics, while "sex" refers to the biologically determined categories of male and female. The theory of gender sees that the role of the individual in relation to the environment in which he/she lives, works, studies or conducts other related activities is too complex to be defined solely by biology. What is believed, men and women, boys and girls of diverse societies in different times are dissimilar not because they are biologically different, but because the social construction in a given culture, time, and place defines and redefines their roles in different ways. These roles are not fixed but learned and negotiated, as well as often contested. Besides differences between the roles of women and men, roles among women and men fluctuate, and both women and men may combine different roles individually over time or even simultaneously¹⁷. In fact, after the complexity of gender is highlighted, it may be argued that while unbending stereotypes based on the biological dichotomy of sexes may offer us stability, the theory of socially constructed gender, being unstable, brings nothing but confusion. This may be a better reason than translation difficulties for the failure so far of the dynamic perception of gender to realistically challenge the traditional conception of gender as being merely an issue of biological women and men. What has to be understood is that the idea that the two biological sexes should have their own predefined playgrounds and act according their "natural" characteristics is still very strong in many cultures. This evidently restricts the acceptance of socially constructed gender.

In our everyday routines, it is not untypical to feel that we know what men and women naturally are or should be, since we readily take gendered practices for granted. The arrangements supporting gender roles are so profound, so

reinforced by history, that they seem to us to be natural¹⁸. We instantly recognise a person as a man or woman, girl or boy – and frequently act upon the socially adapted system we believe to be natural when dealing with people belonging to these particular groups. However, being a small girl or boy, or an older woman or man, is not a fixed state, and the assumptions we make based on people's biological sex are often mistaken. It is critical to notice that different contexts provide individuals with different gender roles to play, and that in a very wide range of spheres, including many formal and informal areas of life, such as the structures of education, labour, health or media and sports, these strictly defined roles are strongly reiterated in most cultures around the world. The vast, often out-of-sight arrangements to maintain the gender balances, and the reluctance to accept wider gender roles within different societies, remind us how far away the strategy of gender mainstreaming is from its ultimate goal, gender equality which covers the wide variety of human roles while accepting every person as he or she is.

2.2 Benefits of applying the gender perspective to crisis management

Understanding the gender perspective in crisis management offers us tools to perceive phenomena which we would not otherwise perceive. The people living in areas currently in crisis are most often defined by international aid organisations according to certain stereotypes linked to their sex. The crisis management expert often finds herself/himself in a situation in which there is a strong temptation to judge people, whether locals or colleagues, on the basis of their cultural, religious or linguistic backgrounds or, for example, on age-related features. However, perhaps the most defining feature of an individual is linked to gender, and recognition of this fact facilitates the understanding of gender as a tool to enable crisis management to achieve a better impact. The gender perspective strengthens civilian crisis management by offering a more comprehensive view of both subjects and objects in crisis management.

Consequently, the strategy of gender mainstreaming in civilian crisis management is not an end in itself, but a means to achieve ends. Excessive reliance on our predefined mindset concerning the people living in crisis areas, or direct utilisation of our common views of the principal roles in post-conflict societies, such as accepting a narrow but common paradigm of peaceful, silent women opposing their violent men, blind experts from seeing that each individual has the capacity to be an affecting and alternating factor in a crisis¹⁹. Unless crisis management experts take the gender perspective into account

15 Connell 2001; 2002; Connell & Messerschmidt 2005; Britt & Adler 2003.

16 See e.g. Mitchell 2004. The European Commission's Guide on Gender Mainstreaming (2004) identifies two different approaches for mainstreaming. *The woman-focused approach* views women's lack of participation as the problem, whereas *the gender-focused approach* is more people-centred.

17 Bouta 2004, 4; Valasek 2008.

18 Connell 2002.

19 For example, while the local women are many times openly victimised by conflict, the tendency to disproportionately depict them as victims, as in connection with trafficking or prostitution in crisis areas, perpetuates inaccurate assumptions about their contribution to war and peace. Women are not solely passive victims but often powerful agents. See e.g. Whitworth 2004; Utting 1994; Hentschel 2006; Strickland & Duvvury 2003, 1.

in their work, their actions may be based on the (wrong) sexual stereotypes of the people around them, which may easily lead to misconceptions of the dynamics in crisis areas. At the same time the adoption of gender perspective, for example, in the form of deconstructing gendered stereotypes, may offer experts greater competence to perceive the vast differences in roles among people in the post-conflict regions, as well as how differently people experience conflict. Looking critically at the needs of different groups of people within the same biological sex categories naturally breeds wider equality, which in turn is fundamental for sustainable peace. This is why, for example, recognising that a certain operation in crisis areas has different impacts on middle-aged men, young men, old men, or men with disabilities, substantially strengthens the work of crisis management since it expands the target of the action.²⁰

Properly utilised, the gender perspective takes into account a wider array of people in crisis areas and provides the crisis workers with a valuable tool to assess the impact of their work on a wider range of people²¹. Recognising through gender perspective the divergent opinions in the host country, and taking these opinions into account to ensure ownership and participation in peace processes are not limited to small elite groups, lead to more legitimated decision-making.

Crisis management work is misguided if an expert fails to recognise important nuances in the analysis of crisis areas. Incomplete conclusions about the crisis lead to ill-advised actions. Any crisis management work that does not take into account gender dynamics may easily reinforce the existing problems and power imbalances between people in crisis areas, thereby undermining any chance of real development for the whole community.²² If crisis management is harmonised with the gender perspective, which examines the diverse concerns of women, men, girls and boys, and even takes into account the variation within these categories, the work will clearly be done in a more equal and open manner, which will in turn *legitimise* the peace efforts in the eyes of local people.

While the application of the gender perspective may be most straightforwardly justified on the grounds of equality, arguments highlighting improved *quality of life* also need to be mentioned.²³ Since our picture of the people occupying crisis areas is very often founded on gender-based descriptions, people in crisis may feel compelled to associate with these narrow descriptions, because help has usually been given to those who are recognised to belong to the particular target group to be helped. In time of crisis, it is logical to assume that people feel compelled to manoeuvre in line with gendered expectations, and thus to conform with the most advantageous gender role pointed out by

the international organisation. Acquisition of the "identity" of a refugee woman, repatriated soldier, or even a raped woman, in the eyes of their rescuers, may unfortunately be the only survival strategy for many who are suffering or in need. From this point of view, it may be argued that paying equal attention to the needs of different people in the post-conflict rehabilitation phase ensures that people in crisis areas do not need to "fit" into some imagined picture, but instead can rebuild their own lives in their own way, which for many means a non-violent way of living. If the experts working in civilian crisis management and peacebuilding operations see women for the most part as victims needing protection, and men mainly as the perpetrators, this does not leave much room for variation. What happens to men and women who do not conform with the picture portrayed by the outsiders who are helping them? Since the gender perspective, which focuses on threats to individuals, relieves people from the strict roles based on stereotypes, it also makes room for a variety of interpretations of being a woman or a man. Consequently, this leaves individuals to live more satisfying and complete lives, for example through a greater involvement in the family and caring activities, as opposed to aggressiveness, or any other characteristic which needs to be maintained because of external pressure.²⁴

In addition, the recognition that crisis management experts need to be aware of the gendered bias in their own thinking, which is steering their own actions, may enhance crisis management. It is critical for these experts not to be limited by biased stereotypes which they have learnt to rely on in their own cultural context. Thus one advantage of the gender perspective, systematically applied, is that it forces us to face our own gender biases based on our own experiences within our own cultural settings. Equally important is to acknowledge that not only individuals but also institutions and organisations²⁵ carry certain gendered identities. In this "gender system"²⁶, deeply rooted social arrangements have generated the manoeuvre that only by complying with expectations can we avoid conflicts²⁷.

Despite the increased attention given to the gender perspective within the framework of crisis management, the structures of peace operations still carry gender biases²⁸. Recognition of the gender system in crisis management

20 As argued by Enloe (2002), a peace that fails to give equal recognition to the diverse needs of people is not a comprehensive, democratic, credible or sustainable peace. Enloe (2002) argues that, the sort of insecurity many people experience during armed conflicts is surprisingly akin to the forms of insecurity they experience when the war is over. See also Enloe 1993.

21 Reimann 2001.

22 Whitbread 2004.

23 UNDP RBEC 2007.

24 Ibid.

25 Reimann 2001.

26 See Rantalaiho et al. 1997, 6-7; Benschop & Verloo 2006.

27 Similarly as my son learns to play the game of gendered life in certain ways, since I reward him [many times subconsciously] for doing the "boy stuff", I am equally a product of my organisation's gendered context rewarding and punishing me according to how I fit into this context. As a man, my role is to act in certain ways in certain time and space, simply because my biological categorisation as a man says so. Similarly, a woman could not be seen acting this way since she lives in a female body. If this woman, however, acts in this situation as I am expected to act, she may become, in someone's files, an anomaly.

28 Strickland & Duvvury 2003.

is especially fundamental for the obvious reason that the peace operations are especially prone to seemingly powerful, but ultimately vulnerable and insecure manifestations of masculinity, causing men and women in crisis management to resort to unnecessary violence and other malpractices in crisis areas (e.g. drunkenness, prostitution, sexual harassment).²⁹ The gender perspective may help experts to find transformative approaches to escape prevailing power structures, and by avoiding strong artificial identities to promote their own identities, which instead of violence and domination may highlight negotiation, cooperation, and equality³⁰. Thus acknowledgement of the gender perspective in civilian crisis management is ever more critical.

29 See e.g. Higate 2007; Patel & Tripodi 2007; Sion 2006; Kent 2005; Whitworth 2005; Whitworth 2004; Whitworth 1998; Refugees International 2004; DeGroot 2002; DeGroot 2001; Crossette 1996; Fetherston 1995.

30 See Connell 2001.

3 Recruiting female civilian crisis management experts

CMC's gender mainstreaming may be divided roughly into two aspects. First, CMC ensures that equal numbers of men and women take part in its activities (experts, training participants). Secondly, CMC ensures that recruited civilian crisis management experts have adequate skills to identify, analyse, and apply gender in their work, that is, that the experts in the field wear so-called gender lenses.

3.1 *Structural challenges reducing the number of female recruits for civilian crisis management tasks*

Increasing the number of women recruits in order to show improved gender perspective has commonly been criticised, particularly for the essentialising rather than equalising nature of this approach³¹. However, what legitimises the concentration on numbers in crisis management, as in any field of action, is that ultimate success almost always necessitates the involvement of diverse people: both men and women, as well as different men and women. Another legitimate reason is related to the universal practice in peace operations of employing quotas to empower the women of conflict areas. While there may be disagreement concerning the functionality of these quotas, it must be agreed that in order to be convincing, peace operations aiming to democratise by quota must themselves symbolise the composition of civil societies founded on the balanced numbers of different kinds of people – including the different sexes.

When the numerical balance between men and women in the Finnish civilian crisis management training and recruiting is reviewed, the greatest challenge clearly lies in how to increase the number of women experts seconded in the field. The number has gradually been raised: during 2003–2004 women made up 14 % of all seconded Finnish experts, while in the period 2003–2007, women represented 19 % of all seconded Finnish experts. In May 2009 women already made up 27 %, which however still falls short of the target balance of 40/60

for women and men.³² More systematic work needs to be done to reach this goal.

The greater challenge of recruiting more women for work in the field, compared with choosing women for CMC training, may be explained by CMC's limited authority in selecting the experts for the actual operations. While CMC selects its own training participants, thus enabling the maintenance of a certain sex-balance in its training, as the example of CMC basic courses on civilian crisis management illustrates (Table 1), CMC enjoys no such freedom in relation to seconded experts. The fact that CMC only nominates the experts for the positions in operations – under the control of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the Ministry of the Interior (Moi) – implies that CMC's hands are, in a sense, tied with respect to the strategic decisions made by the ministries.


31 See Harding 1995; Tint 2004; Garney 2004.

32 See Kokkarinen et al. 2009.

Table 1: Participation in the basic civilian crisis management courses by gender

	Year	Total	Male	Female	Male %	Female %
EU Core (1)	2005	25	18	7	72	28
EU-EGT Core (2)	2006	26	15	11	58	42
EU Concept Core (3)	2006	30	13	17	43	57
EU Concept Core (4)	2007	24	11	13	45.8	54.2
EU Concept Core (5)	2007	24	15	11	62.5	37.5
EU Concept Core (6)	2008	22	10	12	45.5	54.5
EU Concept Core (7)	2008	25	11	14	44	56
EU Concept Core (8)	2009	27	14	13	51.9	49.1
		203	107	98	52.70 %	47.30 %

Building the Finnish civilian crisis management capacity follows the outlines of the national strategy for civilian crisis management drafted by the Finnish MFA and Mol in association with Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Defence and NGOs.³³ These strategic outlines have direct consequences on the number of seconded women and men. At present, the calls to contribute mainly come from the European Union. In May 2009, of all the seconded civilian crisis management experts, 79 % (Figure 1) were stationed in EU-led operations, the remaining 21 % being scattered among OSCE-, UN-, and NATO-led operations, with a few seconded directly by the MFA.

Figure 1: Finnish seconded experts in civilian crisis management by organisation

The segregation of the labour market has traditionally been strong in Europe³⁴. Thus the fact that the EU provides the main framework of Finnish crisis management entails certain challenges to the goal of increasing the number of Finnish female experts in the field, since EU priority areas for civilian crisis management still lean heavily towards policing duties³⁵.

Almost half of the seconded Finnish experts work in policing duties in ESDP operations (police, customs, and border), duties primarily performed by male experts (see Figure 2). In October 2008, of all the seconded Finnish experts 57 were police officers (8 women), which means that police officers represent more than 40 % of all the civilian crisis management experts seconded by Finland. In the police force, women “naturally” represent the minority. According to the statistics of the Police College of Finland, 15 % of police officers in Finland today are women. Of the 2008 entrants, one quarter were women³⁶. Of all the permanent employees 11.5 % were women. In the case of border guards, however, women mainly carry out other than guarding duties. While the first Finnish woman was appointed as a border guard in 1997, women’s representation in guarding duties remains nominal (2.4 % in 2008)³⁷.

33 See Finland’s National Strategy for Civilian Crisis Management 2008: Civilian crisis management decision-making at page 9.

34 Van der Lippe et al. 2004.

35 The priority areas defined by the Feira European Council in June 2000 were police, rule of law, strengthening civilian administration and civil protection, and monitoring (Consilium 2008). The fact that the emphasis on police missions will most likely be strong in EU future missions was evaluated by a High-level EU officer lecturing at the CMC seminar in 10 June 2009.

36 Polamk 2009.


37 Rajavartioloaitos 2008.

Other organisations involved in civilian crisis management employ expertise offered by a variety of professionals. One example is the OSCE³⁸ which has a different view of civilian crisis management, and operations promoting the rule of law, democracy and human rights and the status of minorities, who offer more placements for women experts. Of all the Finnish long- and short-term election observers deployed on OSCE (ODIHR) election observation operations, women and men participate in fairly equal numbers (in 2006, 45/55 %; in 2007, 43/57 %; and in 2008, 50/50 %).³⁹

Finland highlights policing, when recruiting civilian crisis management experts further postpones the goal of increasing the number of women in civilian crisis management.

As long as Finland participates in developing EU civilian crisis management capacities without taking part more frequently in civilian operations conducted by other organisations with different approaches to civilian crisis management, and as long as the EU conducts its civilian crisis management through male-dominated areas of expertise, which seems to be the future direction, CMC will continue to send predominantly men to operations. Increasing the number of women in this context will remain a challenging goal in the future.

Figure 2: Seconded Finnish experts in civilian crisis management by profession



However, the EU operational context does not fully explain the Finnish national emphasis on policing duties when sending experts to civilian crisis management operations. The modest secondment of Finnish experts to UN operations follows the same trend by emphasising police duties⁴⁰. The fact that

3.2 CMC recruitment

The interviews with CMC staff pointed towards a dual conclusion: on the one hand, the need for broader participation of women in civilian crisis management was acknowledged, but on the other hand, in view of the structural challenges, the task of involving more women was viewed as frustrating. In many conversations, it was asked why the number of women in the male-dominated areas of civilian crisis management should be increased when the transformation of the whole system might offer deeper, more meaningful solutions to escape from male-dominated crisis management.

However, given the problematic nature of the context in which the number of seconded female experts should be increased, the development phase of the EU civilian crisis management, and also the importance of Finland as one contributing member to the process, were noted. Despite this challenging situation, there is a high level of eagerness to recruit more women for civilian crisis management tasks, and the goal of involving more women in Finnish civilian crisis

38 Mazurana (2002) argues that operations with strong human rights monitoring mandates tend to have more women (35–37 % of operation personnel). According to the statistics for 2006, the OSCE (promotion of the rule of law, democracy and human rights or the status of minorities) offered posts to 3257 people, 43 % of them women. See OSCE 2009.

39 These figures come from the statistics maintained at the Finnish MFA. Interview 23 June 2009.

40 The tendency to highlight police duties also when recruiting experts for other organisations was emphasised in the interviews. According to the statistics from the end of 2008, CMC had 56 (7 women) police officers in the field: 85 % in EU led operations and the remainder serving in other operations. In addition two (1 man, 1 woman) experts with police background were working in other civilian duties. See Sisäasiainministeriön poliisiosasto, Kansainvälinen yksikkö 2009.

management has routinely been highlighted. In practice, if qualified female candidates have been found, CMC has put forward members of both sexes as candidates for operations. This procedure has transferred the final decision to the operations.

*"As long as we have a suitable woman applicant, her application will be posted together with a male application, even if the male applicant is "more qualified"(...)"*⁴¹

As this manoeuvre may cause dissatisfaction among some applicants, given the high number of eager applicants willing to be seconded by Finland to serve in civilian crisis management tasks, it has evoked deliberation among CMC staff. Some dissatisfied applicants have voted for non-discrimination in order that none of the applicants should be favoured on the basis of gender. After considering the relationship between the Finnish law on equality and the national strategy of civilian crisis management, CMC has found no reason to halt the manoeuvre of nominating qualified female applicants alongside male applicants. The law is not broken as long as the most qualified applicants are identified during the application process. The final decisions are made by the operation leadership, who are free to choose the woman or the man whom they regard as most suitable for the given task. Nevertheless, many job advertisements have clauses encouraging women applicants.⁴² In this sense, CMC avoids any conflict with the legal constraints.

While the law is merely a side-issue in the recruitment of women, what seems to offer a greater challenge is the intensiveness of CMC recruitment, caused both by the unpredictability of the (EU) civilian crisis management recruitment and by the limited capacity to handle the abundant interest in civilian crisis management tasks. As experienced by CMC, the unpredictability of EU civilian crisis management recruiting creates situations in which the call for contributions may be made quickly, without advance notice, after a fairly calm and steady period. This unpredictability and rapidity may lead to unprepared, hasty recruitment of experts. Sometimes the unpredictability in recruiting has led to situations in which finding women has been simply impossible.

*"Sometimes the recruiting situation is so intense that we need to find just quickly someone suitable for the task. In these situations, an emphasis on military experience from conflict areas is a safe choice since the person has already proven their ability to get along in these settings."*⁴³

If the rotation of EU civilian crisis management operations were developed in the direction of better-coordinated recruitment and more predictability, as outlined by one of the staff members, it would also allow more time to balance female-male participation in civilian crisis management within CMC.⁴⁴ However, even improved predictability would not

dispose of all the challenges of recruiting women. CMC receives requests from interested applicants at a rate which cannot be adequately handled given their limited human resources.⁴⁵ In order to deal with this huge interest and to prioritise its activities, CMC has been compelled to limit the advertisement of vacant posts to its website. For the same reason, CMC has been compelled to leave out direct contact numbers of some Human Resources personnel so as to allocate more time for the actual recruitment.⁴⁶ Here, the mounting challenge seems to be *how to recognise the most qualified people from the mass of applicants*⁴⁷, including the most capable women. Again, from the standpoint of increasing the number of women, the problem seems to be the limited capacity of human resources.

3.3 Ways to increase female participation

In relation to the need to increase female participation in civilian crisis management, the interviews resulted in certain innovative suggestions, made as if CMC were operating in an ideal world with adequate time and resources at their disposal.

Although the strategic blueprints for Finnish participation in civilian crisis management are made in the ministries (MFA, Mol), there is a loophole in the procedure which CMC can utilise. CMC may suggest specific secondment positions for ministries if such positions are well grounded and fit into the national strategy of civilian crisis management. Currently, CMC keeps a special eye on potential openings for women as well as being prepared to support qualified female candidates willing to apply for certain civilian crisis management tasks⁴⁸. A dedicated head-hunter devoted to the specific task of connecting the right people with the right jobs would offer one solution for increasing the number of women.

At the moment, the political mandate to increase the number of women in civilian crisis management is remarkably strong. The strategic decisions on Finnish participation to civilian crisis management are made by the very ministries who have particularly supported the 1325 thematic issues in Finland (MFA, Mol). Seeking positions with more gender neutral orientation and presenting these positions to the

41 Interview 27 January 2009.

42 The point of legality was made in several interviews: 27 January 2009; 3 February 2009; 26 February 2009.

43 Interview 27 January 2009.

44 Interview 26 February 2009.

45 A good example of the attractiveness of civilian crisis management tasks is the recruitment operation for EUBAM Rafah. From noon on 20 January to 10 am on 23 January 2009, the "open posts" section of the CMC website was visited 631 times. CMC has one full-time staff member answering the calls and e-mails concerning open positions. During the most hectic times, this person receives 11 calls per hour. Interviews 27 January 2009; 26 February 2009;

46 Interestingly, despite the fact that CMC has limited the channels for contacts, the feedback from the civilian crisis management experts points to improved transparency in civilian crisis management recruitment. Interview 27 February 2009.

47 Interview 27 January 2009.

48 E.g., areas which lack qualified civilian crisis management experts in the EU operations are logistics and procurement, considered relatively strong areas of expertise for Finland. Promoting women application in these areas of expertise may offer a way to increase female recruitment. Interview 26 February 2009.

ministries offers one means to increase the number of female experts in civilian crisis management.

One way to improve female participation in civilian crisis management is “advertising” and “campaigning” on the issue. So far CMC has organised awareness raising seminars to expand public knowledge of civilian crisis management⁴⁹ twice or three times a year. These campaigns have mainly concentrated on educational institutions such as universities. More “targeted” advertising, for example in the police college, the border guard college or other institutions holding identified potential recruits for different crisis management tasks, would thus be a further way to increase the number of qualified women⁵⁰.

One potential improvement would also be to develop support for experts’ families. This issue has also been raised by repatriated experts⁵¹. In comparison with OSCE and UN family missions, EU civilian crisis management stands in the developing stage, with the result that its operations have yet to build any structures for family support on missions. The absence of such structures probably reduces the willingness of women to take part in the EU operations, as it similarly fails to motivate many men. Women are still considered the main home-makers and take the larger role in bringing up children. Because of these persistent conventions, the lack of supportive elements for families in civilian crisis management reflects the view that this domain is predominantly a man’s rather than a woman’s world. The reconciliation of work and family within civilian crisis management has thus been dealt with by relying on the traditional view: the woman’s work yields to her family – the man’s family to his work⁵².

Moreover, bringing the family aspect into CMC activities may contribute to a more effective civilian crisis management. For example, researchers have long argued that stress management and wellbeing factors in work and family are not separate, but profoundly related issues⁵³. Thus, conducting operations without family support suggests that the full potential of the Finnish experts has not been reached.

“(...) if we consider the matters steering individual actions and thoughts in the field, the family must be one of the most significant factors (...).”⁵⁴

Furthermore, the benefits of bringing the family dimension into civilian crisis management would go beyond an increased number of women. Taking the family dimension into consideration would challenge the traditional, deeply normative model of the independent male-peacekeeper

versus his spouse staying at home. Re-connecting the two worlds would automatically strengthen not only the gender perspective in civilian crisis management, but also the whole of crisis management in a very meaningful way, because it would deconstruct the traditional view of an individual working in crisis, who is predominantly an independent man, surviving with no commitments on the home front. This kind of picture evidently fails to describe today’s crisis management experts. Many of the seconded Finns are mothers or fathers, husbands or wives. The decision-makers in Finnish civilian crisis management should take this into account when seeking more efficient crisis management.

The interviews were able to identify other specific ways in which family support could be improved. While understanding that ESDP still has a long way to go in developing its family support for civilian crisis management experts – also because deployment to high-risk areas such as Afghanistan or DRC is increasing – CMC could improve its family support on a step by step basis. The prevailing idea was that CMC should improve information for family members concerning matters related to experts’ working conditions, holidays, home-coming and other work- and family-related issues. One way to proceed might be to build some functions for family members into the pre-mission briefings organised by the CMC to familiarise the outgoing experts with their respective mission. However, it has also been noted that bringing partners to these events must not be allowed to put at risk the networking of experts, which is likely to be an important asset in the host country⁵⁵. Another simple way to improve information-sharing would be to send experts’ families informative e-mails, or information in other forms, about recent events in operations⁵⁶. This again would be a very minor and effortless step for CMC, but important for the often ill-informed families.

However, it was made clear with one voice that all such innovations would require earmarked resources.

49 During the first half of 2009, CMC organised *Haluatko tietää siviilikriisinhallinnasta?* (*Do you want to know about the civilian crisis management?*) Seminars at the Universities of Jyväskylä and Joensuu. In November 2009, a seminar was organised at the Police College of Finland in Tampere.

50 Interviews 27 January 2009; 17 February 2009; 24 February 2009; 26 February 2009.

51 A point discussed e.g. at CMC debriefing session for repatriated experts 29 January 2009; 18 June 2009.

52 Pleck 1977.

53 Kinnunen et al 2000, 3.

54 Interview 26 February 2009.

55 Interview 18 May 2009.

56 Interview 4 March 2009.

4 The gender perspective in civilian crisis management training

4.1 *Structural amendments in training: deeper integration*

While the numerical goal is generally regarded as an important element in promoting gender in the work of civilian crisis management experts⁵⁷, the weakness of the goal to guarantee the manifestation of the gender perspective in the actual work of experts in the field has also been acknowledged.

The strong emphasis on numbers, indicating that gender makes sense to many people predominantly in terms of the headcount of participating women, has led to a trend for gender to be seldom meaningfully operationalised in crisis management, while the real prospects of the gender perspective have been sidelined. Perhaps for this reason the term gender still carries somewhat suspicious connotations even among CMC staff. The burden of being something imposed from above, from a suspicious origin, as opposed to being a critical reinforcement for civilian crisis management, has generated a pattern that gender issues are easily resisted and executed only on demand, and even then superficially without reflection on the real consequences of applying the perspective. This has led some people, even inside CMC, to comment that the overt concentration on numbers has actually meant backward steps for wider gender mainstreaming in Finnish civilian crisis management⁵⁸. The fact that Finnish civilian crisis management is still a male-dominated domain signifies that the numbers of men and women is not the only issue in the discussion of gender in civilian crisis management. As commonly stated in the interviews, it is more important to know that the perspective is realised in the actual work of the experts.

Equal numbers of both sexes, as important as this goal is, inadequately guarantees the application of gender in the actual work of the experts. From a general viewpoint, if an expert fails to comprehend how the gender perspective is related to the expert's work in the field, he or she may actually reinforce the existing gendered biases in crisis areas. This is why, as noted in several interviews, the more important question is:

how to ensure the application of the gender perspective in the work of [male & female] civilian crisis management experts?

As observed already, the concentration on numbers has pointed towards a convention on both sides by which the staff have been truly concentrating on the balanced representation of women but the real understanding of gender has been poor. The limited use of gender inside CMC supports the argument that if the concept of mainstreaming gender is not developed further toward wider application, the orientation of the concept will quickly become locked into the hetero-normative concept of sexes, which sees the issue only through men and women,⁵⁹ resulting in easy dismissal of any further application of the concept. The following reactions were voiced in the interviews:

*"(...) by looking at numbers, quotas, and percentages [of women] in the process of recruiting and training, as I see it, we have somehow taken several **steps backward** (...)." ⁶⁰*

Others saw that the concentration on numbers has guided the work of civilian crisis management down the wrong path:

*"(...) from my point of view as a trainer and recruiter in the field of civilian crisis management, it would be more important to ensure that the individual is ready for the operation, and that his/her personal character is suited to the operation. I don't see that we should now stare too much at the 40/60 balance in women and men. More important would be to send in the **right persons** (...)." ⁶¹*

Since CMC is the leading centre of expertise in Finnish civilian crisis management, executing its national tasks under the Ministry of Interior, its work should not be restricted to the training and recruitment of seconded experts. It is felt that CMC also has a duty to contribute to the wider development of Finnish civilian crisis management. This perceived role also hands CMC vital responsibilities in connection with expertise relating to gender. Since CMC's functioning in crisis areas is visible through the expertise of its seconded experts, it is

57 Cf. Strickland & Duvvury 2003, 25.

58 Interview 4 February 2009.

59 Scambor & Scambor 2008.

60 Interview 4 February 2009.

61 Interview 24 February 2009.

natural that the focus on numbers should be shifted more towards ensuring the application of the gender perspective in the actual practical work of these experts. In building this kind of capacity, the most significant responsibility was situated in the training of civilian crisis management experts.

The primary goal of CMC training is to furnish future civilian crisis management experts with tools to understand the international operational environment in the crisis area⁶². The training offered by CMC ranges from basic to high level courses and prepares the participants particularly for European Union and United Nations civilian crisis management and peacebuilding operations. Consequently, given the wide variety of CMC training, tailoring the gender perspective to particular training purposes is important.

However, regardless of the special needs of diverse training courses, the incorporation of gender in civilian crisis management training too often seems to fail for two distinct reasons, as identified through observations, and restated in the interviews: the first challenge seems to be, *how to incorporate gender in training as a natural rather than external issue*; and the second, *how to convince training participants of the importance of gender as an essential element of civilian crisis management work*⁶³.

4.2 Getting away from external gender sessions

As stated earlier, CMC still stands in the early phase of development of civilian crisis management training. In consequence, the gender perspective in CMC training also remains under construction. However, the gender perspective has not been absent from CMC training sessions.

Gender has been perceived in CMC training up until now for the most part as an important but rather separate issue. The concept has usually been discussed together with other cross-cutting themes such as human security, human rights and cultural awareness, themes that are strongly emphasised in every aspect of CMC activities.

The Table 2 below illustrates gender in CMC training, depicting a five-day imaginary civilian crisis management training course⁶⁴. The gender part of the training was carried out in one separate, fairly short, session, facilitated by a specialised, outsourced, gender trainer. Assigning a separate space for gender has been rationalized in two interlinked ways. *First*, in this way gender training has been easily conducted. *Secondly*, while recognising that importing external gender experts into training courses may be costly, using separate gender experts has been viewed as necessary because CMC lacks proficiency in gender training⁶⁵. Thus in this model, the main task of the training designer has been to find a gender expert able to conduct short sessions about gender, which can be seen as a topic quite separate from the core focus of the training.

According to analysis of course feedback and interviews, the approach of keeping gender separate - bringing the concept quickly in and out of the training - satisfies neither CMC training participants nor the designers of the training courses. As one of the staff members pointed out,

*"As our all training courses contain a specific gender module, it sometimes remains disconnected with the other course content – if we believe it [gender] to be a cross-cutting theme in our training, in fact this is not realised."*⁶⁶

Table 2: The current approach in bringing the gender perspective into CMC training

	GENDER HUMAN SECURITY CULTURAL AWARENESS			
THEME X INSTRUCTOR X		THEME X INSTRUCTOR X	THEME X INSTRUCTOR X	THEME X INSTRUCTOR X
THEME X INSTRUCTOR X	THEME X INSTRUCTOR X	THEME X INSTRUCTOR X	INSTRUCTOR X	THEME X INSTRUCTOR X
THEME X INSTRUCTOR X	THEME X INSTRUCTOR X	THEME X INSTRUCTOR X	THEME X INSTRUCTOR X	THEME X INSTRUCTOR X
		THEME X INSTRUCTOR X		

62 Taitto 2008.

63 Interview 16 April 2009.

64 The length of CMC training courses varies from 2 to 14 days. Overall, the average length of a CMC course is five days.

65 Interview 20 February 2009.

66 Interview 20 February 2009.

Another commentator, this time a training participant very familiar with gender issues, provided a constructive, but distinctly cynical piece of feedback on CMC gender training. The feedback points out the still developing nature of CMC gender training.

"(...) To see that gender has been dealt with during the morning of the second training day, not during the last afternoon, is actually a positive sign. When gender issues have been dealt with in the conclusion, it has created an image of some involuntary theme imposed from above, to be dealt by the training institution only after more central issues (...)."67

Another problem, experienced and pointed out in the interviews, is that sometimes the instructor conducting gender training is seen as an "outsider" regarding the themes that the training has been approaching. Here, the gender trainer easily becomes seen as a person who pays a quick visit in the middle of training to install the technical gender issues into the training, and the work is done. This has further externalised gender issues from the training's core focus, since the concept has become something complex and difficult to be handled only by a specialised trainer:

"Although gender is a natural part of crisis management, it has somehow weirdly become a kind of specialised training theme, which it shouldn't be."68

Training the gender perspective in civilian crisis management training at CMC thus occupies a pedagogically difficult position. Training designers seeking to include the gender perspective in civilian crisis management training worry not only about how the gender perspective could be embedded thematically in the training, but also about *how suitable* the gender trainer is to train gender issues given the *particular audience of the particular course*.

Evidently, planting the gender perspective in CMC training requires from the gender trainer a profound knowledge not only of the subject of gender, but also of the themes that have been discussed on each training course. So the next question is: how then should the link between gender and the training themes be found? Since the interviews revealed the naturally limited familiarity of the "outsourced" gender expert with CMC training themes, some new steps to bring the gender aspect into CMC training courses while avoiding the trap of contextual disparity have been discussed. These include the idea that instead of inviting specialised gender experts to hold specialised gender sessions, CMC should concentrate more on equipping its own trainers with the tools needed to include the gender perspective in their individual training sessions.

The approach of training the trainers may nevertheless offer the chance to bring gender into training in a more integrated way. Equally, it would indicate expanding ownership of gender issues inside CMC, since CMC would itself be the "main claimant" in applying the gender aspect to its own training. As pointed out in the interviews, this expanded ownership would

open more ways to consolidate influential gender training, in which CMC would be able to conduct its operations on the basis of its own shared perspective on gender, familiar and coherent to everyone involved. What this shared perspective should be requires further discussion in the future inside CMC. According to some interviews, in order to facilitate the adoption of the gender perspective within CMC, the centre needs its own gender strategy.

"(...) The strategy would help us to find the main way (...) according to which each of us would act. This strategy would facilitate us to see beyond numbers, as well as make us genuinely act in ways, which move the centre's gender mainstreaming on to the next, deeper level (...)."69

One challenging element of the study stems from CMC's young and dynamic nature. Since the organisation is evolving, the situation today can be predicted to be quite different in a year's time. CMC's explicit policy of supporting its own staff members' international assignments [leading to high staff turnover], the continuing expansion of CMC's activities, the acquisition of new responsibilities, and the huge increase in staff, all indicate that as an organisation CMC is committed to constant reassessment and learning. From the gender point of view, this dynamic entails that if the gender perspective has been brought into CMC's daily operations mainly by interested individuals, as has so far been the case, when these individuals leave, the gender perspective will also depart. This framework once again legitimates the need for a gender strategy: in order to become a more professional centre of expertise in civilian crisis management, CMC needs institutionalised, rather than personified, gender practices. A strategy to formally identify the gender perspective as belonging to the work of CMC, and to describe CMC's core values and objectives in relation to gender issues in such a way that everyone involved would be familiar with this common vision and ready to apply it, would essentially strengthen the gender perspective in the work of CMC.

4.3 Training the trainers

The analysis of CMC Finland training points to the following conclusion: effective imposition of gender elements in civilian crisis management training courses requires that the gender issues be brought into contact with the specific themes of the civilian crisis management trainings. To be accepted, and further processed, in the minds of training participants, the gender elements of the training courses need to be meaningfully integrated with the core training themes.

In order to train experts in border security, customs, human rights or police operations, the gender trainer should first and foremost be familiar with the work of these professions. This indicates that the gender trainer carries a great deal of responsibility, and the expectations of the trainer's competence go beyond competence on gender issues. This in turn means that the approach of inviting outsourced, external

67 Interview 27 February 2009.

68 Interview 17 February 2009.

69 Interview 4 February 2009.

gender experts to bring the gender aspect into civilian crisis management training needs thorough re-examination.

Owing to the fact that CMC basic civilian crisis management training contains multiple themes related to the field work, CMC has implemented these training courses using several trainers. Training these trainers to implement the gender aspect in their specific trainings may therefore offer an advantageous way forward in bringing the gender perspective into CMC training⁷⁰. It needs to be noted here that integrating gender in this way may not be accepted without considerable persuasion. As has been pointed out in the literature, sometimes trainees may even feel resistance towards gender issues, which may be an emotional reaction by men and women who have much invested in the patriarchal system, the legitimacy of which may be questioned in gender training⁷¹.

Training the trainers would mean that the gender perspective would mainstream into CMC training in a more meaningful, internalised manner. In specialised courses organised for narrower audiences, such as audiences consisting 100 % of police or border experts, in which the range of training themes is not so wide, integrating the gender perspective into course curricula may actually be simpler than integrating the perspective into basic courses dealing with multiple themes of civilian crisis management, and consequently requiring multiple ways to integrate gender. Table 3 illustrates a future model for CMC gender training as framed in the interviews. In this model, the basic conceptual opening is made during the first day. The actual gender training proceeds through the subsequent training modules instructed by different trainers.


As discussed earlier, gender easily becomes understood as either a too simple or a too complex issue. Thus, the

necessity of including a dedicated, more theoretical session on gender is recognised. The opening session needs to address wider theoretical beliefs on gender, tackle the widespread misconceptions of gender, and deconstruct some common gendered stereotypes. It would also be essential to make clear that gender is not just about men and women, but that differences among men and women are part of reality⁷². In view of the fragility of the opening phase in gender training, and how easily the momentum to reflect and learn the gender perspective gets lost in gender training, the opening session to introduce the issue should be very carefully designed for each particular audience. One way to activate training participants on gender issues would be to concentrate on the benefits of the gender perspective in crisis management, as opposed to the negative consequences, which will be elaborated further below.

Another way to strengthen the trainers' skills in bringing gender into civilian crisis management training would involve the idea of a *facilitator* who would "facilitate" the appearance of gender inside the CMC trainings⁷³. This facilitator would be able to support the understanding of gender among the training participants. The idea of a facilitator, however, carries the risk that gender would once again be seen as an intellectual concept possessed only by an external expert. Given that the externalisation of gender has been one of the typical problems in gender training, the idea of a specific facilitator needs more delicate elaboration.

The rationality behind the inclusion of gender in CMC training by training the trainers was also seen as legitimate because this approach could be utilised in civilian crisis management training provided outside CMC. Given that

Table 3: Alternative model for gender in CMC training



70 This topic was discussed several interviews. One way would be, as pointed out in the interviews, for CMC to train its own gender trainers, including how the perspective could be applied in the trainers' own training, dealing with the EU pillars or practicalities in the field. Interviews: 15 January 2009; 4 February 2009; 20 February 2009; 27 February 2009; 22 April 2009.

71 Porter & Smyth 2001, 16.

72 Ibid; Kaschuba & Lächele (2004) have also observed that in adult education, gender mainstreaming is often insufficiently linked with the development of gender politics and gender theories and the results of scientific research.

73 Interview 28 April 2009.

trainers would be prepared to include the gender perspective in their own training sessions which they conduct in other contexts, in front of different audiences, training these trainers would ideally mean that mainstreaming gender would not be restricted inside the walls of CMC. Further, once these trainers are trained with the know-how to automatically include the gender perspective in their future CMC training, the result would be a smoother, more systematic training design, in which gender issues are already mainstreamed into training content. In addition, "training the trainers" of other organisations, e.g. military, offers a way forward in functional implementation of gender mainstreaming⁷⁴.

After steps have been taken to operationalise the gender perspective, follow-up measures are equally important. A systematic evaluation of the impact of gender training should be conducted in order to determine the advantages and disadvantages of gender training. More follow-up studies on the longer-term impacts are also desirable. A follow-up study to investigate how experts have utilized the gender perspective in their work may be one path to follow. Another, more challenging task would be to evaluate the gender training from the perspective of the local people in crisis areas.

4.4 A socio-constructive approach in training

One of the leading principles of CMC training is the vision that each participant contributes a special *input* into the training⁷⁵. The *socio-constructive approach*, which highlights the role of the individual as an active and responsible group member⁷⁶, views the training participants themselves as capable of creating an active learning environment. From the perspective of gender, further employment of this approach can be seen as a natural way to strengthen the gender perspective in civilian crisis management training.

As pointed out earlier (see Table 1), CMC has generally been successful in balancing its participation in training courses equally between men and women. This balance strengthens the gender perspective in the training, since equal representation of both sexes enables more natural gender dynamics within the training. However, by adoption of the socio-constructive approach, the scope of CMC's selection of training participants has widened beyond the sex of the applicants.

Until now, in the selection of training participants, CMC has reviewed the applicants' educational, professional and experiential background to ensure that the training courses contain a comprehensive pool of participants possessing different knowledge and experience. In practice, applications are invited from various professions such as the police, customs, border, civilian administration, rule of law, human rights, logistics, human resources, and information management. This training philosophy, which emphasises the unique expertise of each training participant, generates a comprehensive

course dealing with a variety of issues⁷⁷. Hence an applicant possessing the potential to bring the gender perspective into the training could strengthen the gender perspective, and paying particular attention to potential applicants in terms of the gender perspective offers one opportunity to strengthen the role of gender in CMC training.

The socio-constructive approach not only means that the person should be "competent" or "skilled" at working with gender issues, but includes incorporating participants in the training who have, for example, faced gender bias in their own experience. Such an applicant equipped with "self-learned gender lenses" could be, for instance, a woman with a military background, or a man coming from a female-dominated NGO or from another occupation strongly associated with the opposite sex. Yet again, cultivating gender in this way would mean that the perspective would be brought to the training naturally from below, avoiding the common problem of the external gender perspective imposed from above.

"(...) These kinds of individuals have personally gone through such a roulette [by explaining their existence in the context dominated by the opposite sex] that they would readily wear clear gender lenses – it is frequently extremely challenging to adapt in a [sexually] homogenous group of people (...) to answer people about the choice of a path not typical for one's sex."

If applied systematically, the socio-constructive approach fortifies the gender perspective in CMC training. However, this approach also contains challenges requiring further backup from other methods. What happens if CMC training courses lack participants with active ability to bring the perspective into the training? What happens if the selected *gender cultivator* acts passively during the training? While the socio-constructive approach offers a prospective means of bringing the gender perspective into CMC training, it has to be seen above all as an empowering tool for gender training, rather than an ultimate solution.

Another problem of the socio-constructive approach is posed by the dilemma of the numerical ambition to increase the number of women vis-à-vis the objective of increasing the number of participants with gender lenses, with potential capacity to bring gender into the training. The dilemma here is which way to go: to select a woman simply because of her sex, or a man with gender lenses? Should numbers be prioritised in order to mainstream women, or should the more profound approach be adopted of mainstreaming the gender perspective without regard to the applicant's sex? The selection becomes even more challenging when criteria for measuring this gender expertise or readiness are sought. Surely, in most cases the temptation would be to rely on the applicant's sex.

74 Interview 27 February 2009.

75 Interview 15 January 2009.

76 Taitto 2008.

77 Interview 15 January 2009.

4.5 Rethinking gender: positive versus negative gender

Changing the face of gender

The final section dealing with gender training discusses the reform of the customary view of the concept of gender in the context of civilian crisis management. It is argued here, on the basis of the observations, conversations and interviews of recent months, that the general trend is undeniably to portray the gender perspective first and foremost in terms of its negative consequences rather than its positive impacts, and that this poses perhaps the most salient challenge to training the perspective in this specific context. The fact that learning processes in gender training are very often related to resistance and defensiveness indicates a high potential to turn the training into a negative learning experience.

Adopting the negative side of gender may be the result of the low value given to gender issues in civilian crisis management. A further reason may simply be the lack of time during training sessions. The solution is to value gender issues equally with other training modules previously considered as "more important". As previously observed, in CMC training the gender perspective has been given a narrow niche, shared with other cross-cutting themes such as human security and cultural awareness. The short time allocated to the theme may result in the convention that the trainers feel compelled to squeeze the gender module in order to include only the "most important" topics generally associated with gender.

Unfortunately, when gender is discussed, it is common to refer to such issues as how to avoid mistakes (using prostitutes, sexually harass colleagues or locals) instead of seeing the gender perspective as a more comprehensive tool strengthening the work of civilian crisis management. This concentration on the negative aspects may hinder those in training from seeing the positive consequences that the gender perspective is able to bring to civilian crisis management. Recognition of how the negative approach affects gender training, often leading to counter-reactions, can facilitate the emphasis on the alternative, positive idea of gender in this context, which in turn could automatically limit the negative consequences of neglecting the gender perspective in civilian crisis management, which is what gender training in civilian crisis management has first and foremost to avoid. The importance of reinforcing the positive rather than the negative aspect thus becomes fundamental. However, this paradigm shift from negative to positive gender requires a systematic change in the mindsets of those who are thinking about and training gender.

Negative gender: avoiding mistakes in different cultural contexts

The first aspect to point out is that the concentration on the negative side of gender is endorsed, perhaps sub-consciously, inside CMC. To illustrate this point reference need only be

made to the connotation gender issues have in CMC learning objectives (Table 4).

Table 4: The objective of gender training within the CMC training as depicted in the course descriptions

- Understand the concept of gender and gender roles as opposed to sexual differences and be able to introduce a gender dimension in conflict analysis and resolution, i.e. give practical examples for the empowerment of women in post-conflict societies;
- Be aware of potential gender-related *problem areas* in conflict or post-conflict societies, i.e. trafficking, prostitution, female combatants;
- Understand the implications of conflict for gender roles and *potential risks* in the light of human and civil rights protection and participation in society;
- Understand the *adverse effects* for post-conflict rehabilitation inherent in ignoring gender roles in the host.

A glance at the objectives of the gender modules reveals that gender issues relate first and foremost to *problem areas* as *trafficking* and *prostitution*, and that *ignoring gender roles* means *potential risks* and *adverse effects* in civilian crisis management.

While the detrimental consequences of forgetting the gender perspective in civilian crisis management are real, the learning motivation may decrease when the positive gains of mainstreaming gender are not mentioned⁷⁸. The difficulty here is that by representing gender so negatively from the beginning, gender training at CMC has created for itself a complicated starting point, with which CMC has to struggle during the rest of the training. The depiction of the role of gender issues in training objectives corresponds to the prejudices many people already feel at the beginning of gender training, which may again be the result of the tendency to emphasise mainly the negative aspect of gender. However, these prejudices are often the most challenging hurdles for gender trainers to overcome.

The tendency to link gender with negative consequences was presented even more strongly in some interviews. Many interviewees linked gender with cultural awareness⁷⁹, but also here the wider emphasis seemed to be on avoiding mistakes

78 To illustrate this point, it may be asked what would be the outcome of training some other themes of crisis management, such as team building, or procurement in civilian crisis management, if the aim in these training sessions would predominantly be to point out the negative consequences of not behaving correctly.

79 The linkage between gender and culture in civilian crisis management was important from many perspectives: firstly, civilian crisis management work is done in culturally different frameworks, and consequently, always needs to be seen in these specific contexts; and secondly, the multicultural nature of crisis management operations also requires cooperation, which takes into account the linkage between gender and culture.

resulting from gender bias in a culturally different setting. Several interviewees were able to reveal a personally lived incident from past work experience. One of the interviewees recalled an illustrative story about a colleague, a Muslim woman, who had been asked on a date by a Western male colleague. Though she had politely refused the invitation on the basis of her cultural background, she had become stigmatised in the eyes of her male colleagues as a lesbian who only goes out with female colleagues⁸⁰; similar reflections were heard from the other interviewees. The replication of warnings, such as that the female experts cannot risk their work e.g. by “using spontaneous language as in home”⁸¹, or that “in certain cultures” it was best to leave the “most pointless” behaviour at home⁸², are typical of much of the discussion of gender in civilian crisis management work. The main usefulness of the gender perspective has been seen in enabling mistakes to be avoided.

The strong linking of gender issues with prostitution, sexual harassment, and other sexually tuned actions, mostly instances of men behaving badly, is also evident in the discussions on gender issues. To highlight the malpractices occurring in crisis management is naturally a very important topic⁸³ requiring the maximum necessary attention. However, it must also be asked whether the malpractice of internationals is best dealt with during civilian crisis management training courses conducted in Finland, or whether there would be other more relevant venues to address these issues, such as induction training for operations which include the code of conduct training. Another question to be asked is, what are the real chances of a training institution changing the attitudes of its adult training participants in a short week or two. The more pessimistic in this respect would point out that since using prostitution, for instance, does not happen by impulse, but requires a more systematic process (travel to the brothel, client/customer encounter, payment etc), this suggests that for some people it may be morally easier to use prostitution or to conduct other kinds of gendered malpractices. As pointed out aptly by one of the staff members, the training institution's capacity to change individual (gendered) attitudes, learned and negotiated over a lifetime, should not be overestimated.

“If someone does not possess a comprehension of gendered practises (...) we [CMC] cannot teach this in a couple of hours.”⁸⁴

80 Interview 24 February 2009.

81 Interview 3 February 2009.

82 Interview 24 February 2009.

83 In April 2009, a seminar organised by CMC 1325 Steering Committee in Pristina, Kosovo, exposed the seminar participants again to the case of the misconduct of internationals. The local NGOs expressed their deep unhappiness with acting as watchmen for internationals visiting brothels, and perpetrating their position through other malpractices – a message fitting only too well with stories heard from other operations around the world (CMC Finland 1325 Steering Committee Seminar: “Gender-Based Violence: Investigation and Prosecution – Sharing experiences between Finland and Kosovo”, 2 April 2009. See more at CMC Finland website).

84 Interview 20 February 2009.

While it is true that improving the gender sensitive behaviour of civilian crisis management experts must be addressed at some stage of the preparation, with reference to locals and other internationals working in the operations, the end result often seems to be that the gender trainer steps into the trap of accusing, which subsequently makes participants “see red”, and the momentum for deeper understanding easily becomes lost⁸⁵. How to move the approach towards a positive view of gender is a demanding but necessary issue.

Positive gender: its relevance to experts’ work and thinking

A positive conception of human beings, in this case the experts in the field, sees the malpractices in crisis management missions, such as prostitution and other forms of exploitation, as only the behavioural pattern of a small international minority. Thus putting more effort into training gender issues which are more relevant to the experts’ substantial work – as opposed to warnings of malpractices they would in all probability avoid anyway – has the potential to produce more meaningful learning on gender issues.

One recognised weakness is that the gender trainers have failed to mainstream gender successfully into the main training themes. In order to have more impact, the training needs to incorporate gender more meaningfully into the actual work of crisis management, and preferably into the experts’ daily work. In the case of border experts, for example, more emphasis on human trafficking and how to deal with victims could offer a more meaningful approach to training the gender perspective⁸⁶. The means of applying the gender perspective to experts’ sometimes very specific work in crisis areas also requires more attention in the training. In addition, the need to link gender issues more naturally with participants’ personal experiences has been pointed out. This reflects the common vision in adult education that reflections stemming from the learners’ own concrete experiences strengthen the motivation for learning. Using examples from experience would ensure that theory and practise are linked from the very beginning⁸⁷. Regarding this linkage, the interviews threw up many potential ideas:

85 One of the interviewees coming from the military had attended a gender training, which had a very accusing tone. In this training, the trainer's dichotomised perspective on gender equality as equality between women and men created irritation among the class participants. As seen by this participant, at this time a better gender trainer would have been a person with ability to link gender to the actual work of military personnel (Interview 21 April 2009). Another interviewee (18 May 2009) recalled a training session on gender which started with the trainer's angry announcement to the male participants “You are all arseholes” – to make the point that men behave badly. See also Wettorskog 2007 who writes about “moralizing” in gender trainings.

86 Mackay 2008, 8; the Gender and Security Sector Reform Toolkit (2008) edited by Bastick and Valasek offers valuable insights into the relevance of gender for different areas of expertise.

87 See Vuorinen 2001, 44.

*"One way would be that participants would consider, for example through some particular exercises, gender regarding his/her own specific field of expertise."*⁸⁸

*"Concrete case-exercises, integrated in the training, to identify particular situations."*⁸⁹

*"One way would be to ask training participants to bring in some personally lived situation in which stereotyping has resulted in confusion."*⁹⁰

In addition, one way to associate gender issues more with practical work would be to develop cases with a clear gender dimension in the scenario exercises. These exercises are an important part of CMC training, and after all, one of the components the training participants seem to remember best when recalling their training experiences.

Another factor that gained attention when pondering meaningful methods for gender training was self-reflection on one's own gendered attitude, which frequently seems to be missing from the Western discourses of gender mainstreaming in conflict areas: to be an effective implementer of gender mainstreaming in the field, one must look in the mirror. It is impractical to try to learn gender dynamics in culturally different post-conflict societies if we are unable to detect the gendered dimension in our own actions. As one of the staff members analytically commented:

*"Gender is something we tend to outsource so often, as if it was something happening in developing countries, not here within."*⁹¹

The truth is that Westerners may concentrate so hard on the women, boys, girls, and men of – from their point of view – "irrational", even "backward"⁹² crisis areas that they fail to see how their own gendered thinking greatly influences their work in crisis areas.

Thus, the recognition of how gendered conceptions impact one's own sub-conscious thinking, eventually directing one's actions in the field work, may suggest a promising dimension to be brought forward in training gender. This may, however, be an uneasy task, since for Westerners, and particularly for Finns⁹³ who confidently take their gender equality for granted, almost patronizing others, introspection may painfully bring to light their own frailty on gender issues. The reality that gender inequality lives vividly inside our own borders is often forgotten, and here so-called modernity seems to explain much of the case. In a modern nation like Finland, the notion that many issues have already been solved seems to dominate many minds. However, the dilemma of modernity is that while being modern takes many forms, modernity takes many issues for granted. Being modern in the case of Finland

certainly means that the country stands in the forefront regarding several issues, including gender issues. However, the argument here is that the underestimation of our own gender biases weakens our motivation to learn gender issues, since the concept of gender is seen as being something unfamiliar to us, belonging to countries far away. Here, some examples from our own domestic gender issues would bring gender closer to training participants, in order to enable them to perceive that gender is no external issue, affecting only crisis areas, but rather that gender bias affects people in Finland as well: male unemployment, alcoholism, suicide, widespread domestic violence, effects of the glass ceiling, and the obvious gender pay gap, as well as the hard attitudes towards homo- and transsexuality, are among the most evident examples.

When the possibility was discussed of overconfidence in respect of gender issues, arising perhaps from our own (Western) society, one of the matters raised was that this egoism and sense of "superiority" may blind us to the gender perspective in other places outside our borders:

*"[it] restricts us from self-reflected evaluations of the [gender] questions – because we may think by default that we think correctly – and if we are unable to put together any self-reflection, we may be incapable of recognising the problems around us, both within our own surroundings and surroundings alien to us, since we don't have the ability to be sensitive to these issues. Subsequently, we may start to think that we are just working here...or we get frustrated (...)"*⁹⁴

*"Also in this case, one has to be conscious of one's own set of values, and of the ethical world where one was born and raised [...] It is really important that one is able to question one's own thinking and principles."*⁹⁵

As previously discussed, to take up the challenge of self-reflection is not an easy, but certainly a necessary task, since the self-evaluation of one's own thinking is often the factor identifying the real professionals. Keeping in mind the process-like nature of gender mainstreaming, it is safe to say that only after CMC has secured self-reflection of this type in the minds of its experts will the gender mainstreaming have truly started.

88 Interview 20 February 2009.

89 Interview 17 February 2009.

90 Interview 20 May 2009.

91 Interview 27 February 2009.

92 A point made by Whitworth 2004.

93 See e.g. Jokinen 2009.

94 Interview 17 February 2009.

95 Interview 27 February 2009.

5 Conclusion

The time spent searching for approaches to bring the gender perspective meaningfully into the evolving activities of CMC Finland was time well spent. The study was able to raise a few important challenges linked to the application of the gender concept in the recruitment and training of civilian crisis management experts. Moreover, the method of inviting people themselves to ponder the issue in all likelihood supported the self-reflection of CMC staff on gender issues, and sharpened their own thinking about the gender perspective within their daily routines.

Moreover, the opportunity to interview the staff working on different tasks was an enlightening experience which enabled me to see the vast number of tasks such staff are committed to performing every day. The interviews and observations not only confirmed my assumptions of the strong sense of gender the staff generally brings to CMC through their own experiences, but also provided me with a realistic idea of the difficulty of adding anything to CMC's already busy workload. The development of CMC gender perspective must be seen in this demanding context. The nation-wide emphasis on gender issues has been matched by the enthusiastic attitude of CMC staff to develop the perspective in civilian crisis management.

However, in terms of gender, as with any other issue to be brought into a dynamic context of this nature, more systematic efforts are needed. CMC has generally succeeded with numbers, particularly if one considers the structural challenges. When the total number of Finnish women seconded is considered in the light of ESDP, with its strong emphasis on policing duties in civilian crisis management, the number of women actually exceeds expectations. This is, nevertheless, not to imply that the work is done. More innovative ways to increase the number of women are needed.

On the one hand, the sole emphasis on numbers is not in itself a sufficient approach to address the gendered world of conflict-prone societies. As has been learned by examining CMC's busy recruiting, at the moment the allocation of resources makes the fulfilment of the task of increasing the number of women participants the most explicit goal to bring gender issues to the fore. However this set priority means that the main emphasis has been laid on the number of women instead of examining *what kind of women* are being recruited.

In consequence, this approach may strengthen the gendered stereotypes of women, since they are wanted mainly because of their sex, not because of who they are, which contradicts the fundamental idea which gender mainstreaming seeks to introduce.

On the other hand, the application of the gender perspective must start from the people themselves, women and men alike. The conversations with CMC staff members called for a new paradigm of thinking: instead of numbers, efforts towards gender mainstreaming ought to be aimed rather at recognising the readiness of individuals to apply the gender perspective in their thinking and working. This paradigm shift, particularly if applied in civilian crisis management training, may offer a more meaningful and practical way to bring the gender perspective into the work of experts in the field. This may eventually contribute to the impact of these operations on the human security of local people.

So far, the main challenge in training has been to link gender meaningfully and practically with the varying training themes. The multidimensional nature of training content and the variations in course participants' backgrounds have led to the routine procedure of serving gender in all the training courses from the same plate. Innovative methods of gender training which pay attention to the diversity of training courses and participants are needed. This study was able to put forward some innovations for more integrated gender training. The most repeated idea, which was to shift the training towards a "train the trainers" approach, offers a workable way to improve the training. This change may not be as easy as it sounds, as both participants and trainers would need to be able and willing to embed gender into their favourite subjects, and therefore be motivated to this endeavour.

In reality, a training institution's capacity to change an individual trainee's values is extremely limited, or at least the process takes longer than two weeks. What are the possibilities for a training organisation to change the mindset of a thirty- forty- or fifty-year-old expert, whose gendered thinking and working toward others have been constructed over a lifetime, within one week or two? Consequently, the most effective way to implement gender in civilian crisis management may simply be to ensure that the *right people*

with the *right character* conduct civilian crisis management duties. From the gender point of view, the right person would be an individual with an open mind to evaluate the gender perspective in his/her everyday actions. However much the experts are trained, the truth remains that the final evaluation of the meaning of gender mainstreaming is made during the individual work of each seconded expert. This requires the selection process of civilian crisis management experts for the field and for the training to be more inclusive, with more time allocated to considerations of values. It is very possible that by detecting the right values amongst the candidate experts, the application of gender may become guaranteed.

Furthermore, funding and resources need retargeting to better reflect the strong political will to implement the gender perspective in Finnish civilian crisis management training and recruiting. If this strong political will is unsupported by adequate resources, the political word mongering may eventually lead to a decrease in motivation of people to apply gender in crisis management. If CMC really wanted to play a significant role in applying gender in Finnish crisis management, as has often been planned and stated in political plans and documents, the lack of earmarked resources, reflecting the real level of this ambition, contradicts these plans and documents. Although implementing the gender perspective in civilian crisis management needs to be understood as involving an attitude change in individual minds, developing the vital first steps in this attitude change requires the allocation of time and resources. If gender structures in civilian crisis management training and recruiting were adequately funded, there is a good chance that the gender issue would become less easy to dismiss as secondary. Resources would confirm that gender forms an important part of civilian crisis management. The policies highlighting its importance therefore need to be reinforced with resources.

The gender perspective lives actively in the collective mind of CMC, and the inspiration to extend the perspective deeper into CMC aspirations has been noticed. While the inspiration to implement gender mainstreaming was not necessarily congruent with staff members' conceptual understanding, it may ultimately be argued that the whole concept of "gender" is flexible, or understood differently in different places and times. So the study sought a common approach to applying the gender perspective in CMC's activities.

6 Key recommendations

1) The need for its own gender strategy. If CMC is to push its experts towards deeper thinking on gender, in order to facilitate this process, CMC needs its own gender strategy. The strategy needs to be able to describe CMC's core values and objectives on gender issues in such a way that everyone involved, CMC staff, trainees, training participants and recruited experts, would be familiar with this common vision and ready to apply it.

2) Increasing the number of women in innovative ways. CMC should organise more targeted campaigns to advertise and raise awareness about civilian crisis management duties. A dedicated person (gender headhunter) to trace the right posts and connect them with the right applicants should be recruited for the Human Resources division. CMC should develop family support for recruited experts and their families both in the field and back home, for example, by including families in briefing events.

3) From external gender expert to training the trainers. The use of specific gender modules in the training should be transformed into a more integrated approach. The main emphasis should focus on strengthening the trainers' skills to link the gender perspective with their specific area of training. The negative portrayal of gender issues requires re-examination: instead of a "do-no-harm" approach, a more meaningful way to link gender with the actual work of experts is needed. In order to secure a place for gender within the training, one way to proceed could be to appoint a gender facilitator, who would facilitate the perspective's appearance in the training.

4) Evaluation. CMC should establish follow-up measures to evaluate systematically the impact of gender training and gender mainstreaming at CMC Finland. The follow-up measures need to include not only the perspective of the training participants but also that of people in crisis areas.

5) Further research. How to move the recognised attitudes on gender more towards a positive picture is a demanding, but at the same time fundamental issue in the framework of crisis management. Unless there is progress towards a true acknowledgement of the benefits of gender in crisis management, the commitment to gender equality will become lost once more.

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High integrity and feminine care: Female police officers as protectors in civilian crisis management

Elina Penttinen

The visibility of violence against women in recent conflicts has been used as grounds for arguments demanding more female personnel for peacekeeping and civilian crisis management (CCM) missions. Following the lead of Norway and Sweden, also Finland published a National Action Plan (NAP) in 2008, so as to implement UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (UNSCR 1325) *Women, Peace and Security*. In practice, the plan should result in the increase of the number of women on peacekeeping and CCM missions, and add a gender element into all conducted projects. This paper asks, what is being added and increased when it is women that are on demand? In particular, the paper investigates the meanings of gendered and ethnicised subjectivity in security politics in which Nordic women are seen as *the solution* for better crisis management in the form of operational efficiency. The study draws from in-depth interviews of Finnish policewomen, and their narratives of providing security on CCM missions. The paper argues that the dominating narratives, which essentialise women with care and empathy, are attempts to reformulate a new ideal of a security agent, who is capable of incorporating responsible and especially ethical action on the missions. However, as these qualities are being seen as feminine, the eyes are easily turned towards the ways in which female staff has thus far exemplified the position of ethical competence.

It was actually my first day on the job, and although it was late March it was surprisingly cold and it was snowing, not much, but snowing anyway. We were one Indonesian and a Jordanian, one interpreter, one Serb, and a Croat from the local police. It was about eight in the morning so we go out from the police-station and the interpreter says: "OK, so we will meet back here at 1 p.m." The internationals used to go back home when it was cold! And I said: "What? We came here to work, and we are going to walk. And no one is going home." I was the only woman there, and still at that time the same rank as them, I only became manager later on. So, they would not believe me and insisted that it was too cold and that they always stayed at home when the weather was like that, and said: "Why don't we vote on it?" And I said: "That's fine, let's vote, but one woman's vote equals a thousand and today we are going to walk!" The boys were quite bitter the whole day, but in the end I earned their respect.

The most difficult thing for me to deal with was the kidnapping of children. Having to tell about this to the parents was the most demanding thing. It is just as hard as having to deliver the news of someone's death. No one can know how hard it is until they have had to do it. Still, when confronting the parents, we do say and try to convince them that we will do everything we can, that we will negotiate and try to get their children back. It is important to say that we will do everything, although negotiating with the militia is often futile, when they will always first deny with bright eyes: "No, no, we have not taken anyone." But there was that one time. We just happened to be in the area. We just happened to be there, when I saw the kidnapping of one girl. And it was because I saw it myself that I went after her, and I just marched into this centre. I knew that the girl was there, since I knew where they took children, before moving them in the training camps that are out there in the country, and not within our area. So, it is important to get to them before they are transferred. The guard at the gate of course denied everything and told us: "There is no girl here! No child has been brought here!" But there was absolutely no use for this, since I had seen them take her, and I was not leaving without her. So, we get into an argument and the guard, a short fellow, starts yelling at me: "If you go any further I will shoot you!" At this point, my interpreter starts intervening and telling me that this may not be a good idea, that I should listen to the guard and that we really should go; it is not safe. But I tell him to tell the guard to just go ahead with it. "Tell him: Go ahead! Shoot me! Let it all out! But I have diplomatic immunity, and if he shoots me there will be a big case about it. I have been ensured access to all the places in this area and I am not leaving here without that girl!" Well, it was not exactly true about the access to all the places. We did not have access inside the camps, but it was a good argument to use, since that camp was in our area. So then his superior came at that point and we really get into it, not in a physical fight but close. They did not shoot me then, but later my interpreter said that he would not have been so trusting.

It is these little things. I brought the kids at school in Sri Lanka a telescope made in Finland. I figured that, maybe, when these kids will look at the night sky and see the moon then, maybe they will realise that, war is in fact a really stupid thing.

1 Introduction

The visibility of gender specific violence in new wars, which target especially civilian population, has been the grounds for the birth of the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 *Women, Peace and Security*¹. The effects of war that had been ignored, or considered private or side effects of war, were now made visible². Much has to do with the ways in which the fighting in ethnic conflicts of the 1990s differed from the system of old wars between nation states³. In the new wars the warring parties are more complex, ranging from military to paramilitary groups to organised crime, and the difficulties to distinguish between civil and military, public and private forms of violence have become especially common. Therefore, although the phenomenon of sexual violence as such is not new in war situations, the scale of sexual violence in the ethnic conflicts of the 1990s has raised a demand to address this in crisis management, peacekeeping, and overall peace processes. The UNSCR 1820, for example – a follow-up for UNSCR 1325 – recognises sexual violence as a weapon of war. Thus, the role of women and girls in post-conflict situation is now recognised, and their inclusion in peace processes has become a prevalent necessity. Sexual violence is not only limited to war situations, however, but the problem of prostitution alongside international peacekeeping missions has also been recognised and addressed as a security issue. The recognition of extreme and systematic sexual violence thus brought international attention to women and girls in recent wars, and was also the grounds for the UNSCR 1325, which addresses sex/gender specific violence, calling for solutions in which the role of women is fundamentally recognised. My aim in this paper is not to discuss the move from old to new wars, or to analyse particular forms of sexualised violence, but to discuss the gender-specific politics that ensued from the recognition of these new strategies of fighting. I will not, however, dwell much on the debate on the essentialisation of women

within the Resolution 1325, since the deconstruction of the Resolution is already quite well known⁴.

Although there is well founded criticism towards the Resolution for essentialising women into a single category, equalling gender to mean women, and ignoring the vulnerabilities of civilian men and boys, the Resolution 1325 is an important move towards finding new solutions for dealing with sex-specific violence in conflict and post-conflict situations. It opens a possibility to seriously begin to discuss, what these gendered forms of violence entail in terms of the ways in which peacekeeping efforts are being conducted⁵. The adoption of the Resolution in National Action Plans indicates that there is a strong political will to acknowledge sex-specific violence in recent conflicts, and to consider its consequences for post-conflict reconstruction. Yet, the downside is that the Action Plans may be just that; an aspect of political will that does not easily trickle down or transcend to the reality of the civilian or military missions. This paper deals with the gap between these two realities, and acknowledges the isolation of a third – that is, the academic world in which we analyse both the political realm of speech and plans, and the actual world of real men and women doing the work and living the life of international missions. My curiosity here involves a simple and specified task to analyse, what the politics of increasing women is about at the political level. In other words, what is it that is needed and added through the Action Plans, when they spell out the goal to increase the number of women on international missions?

The need to increase the number of women in peacekeeping and on CCM missions is based on several assumptions that seem to be taken for granted. These assumptions describe an unquestioned belief system adopted at the political level of ministries and international organisations. First, there is the idea that local women in post-conflict areas will most likely find it easier to seek help from female personnel, and to talk to women rather than men about their experiences and about the violence done to them. It is easier to approach women because they are perceived as more trustworthy,

1 Skjelsbeck 2006; http://www.iwvc.org/1325_word.pdf, accessed 9.6.2008; See also <http://www.peacewomen.org/un/sc/1325.html> for the full text of the UNSCR 1325 *Women, Peace and Security*.

2 Skjelsbaek 2006; Höglund 2003; Rehn & Sirleaf 2002.

3 Kaldor 2004; 2006; 2007.

4 Väyrynen 2004; 2010.

5 This means NATO, UN and ESDP missions of the European Union.

more empathetic, and less corrupt. Yet, it is also recognised that, in some societies, women are not allowed to speak with foreign men at all and, therefore, could not reach for help independently if the internationals consisted solely of men. Increasing the number of women in peacekeeping and in civilian crisis management is also legitimated by the idea that they are less likely to misbehave on the missions than men, that is, to sexually abuse local women, engage in buying sexual services, or misuse alcohol. For this reason, it is also considered that the presence of women on the missions would affect the male staff positively, and keep them in check from excessive misbehavior on the missions. Women are imagined to assume these attributes of high integrity and care, both towards the local population in the post-conflict area as well as towards their male colleagues.

The origins of these assumptions stem from the active role of feminist peace activist movements, which have been emphasising women as more peaceful than men due to women's role as mothers and caregivers. Also the politics of gender equality adopted by Sweden and Norway in relation to crisis management indicates, that increasing the number of women will result in operational efficiency⁶.

This paper stems from a curiosity toward the role assigned to women in crisis management, which lead into seeking out female police officers who had been on police, monitoring, or peacekeeping missions, and were willing to share their experiences in an interview⁷. In these interviews, the police officers were asked to reflect on the relevance of the politics of increasing women, so as to consider how the underlying assumptions related to their everyday work. The goal in these interviews was to find out how the women, who were seen as the solution, saw themselves the matter of their gender and ethnicity in reaching operational efficiency. In this research, the objective was to hear the female police officers' own opinions on whether the increased amount of women would result in more than the gender-balance, or gender-equality of the international staff; towards the higher goal of operational efficiency and a sense of balance with the local population.

This study draws from these in-depth interviews with eleven Finnish female police officers and two civilian female personnel without police background on their experiences of providing security as "a woman". The women I interviewed had been on a number of missions in places such as Bosnia, Croatia, Kosovo, Sri Lanka, and Darfur, and on military missions in Lebanon and Golan. From these interviews emerges the hypothesis that, because empathy and care are emphasised as required qualities for personnel in crisis management operations dealing with complex and sensitive security issues – such as violence against civilian population – it is understandable that "women" are perceived as an example of such ethically competent security agents. This is because the required qualities are traditionally seen as feminine characteristics. Therefore, it is easy to focus on "women" peace-keepers, especially as they do stand out as a minority in male dominated crisis management staff, and as their actions and competence thus far has shown to be in line with the ideal. While there has been a shift in the objective of security in international operations from state-centric security to human security, also the competence of crisis management staff is shifting accordingly to include the capability of, and responsibility for providing security for civilian populations in complex security environments. However, the misperceptions here involve equalling this new action competence with qualities naturally possessed by women because of their gender. In this paper, it is shown that, in order to get things done properly, Finnish female police officers first rely on their professionalism, second their cultural background, and last on their gender.

6 This is emphasized especially by the GenderForce project in Sweden. See <http://www.genderforce.se>.

7 The female police officers interviewed for this project were sent an email request to participate in this study and share their experiences in the interviews. By autumn 2007, there had been twenty Finnish female police officers on civilian crisis management missions (since the early 1990s), of whom I was able to interview eleven. Most of the women had been on more than one mission, starting from the early nineties. Two of them also had military peacekeeping experience. In 2008, the number of Finnish women in CCM missions increased somewhat with the new EULEX mission in Kosovo, as well as the EU monitoring mission in Georgia. In May 2008, I spent 10 days in Kosovo and had the possibility to interview Finnish female officers working for the EULEX mission. I also interviewed two Finnish male officers, who were currently working for the EULEX mission, but had a military background in peacekeeping and UNMIK. During my stay in Kosovo I also met with a number of women from local women's NGOs, such as *Dora Does*, and *One to One Kosova*.

2 UNSCR 1325 Action Plans in fashion

Although eight years has passed since the Resolution 1325 was first issued by the UN Security Council, the time has finally come when the question of women is seriously being adopted at the national level of the countries that have signed the resolution. Finland published its national 1325 Action Plan in September 2008, following the lead of Sweden, Norway, Iceland, Austria, and the Netherlands – to name but a few of the countries that have their own Action Plans⁸. Gender-mainstreaming of civilian and military missions has now become an integral part of foreign politics, so much so that the President of Finland Tarja Halonen wishes to make it a Brand of Finnish Foreign policy⁹.

The objective of the National Action Plans is obviously to bring the gender element visible at all levels of crisis management, and to add more women in the outgoing staff to both conflict and post-conflict areas. This is legitimated certainly by basic gender-equality arguments, as well as arguments for operational efficiency¹⁰. The Action Plans are also a way to measure the effectiveness and implementation of the Resolution, and to show to the United Nations that the member states take it seriously at the policy level¹¹. The main concern in respect to the NAPs, which in one sense try to outshine one another, is that the issue of gender equality and the recognition of gender specific violence stays only at the level of politics, and does not seriously trickle down to the operational reality of the missions. This is indicated also by the suggestion that the mere number of Action Plans would be a

proof of the effectiveness of the Resolution. My first concern here is, whether the Action Plans can efficiently result in concrete changes in the ways in which the actual personnel in crisis management conduct their work. This concern is based on scepticism toward the willingness of institutions, such as the police or the military, to take the easily ridiculed "gender issues" seriously, and to change their conduct so that gender equality among staff becomes possible. This means a need for awareness among international staff, in missions such as EULEX, on how the actual police work is gendered; that is, a need for policemen to consider gender as an integral element of their work in tasks such as witness protection, homicide, investigation of organised crime and corruption¹².

A second concern rises from the possibilities of women to gain high level positions in crisis management, and the possibility to break open the masculinist institutions in which men keep together closely and look after each other's interests. In the EULEX mission, for example, at the first Category level there are no Senior Staff positions held by women in either Offices of the Head of Mission, Justice, Administration, Police or Customs¹³.

A third concern rises from the previous. This has to do with the enormous gender based requirement of high integrity and feminine care that has been assigned to very few women actually working in these missions – assigned to them, because they are marked by their gender as female, and by their ethnicity as Nordic women striving for gender-equality.

The last concern that I have regarding the national 1325 Action Plans has to do with the ideology inherent in the discourse of the Plans. This is an ideology that easily equates gender with women, representing a higher number of women in peacekeeping and civilian crisis management as a solution to the numerous problems that the missions perpetrate. The idea of increasing the number of women in order to solve the misbehaviour of male colleagues, and to better recognise the needs of local women (and girls) sounds an awful lot like the

8 See e.g. http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/foreign_policy/human-rights/pdf/Women_PeaceSecurity-en.pdf; <http://www.bmeia.gv.at/en/foreign-ministry/foreign-policy/human-rights/women-peace-security-scr-1325.html>; http://www.peacewomen.org/un/UN1325/DutchActionPlan_article.pdf; http://www.mfa.is/media/frambod/women_peace_security.pdf; Accessed 18 June, 2008.

9 Tarja Halonen, Speech 19 September 2008, Publication seminar of the National Action Plan.

10 See especially example in the GenderForce project, http://www.genderforce.se/About_Genderforce.htm, accessed 17.6.2008.

11 The United Nations Secretary-General's Report from 25 September 2008 on Women, Peace and Security indicates this. Report S/2008/622.

12 Personal communication with Head of Human Rights and Gender Office, Sirpa Rautio, EULEX Kosovo, 22 October 2008, Prishtina, Kosovo.

13 Report by Human Rights and Gender Office, EULEX, Prishtina, Kosovo.

idea of Add-Women-and-Stir from the early days of Feminist International Relations (Feminist IR) research¹⁴. Adding women in the feminist past was a way of seeing and finding where women are in international relations, and then stirring them with the usual and uncontested IR methodology – into studies recognisable as the Discipline of International Relations¹⁵. What was regarded problematic with this specific approach was that women were considered as a unified and uncontested group and, indeed, the gendered assumptions of the mainstream IR methodology were not addressed¹⁶. Yet, adding women and stirring was an important phase in feminist IR, since it opened the need to question the gendered ontology of IR discipline and to develop ways to acknowledge gender as socially constructed. Indeed, following Judith Butler, in IR theory as well gender is to be regarded as a matter of performativity.¹⁷ Individuals enact and reiterate their gender through their actions and subjectivity. Gender in a sense is an assignment which can be performed in different ways, to different degrees and, indeed, more or less successfully. This directs us to see gendered subjectivity as a matter of masculinity and femininity enacted and incorporated by different individuals. Therefore, in feminist studies as well as in IR, the idea that our biological sex determines our attitudes and behaviour in life has been dismissed. Instead, the emphasis is now on seeing how gendered subjectivity is socially constructed.

This analogy raises several questions which transform the ghost of feminist past into a living body of feminist IR today. As regards the popularity of the Action Plans in today's international politics this compels us to ask a number of questions. First: Why is it that this stance of increasing the *number of women* is so powerfully adopted in crisis management and peacekeeping today? In other words, why is there such an emphasis on adding and recognising women now, eight years after the original launch of the UNSCR 1325? More importantly, what is being added and recognised when it is *women* that are being added and recognised? Second: What is assumed, in this practice of adding and stirring *women*, about the gendered subjectivity of *men* in relation to crisis management and peacekeeping – which are the businesses involved in the managing of the Other, the undemocratic, violent and irrational, qualities that mix the gender and ethnicity of the protectors and the protected.

As regards the gendered subjectivity of men and women produced in the Action Plans the trouble is that, when empathy, peacefulness and care are understood as qualities added and increased by “women” on the missions, indirectly, “men” become produced as the binary opposite of these qualities. That is, if it is seen that women are easier to approach, more empathetic and caring it is simultaneously implied that men, as a category, are seen as more prone to irresponsible behaviour. Certainly, this is not the objective. Indeed, this example reveals how men in crisis management are seen as an

ungendered, and the meaning of their gender in their conduct of the missions is not adequately acknowledged or theorised. However, the example also shows the difficulties imbued in the politics of gender equality and gender essentialist notions.

What needs to be discerned here is the distinction between the qualities and characteristics that are masculine and feminine, and that these cannot be reduced to gendered individuals. In other words, not all women on the missions are empathetic and responsible, and not all men irresponsible and uncaring. Indeed responsibility, ethics, and the capability to recognise human subjectivity in others are qualities to be required from both men and women working in the field. This entails, however, an understanding that gender is something that cannot be escaped, in a sense that it continues to affect the ways in which one reacts and is perceived in the environment of international operations. This is supported also by the experiences of female police officers interviewed for this research.

On the basis of these interviews it seems, that what really is in demand in crisis management operations is a capacity to manage oneself before managing others. This capacity of self-management is assumed to be something which women naturally have as they are the caregivers of others. In this regard, the question really becomes interesting. Namely what, exactly, is being increased when the capacity of self-management is being increased, and what does this entail in terms of gendered subjectivity in crisis management? What kinds of positions does this assign to women and men? Jarmo Toiskallio describes the same quality in the military context as Action Competence¹⁸. This means the capacity to act in a right way in a complex and changing security environment. It is more than just correct behaviour, for one can act in a correct way according to the mandate of the mission, yet this may result in incapacity to protect civilian population in practice – as, for example, in the Srebrenica massacre¹⁹.

Here, the question of what is added when women are added reveals itself as a possibility to rethink the understanding of security, as well as the requirements of competence for crisis management professionals. This competence is more than just expertise in one's own profession²⁰. It is a matter of capacity for the right action at the right time, in cooperation with international staff as well as the local population. With these realisations, we begin to really get closer to a transformed crisis management that is capable of acknowledging the capacity of emotional intelligence²¹ – which is a competence belonging both the sexes. The argument presented in this paper is that emotional intelligence in crisis management situations translates to a way of working in the actual reality of the field like a *professional surrender*. Professional surrender means more than simply situational awareness. It means the capacity to be present “in the now” and to individually act in the right way in order to provide human security. Professional

14 Murphy 1996.

15 Sylvester 1994.

16 Penttinen 2004; 2008.

17 Butler 1990; 1997.

18 Toiskallio 2004.

19 Misewski 2004.

20 Interview with Prof. Helena Ranta, Leader of the Finnish Forensic Team, March 2009.

21 Goleman 1997.

surrender is, in a way, the same as action competence, yet it emphasises the high professionalism of crisis management as a mastered skill²² to fall back upon. It is a skill that creates the confidence to act “in the now” by inherently connecting with empathy, care, and the recognition of subjectivity of the local community – even if it would mean exceeding the descriptions of the job one is assigned to.

22 A mastered skill is such that one does not need to think about it, or thrive towards it and it seems to happen naturally and with ease, although it has taken years of practice. Here, I want to compare crisis management mastery to a mastered skill of ballet or chess. (See discussion in Klemola 2004)

3 Are women naturally more peaceful than men? Is it true?

The ontological assumption that women are more peaceful and empathetic than men has been contested by studies showing evidence of women's involvement as perpetrators of violence, not only in ethnic conflicts but in military interventions as well²³. However, problematising the inherent peacefulness of women is not prevalent in the Action Plans. One reason for this is that the original Resolution is titled "Women, Peace and Security", and the Action Plans are nationally adopted versions of this Resolution. Yet, there is a tendency to rename women with gender, in order to avoid the essentialisation of the category of women²⁴.

It seems that for women in peacekeeping and civilian crisis management there is a readily made script by which to live and conduct work on the missions. The position assigned in the NAPs to women is to be the solution to the numerous problems that the missions have perpetrated. This does not refer to any particular positions within the organisations which they have been assigned to, but instead a gender-based expectation of higher work ethics – simply because they are women. Embodying the position of a woman in crisis management or peacekeeping has turned into an assignment which serves the objective of operational efficiency. Whether it is violence against civilians, or misconduct of male colleagues, being the solution to such acknowledged problems places an enormous trust in the high integrity of female staff. However, according to the interviews conducted for this research, the female police officers do easily live out the script of empathy and care, which is expected of them on the basis of their gender. Thus, the trust placed on female staff is not without any grounds. With women forming a minority in peacekeeping staff, and having performed according to the ideal competence of an ethical security agent, the ideal professional is now seen to have a Nordic woman's body.

This being said, the point here is not to essentialise here what a woman is (or is not). Instead, the objective is to recognise how a person, gendered as a woman and having a

Nordic cultural background²⁵, breaks the stereotypical image and energy of the masculinist police and military institutions, and therefore stands out when policies are made to ameliorate crisis management operations. Yet, this research shows that although the emphasis is on adding women, what is demanded more specifically are the qualities of Nordic police officers, and especially female police officers. This relates to the cultural idea of Finnish women as a hard workers, yet empathetic and having especially high integrity. It is these women that do not easily fit in as the binary opposite of the masculine hero; meaning a stereotypical image of a feminine beautiful soul²⁶ to be protected²⁷, for whom breaking a fingernail is a disaster, woman who cannot and is unwilling to drive, a woman who through flirtatious behaviour delegates her tasks to male counterparts. The Nordic, or in this case the Finnish policewoman challenges such images of the female. However, as she is in between the binary opposites of the masculine protector and the passive protected, she is also not one of the guys in a team of internationals. The women interviewed mentioned their physical attributes – being tall, blond and strong – as something that also influenced the ways in which they were received by their international colleagues, or by the locals. They described their own position and that of their Nordic female colleagues as highly professional women who stand out from the male majority of the international staff. Their positions and actions highlight the meanings given to gender and ethnicity in police work, as they belong to the minority on the basis of their gender and cultural background. The women interviewed sketched the difference of female police officers in the international working environment in various terms. Women are less likely to get drunk on regular basis, for example, they do not necessarily look for romantic endeavours with their colleagues, and most likely will not buy

23 Sjöberg 2006; Sjöberg & Gentry 2007; Carpenter 2006; Jones 2006; Zarkov 2007.

24 See e.g. the 1325 Action Plan by Iceland, http://www.mfa.is/media/frambod/women_peace_security.pdf, accessed 18.6.2008.

25 Nordic cultural background is a point of contrast to South European, African, and Asian cultures and gendered identities, and is as such a cultural contrast to the meaning of gendered subjectivity in these "Other" cultures. This contrast of cultural gender identity has come up in all the interviews.

26 Sjöberg 2006.

27 See Young (2003) for a discussion of logic of masculinist protection.

sexual services from local women, or be involved sexually with the local staff²⁸. In short, the Nordic policewoman behaves well and is dedicated to do her best on the mission. As such, she is a binary opposite of not only her male colleagues on the same mission, but also of the perception of what a feminine woman can be.

28 In the interviews, the stories of the mission life of their international colleagues formed a position against which the women contrasted their own working ethic.

4 Gendered (and ethnicised) subjectivity in civilian crisis management

I had three children at the time. We went there, the whole family. I made a point that my children get acquainted with the neighbours' kids, so they would have friends. I also learned a few words of local language, so I could talk a little bit, buy vegetables and the like. We still go back there for holidays and see the people we became friends with, and send each other gifts at Christmas.

It is important that women are involved in peacekeeping, if for nothing else than setting an example. That a woman can do this, that a woman can read and write, have a job, drive a car, travel and have children at the same time.

I have noticed that, for both the colleagues in the local police and for the local women, as a woman, I am extraordinary, that as a woman I am so much more, easier to approach, to talk to.

Despite the emphasis on gender-balance and the need to increase the number of women in crisis management and peacekeeping, the fact remains that women still are a minority. This is true also about the current EULEX²⁹ mission in Kosovo, which has reached its full operational capacity well after the National Action Plans of the participating EU countries were published. Some countries, such as Sweden, make an exception and include an equal number of men and women in their outgoing staff, while some EU countries do not send out any female police officers at all.

In this sense – as they are so few in number – there is a feeling of exceptionality related to the Nordic female police officers in international crisis management. This exceptionality, according to the women interviewed, might have represented itself in a sense that they were put on a pedestal and were being very highly respected or, on the contrary, they would be treated with complete nonchalance. Many also felt that,

as women, they have to prove themselves, to work twice as hard; but even that was accepted, since it was not much different from what it was like to work in Finland. Often, our conversation would turn to the difficulties, lack of respect, belittling and harassment they had experienced when joining the Finnish Police Service as young female officers.

In the international missions, their experience, work ethics and Finnish nationality would also yield positive results. The women felt that Finnish police officers were given more responsibilities and higher positions in the organisation more easily than other nationalities. Gender, combined with high professionalism, was something the women did find working for them in their actual everyday work on the missions: "None of my Nordic (female) colleagues would use their gender for their advantage, but they would use their professionalism along with their gender to get things done properly."

The reasons to get involved in the international missions were described also with a sense of empathy and care. A sense of purpose and personal fulfilment were gained in the possibility to assist the post-conflict countries in establishing the rule of law and in bringing stability, even if it were for a little while only: "We are not there to solve the whole conflict, but to help, to make things better, even if it would be for the short while we are there." The motivation to participate in the international missions was genuinely about care, willingness to be involved, and assist in the process of transformation: "The reason for me to go was to be there for them, to be present and share my expertise. Our job was to unite the local police – and who would be better for the job than a Finnish policewoman?"

Similarly, learning from the international colleagues as well as forming friendships with the locals was something to be gained from in the missions, and hence considered invaluable:

What I have learned is to relax and not to worry about minor things. Maybe we Finns are sometimes even too serious.

When I came back to police work in Finland, and someone would call to make a complaint about such things as a neighbour spreading gravel on their property, I had to take a really deep breath and think

29 EULEX is the largest Rule of Law ESDP mission in EU history, including mentoring and assistance to build Kosovo's own police, judicial and border management systems.

that, for this person, this issue is really important. While for me, it seemed so futile after having been dealing with much graver issues, in places where people have lost their loved ones and live with next to nothing, and still manage to go about their daily lives with dignity.

Listening to the stories gave the impression that these women do follow their hearts and are truly ready to take chances. The stories of how they got involved in particular missions, and the events that followed, seem to be filled with incredible coincidences, surprising events, situations that come up and work out in unanticipated ways. To explain the experiences of these women in their professional lives, whether in their home country or abroad, could be described as being in alignment with their passion and sense of self. It could be described by a sense of flow, a professional surrender, meaning a way of working intuitively and passionately in the present moment. It shows that they are not only experts in international crisis management, but masters. In this regard, they rely on both, their professional skills and experience as well as their intuition, so that they can act at the right moment in the right way as the opening stories indicate. Indeed, working intuitively also means a difference in attitude toward the post-conflict situation, which the women shared. The operation and the field were seen as filled with possibilities, instead as being infested with irresolvable problems. The sense of passion for the work and doing their personal best was something that was recognisable in the approach by which these women explained their work, and shared the stories of their experiences:

The way I see it, is that those areas that we go to, Kosovo or Darfur, are so full of possibilities. One just needs to see them and go for them. There is so much that we can do more than the job we are sent out to do. For example, I became involved in a project of teaching women to build energy saving ovens and to cook with them. These ovens save women's time since, before, they would cook with three stones. It takes so much wood to heat those three rocks, it is inefficient. With the stove project we could do something small, but very practical to assist the local women. I also used to go to the local university and library. There, I would borrow books and give them to my (male) colleagues to read, and say: 'Here is a book for you, read this!' So that they could read in their own language, and learn something about the local culture.

Seeing it possible to act in a right way at the right time also means that one is confident with oneself to know, intuitively, what is the exactly right action in the changing and varying circumstances. The female police officers were examples of such confidence, for in their stories of how they conducted their work on the mission or at home they would not let others' opinions affect the things they thought were possible for them to do. Because of this attitude they lived outstanding and exciting lives. As such, they not only set an example for

those others they were sent to assist³⁰ but, more importantly, for their Finnish and international colleagues as well. The example that these women give is that, by following one's own intuition and strength regardless of what anyone else thinks is possible, and by allowing oneself to feel the excitement of it, everything works out and life brings you the most incredible experiences, fantastic new connections, and friendships.

But in order to achieve this way of relying on one's professionalism and intuition at the same time, one has to give up all the prejudices and allow the others to be as they are, without demanding them to change – whether they are the culturally different colleagues at work with their “quirky” habits (in respect to Nordic habits), or the locals with culture and customs different from each of the internationals. This involves the recognition that, although in the home countries of the internationals things are done a certain way, practices cannot necessarily be taken directly to the places where the missions are being conducted. Instead, what is required is a way of doing things that respects the local community. Allowing for difference is a way of doing that decreases the resistance of the local community against the internationals. This means being willing to learn the local culture, learn at least a few words of the language and the way to greet people with respect; it means being open to new experiences and the capability to recognise the common humanity that we all share.

It was after a house search at one in the morning, when we were looking for this one murderer – we made a big commotion about it, fully armed and everything. When we were leaving, I turned to the old lady in the house and said in Albanian: “We are sorry for the disturbance we have caused.” In response, her face lit up and she smiled and gave me a big hug, as if I had done something very special for her.

There is a possible gender difference present here, as the stories about the actions and behaviour of the international male colleagues were not always flattering. In the stories on how the acts and behaviour of men and women differ in the field, there was often a distinction made in the degree of openness and tolerance towards other cultures. Not necessarily would all the women on the mission be passionate about doing their work properly so as to help and assist others, but it seemed that, more often, it was the male colleagues who had rather selfish interests and were not interested in changing or developing their own identity in dialogue with others. Examples were told about male colleagues, who travel and learn about the country in which they were stationed at. Some, however, would go outside only to get the ticket for their holiday back home, or go to the refugee camp for a photograph to take

30 In all the interviews, it came up that the professional policewoman was seen as an example for the local women in post-conflict countries; that it is possible for women to work and have a family. The women felt they could be an example in the little things – that women can also drive a car, for example – or in “bigger” things, such as the fact that women, too, can have senior positions in professional life.

home as a souvenir. Yet, for the female police officers, the passion for work might have meant embracing the mission in ways that not all colleagues were ready to do, such as living in the same tent with a colleague from Africa.

Some say that we are so different (Nordic in relation to Africans). But the way I see it, is that we are so much the same.

5 Responsibility to protect (whom and what)?

As already mentioned in the beginning, the accepted reason to increase the number of women in peacekeeping and on civilian missions is that they are better received by the local population. The relevance of this idea was addressed during the interviews but, instead of reflecting back on the mission experiences, the discussion would most often turn on the ways in which the male police officers related to their female colleagues during the missions. Therefore, the meaning of being a woman in a male dominated organisation seemed to be more important in respect to the male colleagues than the local population. Indeed, in relation to the local population, the women interviewed explained that their cultural background as Finns came before their gender as female. Finland does not have a history of a colonialist country, and is known for its neutrality and serious work ethics. These associations were seen as helpful for the women in their actual work of crisis management.

However, if the gendered subjectivity matters more in relation to male colleagues than the population at which the operation is directed, we are compelled to ask: What, exactly, is being increased when it is the number of women that is increased? What was shared by the women in the interviews was that a female colleague represents to the male colleague a person with whom one can share worries and hardships, dealing with stressful situations at work or at home. It is easier for the men to discuss with their female colleagues about difficulties in their personal life – indeed because femininity is associated with empathy and care.

The stressful atmosphere of the missions and being far from home adds to both personal and professional pressure. In the setting in which women form a minority in overall masculinist institutions, this pressure may unfold as suggestions, or outright sexual harassment. Some of the women that I interviewed had also been on military peacekeeping missions, and had experience from more intense situations than those of the civilian missions. These women felt that on the civilian missions sexual advances were slightly fewer and the pressure milder. This was because it was easier for civilian staff to form relationships with locals – which often did happen with interpreters, for example – whereas on military missions such possibilities do not exist. The alternative, then, is often to buy

commercial sexual services, which can be sought only during leaves from the military camp as such practices are prohibited during the mission.

Dealing with sexual advances during the mission takes sensitivity, and also good sense of humour, according to the interviewed police officers. They explained a number of strategies to deal with these issues; namely brushing them off as a joke, and avoiding situations in which sexual advances would occur, such as parties involving heavy drinking. Yet, one cannot completely avoid such places and situations. And it should not be necessary to avoid social gatherings just because of the likelihood of sexual advances. Here, the response to sexual passes could be a sensitive confrontation of the issue by saying, “wait a minute, what is happening here, I suppose you really miss your family” – and then the situation would turn into a discussion of what was really bothering the male colleague, and away from the sexual tension.

The issue of heavy drinking and partying came up in the interviews as an example of the difference between female and male officers in how they would spend their weekends and days off. The female police officers were not so keen on such activities, and some saw it as a threat to the security of the mission: *“I always worried about what the guys would blurt out while drunk. If you drink on the mission, you better not do it with the locals. I always had a good excuse though, as I could say that I was driving and so politely decline the drinks that were offered when we met with the locals.”*

In the stories on how gender matters on the mission, partying and drinking and bragging about partying and drinking, seemed to colour the everyday of their male colleagues. Certainly, this does not mean that the same was true of all the men on the missions, or that none of the women would be involved in such activities, yet it portrays the kind of culture, or life, that the internationals live on missions overseas. Moreover, it portrays the grand-narrative of the difference between motivations of male and female colleagues to go on an international crisis management mission. It seems that, for women, the mission is to make a difference, albeit small, in the world. The main motivation for the interviewed women was sharing their expertise, doing everything one can in improving the stability of a conflict or a post-conflict situation – and in

return learn about a new culture and make new friends. Yet, they see that the majority of men were more interested in an adventure, and the tax free car.

On the other hand, the mission was referred to as a different world; a world in which different rules apply, an aquarium, or even as an isolated island. This refers to the life of the internationals, a place they together form in another place, in opposition to that place where they are stationed and the place that is home. It seems that things that cannot be done at home are allowed and accepted as normality in this separate and isolated world of the mission (place upon a place). In such a place, drinking, promiscuity, and sexual affairs – whether commercial or otherwise – are accepted as part of the normal mission life.

The local population and culture form a point of contrast against which the mission life as an isolated place is formed. The locals are seen as different and often difficult to understand. In the discourses there certainly are jokes about the laziness and lack of initiative of the locals, in respect to the projects that the internationals are trying to carry through. It is as if the internationals are there to implement projects regardless of how they will be received, and whether they will have the desired effect.

Yet, the women interviewed recognised that the gap between the life lead by the internationals on the missions and the life of the locals is so great that achieving the goals of the mission – such as ending corruption – is often nearly impossible. In a sense, this recognition is about seeing the inherent paradox between achieving goals of the mission and the ways in which the missions are currently being carried out. The female police officers expressed an understanding toward their local colleagues for taking bribes, as the salaries paid might not even cover the basic living expenses, especially if the person had a large family to support. When the salaries paid to the local police or border guard are extremely low, and not even a tenth of the salaries of the internationals, male or female – who in addition are there for a short time and can then leave back home (with their new car) – who could blame them for taking bribes? In such a situation, the female police officers felt that, if one would seriously want to end corruption, it is not enough to just tell the local colleagues to not take any bribes – especially because there were no consequences that would follow.

It seems then that, in places such as Kosovo, the internationals have in a sense created a world of their own, in which they create the reason for their own existence as well as the demand for their mission (for without it, the party would be over and the high level, prestigious positions would be gone). As such, the life that has been created – which is the life of the internationals living in and creating a place upon a place – is very much a gendered creation. It represents a masculinist and colonialist culture, and the locals in Kosovo give this way of life a Western man's face³¹. The resentment for this masculinist culture creates a demand for change. Indeed, in Kosovo it is seen that female police officers, and a military

operation instead of a civilian one³², will break this place upon a place which the international CCM missions UNMIK and EULEX have created³³.

In this respect it does seem that, politically, it would be a wise move to send out from the Nordic countries individuals that are gendered as women. For they are, on the basis of their female body, given a better chance to work as civilian crisis management staff, as physically they do not represent the male majority. Women being seen as more responsible for their actions and more interested in promoting change and human security in post-conflict situations, they break the colonialist image with their gendered physical presence as well as their Nordic cultural background. Indeed, in terms of the response to their presence by the local community, the fact that Finland does not have a past as a colonial ruler seems to work especially in the favour of female police officers. But the need for adding women may be far more practical than that. Women are simply perceived as more righteous and responsible, that is, as less likely to share the masculinist culture of drinking and sexual exploitation.

Indeed, for this reason, there is an additional task assigned to women as their number is increased on the missions, and that is the task of taking care of and looking after their partying colleagues. This may be a heavy burden to bear. Keeping colleagues on the right track is extra work that is assigned to women on the basis of their gender. This position of empathy and care is something that all the interviewed women at some point had had to deal with. In such moments, situations or events, gendered identities concretise and expectations become negotiated, even though this kind of work the female police officers hardly had set out to have when leaving for the mission. As one of them said, *"isn't a woman always a mother also?"* But then – as has been mentioned above – for many, such situations were already familiar from the workplace in the home country.

Yet, one should bear in mind that care and empathy are not qualities solely reserved to women, or reducible to female gender. Seeing only women as capable of care and empathy silences and rules out the ways in which men share and enact these same qualities and goals. Here, the most important aspect to be emphasised is professionalism, and also the kind of willingness to work hard that is associated with the Finnish work ethics. The female police officers had also had other projects that exceeded their job description, such as organising the collection of used footballs to be given to youngsters or clothes to refugee camps, even a telescope as in the opening story. These projects were carried out with their male colleagues, who were also willing to do more than the job description demanded. These extra projects exceeded

32 On several occasions when talking with local people in Kosovo, when asking what would happen if all the internationals would leave, the response was: *"We want to keep KFOR, the rest can go."* It seemed that the trust in EULEX to be more efficient than UNMIK was not very strong in the beginning May 2008. KFOR on the other hand was seen as an essential protection.

33 E.g. in Interview, 29 May 2008, Prizren, Kosovo. *Dora Dore*, Kosovo.

31 See also Väyrynen 2008.

the limits of the narrow conception of security, and indeed showed how the principles of human security are being implemented in the everyday life of the missions, even before human security has become a guiding principle of civilian crisis management. *"It is a matter of emotional intelligence and not gender."* In other words, it is a matter of action competence, a quality that is not reserved only for women on the mission, albeit they thus far have been exemplifying it in their work in the international context.

The women interviewed for this project showed such action competence in their efforts to go beyond the limits of their job to protect, knowing the right action intuitively and by keeping the goal to help the local population in mind. This aspect was also seen as the most rewarding part of the job, the moment when one is able to help at least one person, one situation, or one negotiation. And this is something they could do by being aligned with the present moment. In these moments and events, skills that would go beyond the normal duties were needed, as well as willingness to be present, to be in the moment. In a sense, it is again a matter of willingness to put oneself on the line for the others, who indeed are recognised as sharing the same humanity, being the same as I. It gives back a sense of exhilaration, to exceed the limits of what is thought of as possible to achieve in a particular job, or in a particular mission. Yet, these women have their high level of professionalism and experience to fall back upon, which enables them to count on themselves, align with the demands of the present moment, and achieve success in the nearly impossible situations where someone else might have already given up.

6 Conclusions: adding women, a politics of hope?

So, to answer the question: What exactly is sought after when it is the increase of number of women that is in demand in civilian crisis management? The argument here is that what is in demand is a capacity of managing oneself before managing others. It is indeed about responsibility, high professionalism combined with empathy and care, the recognition of subjectivity in others – meaning both the international colleagues and the local populations. It could be seen as action competence, emotional intelligence, or the capability of professional surrender in the now of the crisis management – in the mission's present, whatever that present moment might be. Indeed, it is a matter of management, self-discipline and mastery, of both police work and the concept of human security.

This means that the motivation to go on a mission should be a personal desire to expand and share knowledge, learn from the local culture and adjust to the changing environment. Indeed, the question of gender balance is, rather, a question of internal balance. It is a matter of diligence and sensitivity. In other words, before one is able to bring peace and stability to a post-conflict area one needs to be in balance her/himself, in a personal and *subjective gender balance*. This, indeed, would also increase the operational efficiency of the missions.

As such, the politics of increasing the number of women is a politics of hope. For it is hoped that female police officers or military peace-keepers are more likely to embody and live this subjective gender balance, and hence operate from the positions of empathy and care in respect to their colleagues and the local population. Hoping as a form of politics is not a strong form of politics. Hoping is without agency and, as such, it is weak. When one hopes that a desired outcome would happen, one gives up one's own power to affect the results of the actions taken. Hoping is passive and leaves outcomes to be determined by circumstances that are also seen as unfolding without decision making or individual action. It takes power to keep power relations in place³⁴ and in the case of politics of hope, the power keeping the power relations of the operation in place remains invisible. One seems to simply (passively) hope, that the people sent on the missions will act the way they are

supposed to do, and hence fulfil the demands expected from them.

Certainly, the politics of hope is not without any grounds at all. Indeed, this hoping is based on the experience of the past, which shows that dedicated, professional and hard working women seek to go out on the missions and are willing to put themselves on the line. Yet, the weakness relies in the fact that responsibility, dedication, empathy, and care cannot be reduced simply to gendered subjectivity, in this case to policewomen. As studies and numerous examples show, also women are capable of violence, exploitation and misbehaviour. Women are still a minority in the police and military and, as such, an oddity who has to work twice as hard to earn the respect. She is also under more close scrutiny of her behaviour. Women in the police or in the military cannot use the phrase "boys will be boys and men have their needs" to legitimate heavy drinking, or buying sexual services. In regard to women in the police and the military, this phrase just does not make sense. Yet, it is not her female body that prevents her from such activities; but it is her female body that makes her stand out in case of misconduct on the mission.

Therefore, the first remedy for the weak politics of hope is the deconstruction of essentialism of the male gender, and hence the meaning of "life on the mission" in masculinist institutions. This means a deconstruction of the stereotypical image of men as driven by sexual aggression, seeking to go on the mission for adventure, new car or the prestigious position, and other benefits that the international mission brings. Politically, the endorsement of this stereotype creates as its binary opposite the position of the Nordic female police officer as responsible, caring, and righteous. Neither of these stereotypes being reducible to gender, politics based on the balancing of these stereotypes by simply increasing more of the other is untenable.

It seems that the increase of women is a corrective measure to the misbehaviour and problems that have arisen from the so called "mission life". Hoping that men behave better when women are around puts an enormous responsibility on women on the missions, especially as there are so few of them. Despite the politics of increasing the number of women in crisis management, and regardless of the number of countries

34 Enloe 1996.

which have published 1325 Action Plans, the number of women selected to crisis management operations still remains very low, with some countries not selecting women at all. Also in this regard, the politics of hope is not very effective.

The position of professional surrender and action competence need not be qualities embodied by women in crisis management. It may be embodied by individuals gendered as men as well, both internationals and locals. What is required is a transformation of the possibilities of gendered and cultural subjectivity, so that there are other ways to enact masculinist subjectivity of the international than the disrespectful, exploitative form now so familiar from peacekeeping and civilian missions.

In this respect, subjective gender balance is required and needed in order to truly reach for operational efficiency. Indeed, one could argue that the politics of 1325 Action Plans is not Add-Women-and-Stir, but Add-Women-and-Hope. The argument here is not against adding women, quite the opposite. The argument is for the capacity of self-reflexivity and responsibility of the actual men and women working as security providers in the missions. The call is for capacity of managing oneself before managing others, meaning a capacity of self-inquiry into one's own beliefs regarding one's needs, desires, and addictions. The call is also for an understanding of how these beliefs are constructed in the lived experiences of one's own gendered and cultural subjectivity in the context of civilian crisis management missions.

This is what is necessary, if indeed there remains the desire to increase the number of women – for otherwise the task of high integrity and feminine care may be just too much for the actual women on the missions to bear.

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War-related sexual violence: Its dimensions and proposals for response

Maaria Ylänkö

Sexual violence (SV) is a threat to human security in both in times of war and peace. As the majority of victims in current armed conflicts are civilians, SV has also become a general security threat in many conflict areas. In June 2008, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1820 qualified SV as a “war tactic” with the hope that this definition will support in increasing awareness against SV and in prosecuting the military offenders. Despite important advancement in international law since the 1990s in the prosecution of wartime rape and despite increased attention placed on the issue, as a war crime rape still remains overshadowed by other atrocities and systematically disregards the victims. The emphasis of the international community has been on prosecuting and punishing the perpetrators SV, while the victim’s needs and rights have been pushed aside. Presenting SV as a gender matter or as a cultural phenomenon may not be the most useful point of view. Pragmatic actions against SV should still be taken. Even though this study is analysing sexual violence globally, a specific priority is given to the case of Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) where the author made a field trip in July 2009.

1 Introduction

Recent decades have provided documented evidence of SV and mass-scale rape in war zones around the globe: in Asia, Africa as well as in South-Eastern Europe. Since there are no more clear war zones and home fronts in contemporary conflicts, wars take place in the middle of the civilian populations. There is reason to believe that the general increase of sexual atrocities in recent armed conflicts is real and not a bias due to increased monitoring. The nature of war has changed, as have the means of waging war.

The Yugoslav wars of 1991–1995 marked a turning point; sexual atrocities became publicised and put pressure on United Nations to respond. As a result, remarkable changes have taken place and SV is now well defined as a specific war crime in international legislation. Many betterments and juridical innovations have been carried out successfully so that today the international law fits the problem of war-time rapes. Obstacles for prosecuting perpetrators and those commanding their inferiors to rape have been removed, the definition of rape has been broadened and the burden of proof for the victim has been reduced.

In the level of discourse practiced by the international community there is no space to perceive SV as a consequence that unfortunately, or inevitably, occurs in armed conflicts. The United Nations addresses SV specifically in two Security Council Resolutions: the UNSCR 1325 on *Women, Peace and Security* and the UNSCR 1820, the latter which is dedicated specifically against SV. Also, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and numerous international and national Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO) have formulated policies and programmes against SV.

When rape is viewed as a war weapon, it begs the comparison to prohibited weapons like napalm and brings hope that SV could be banned and outlawed alike. There is also a tendency to parcel development, eradication of poverty and equality with SV in armed conflicts and expectations that if the status of women could be promoted SV would vanish.

Despite heightened global awareness, the measures against war-related SV still remain only on paper, posters and bites on computer screens. Although international law currently gives enough means to prosecute and to punish rapists, in practice there is a lack of implementation of these

laws and the impunity that accompanies waves of SV suggests that there is a lack of political will to act concretely. There is also a lack of practical knowhow regarding methods to stop and to prevent outbreaks of SV.

Strengthening Rule of Law (RoL) and carrying out Security Sector Reforms (SSR) are necessary steps in order to eradicate SV. However, this is largely a question of resources. In a post-conflict situation the administration required to deal with *gender catastrophes* has inevitably been disrupted and generally there is lack of judges, tribunals and prisons. Awareness about the existence of SV is not enough; awareness should be converted to compiling databases, constructing buildings, and training medical staff to care for the victims of rape. Areas where waves of SV have taken place can also be difficult to access because of guerrilla fights and poor roads.

During times of peace, rape is a crime that is understood to be a primarily psychological trauma; however this undermines the violent nature of the crime and disregards the physical harm. It is not generally known that rapes that take place during war can be extremely violent and can have permanent effects on the victim's health. Physical injuries and consequences of rape can be as *invalidising* and as devastating as damage caused by firearms.¹ Yet raped women are not classified as war victims, unlike wounded soldiers with their wives and families.

1 Wakabi 2008.

2 Sexual violence and international law

The most abundant topic of the literature on SV since 1990s pertains to its juridical aspects. However, this new emphasis on juridical developments does not mean that rape has not been outlawed in armed battles before by other moral codes. Violence is usually banned by customary laws, and forced sex is understood to be a form of violence.²

2.1 Historical review

In Europe, the earliest written documents condemning war and peacetime rape dates back to the 1600s. The 1863 US Army Regulations (so-called Lieber Code) listed rape as a war crime. Still, until the end of the Second World War, SV remained a matter that did not require intervention by the international community.³

After the Second World War, the allied forces agreed to create an international tribunal to prosecute the Nazis for war crimes; the tribunals took place at the city of Nuremberg in 1945 and 1946. The prosecuted, whether military or members of organisations, were accused as having an individual responsibility for committing crimes that were divided to three types: crimes against peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity.⁴

Rape was recognized as a crime against humanity by following the previous international customary laws regulating wars, but there was still a gap in the qualification of SV. The negligence of rape may also have resulted from the Nuremberg Trials focus being on the mass destruction of human life. Moreover, SV that took place during deportations and in concentration camps seemed to be considered a milder form of violence when it was contrasted against mass murders.

In the Tokyo Trials for Japanese war crimes in 1946 and 1948, rape crimes were expressly prosecuted, but even then mostly in conjunction to other crimes. The Tokyo Tribunal (also known as IMFT, International Military Tribunal) nonetheless succeeded in including rape as a violation in the list of other recognized crimes such as, mass murder and torture, and broke thus silence on SV. Still, only a part was investigated: for decades thereafter, the abuse of 200 000 women as *comfort women* by the Japanese government was ignored and denied by Japan. Also, the victims of rape in Nanking (principally Chinese women) in 1938 did not testify to being raped. Therefore, it has been widely stated in literature that in practice the Nuremberg and the Tokyo Tribunals failed to adequately prosecute sex crimes.

The Geneva Conventions of 1949 were the instruments that established protection against rape for woman in a modern and universal way. The core of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) that regulates the relations between the state and the public spheres was comprised in the Conventions. In addition, there were 50 specific provisions about non-discrimination that provided special protection to women. Yet on the list of grave breaches there was no explicit reference to gender based violence. They remained, once again, as crimes that were subject to domestic jurisdiction. Rape was not specifically mentioned in the Geneva Conventions of 1949, but a common article 3 (1) (c) prohibited outrages upon "personal dignity".⁵

Rape and sexual assault became clearly outlawed in only by the amendment protocols of the Geneva Conventions in 1977. Article 27 protects women against "any attack on their honor, in particular against rape enforced prostitution or any other form of indecent assault". The additional protocols of the Geneva Conventions Security in 1977 prohibit rape as grouped under the definition of "any attack on their honor" and speaks about women's "dignity as women".

The emphasis on dignity, honour and dignity as women has later been criticized as offensive from the victim's point of view, since their use implies that a raped woman becomes dishonoured and her dignity as a human being would be

2 Islamic law also stipulates that that a state of war does not make an exempt for the prohibition of rape; rape is also outlawed in the Old Testament (Deuteronomy 22:28): "If a man happens to meet a virgin who is not pledged to be married and rapes her and they are discovered, he shall pay the girl's father fifty shekels of silver. He must marry the girl, for he has violated her. He can never divorce her as long as he lives."

3 Talmar 2008, 11.

4 Ibid, 23.

5 Talmar 2008, 15.

determined by her sexuality. Another central problem has been the definition of rape. Defining rape judicially is about, 1) the technicality of the act, 2) the use of force by the perpetrator and 3) the lack of consent of the victim.

In the 1990s, two international tribunals were established to prosecute for war crimes that had taken place in conflicts that were still not settled. As there was no internationally agreed definition of rape, both needed to define independently the crime of rape for their statutes. The classical rape trials had emphasised woman's consent to a penile invasion, but now they were about the technicality of the act, about whether a superior could be responsible for the rapes by his subordinates and about coercion of a third person to rape.⁶

The first one to be founded was International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in the Hague, the Netherlands, for the war crimes in former Yugoslavia. During the Yugoslavian wars, the systematic use of rape and forced pregnancies in Bosnia by the Bosnian Serbs against Croats and Muslims put pressure on the UN to react. In February 1993, the Security Council decided to establish a tribunal that was mandated to prosecute persons who were responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law in the territory of former Yugoslavia since 1991.

The second one was the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) that was founded to investigate the genocide in 1993 and 1994.⁷ In the same way as for ICTY, the Security Council voted for creating a tribunal that finally was decided to take place in the city of Arusha in Tanzania.

Both trials came to approximately similar conclusions about the definition of rape. The most outstanding cases in this regard were the *Akayesu* case about crimes originally committed in Rwanda and the *Furundzija* case for war crimes in Bosnia. Both cases were the impetus for innovations in defining and prosecuting rape as a war crime.

Jean-Paul Akayesu⁸ was the mayor of the Taba commune in Rwanda from April 1993 until June 1994. The commune became a theatre for mass murders and rapes. First of all, the case of Akayesu resulted in abolishing the prerequisite to prove lacking consent the rape takes place during a conflict. This came to be the "Rule 96" of international law. It states that during a conflict situation consent shall not be allowed as a defence.

Secondly, the Trial Chamber did not go into a physical description of rape as argued by the prosecution, but chose to consider rape as "a form of aggression". The central elements of rape "cannot be captured by a mechanical description of objects and body parts". Hence, from the Akayesu case on, insertion of any object into bodily sexual orifices may also constitute a rape.

The third precedent set was that a commander can be found responsible for rapes committed under his leadership. Jean-Paul Akayesu was not accused of carrying out rapes himself, but for ordering and encouraging to rape as a

superior. Finally, the fourth innovation which was related to the alleged ethnic persecution, was that "rape and SV (...) constitute genocide in the same way as *any other act* as long as they were committed with the specific intent to destroy, in whole or in a part, a particular group, targeted as such."

As for the juridical innovations of ICTY, Anto Furundzija was a local commander of a special police unit of the Croatian Defence Council (HVO) 1991. His case was the first one to prosecute a military leader for rape which was committed by his subordinates during a situation of interrogation, (and not in a situation in the course of armed conflict). It also established a first case where a single occurrence of rape that occurs in conjunction of a war was regarded a war crime.⁹

Although Anto Furundzija did not himself physically perpetrate the violence, the Chamber sentenced him guilty for torture and outrages upon personal dignity. His case thus expanded the definition of rape in international law from the mere physical and mechanical definition that was employed by the Akayesu judgment.

The ICTY also established a connection between forced pregnancy and genocide and there were several other juridical innovations made in order to identify the practice of SV. It is no longer regarded as a by product or collateral damage of military conflicts.

2.2 Achievements of international law

The most important betterments of international law since the 1990s can be summed as follows: Rape and SV are separately and distinctively defined under international law, so that they can by no means be regarded as a by product of another issue. The consent as defence is eliminated in any case where coercion is shown and prohibited evidence of the victim's prior sexual conduct, "Rule 96", and even a single victim of rape can give rise to a conviction for war crimes.

The law on SV has been made symmetrical which means that it is acknowledged that both females and males can be victims of SV. Rape has thus become a gender neutral concept and special concern has been taken with the vocabulary. According to law rape is now about the "invading" the body, and not about "penetration". One can be convicted of rape and SV without being the physical perpetrator and superiors can be held criminally responsible for rapes committed under their supervision.

All in all, rape and SV were successfully prosecuted as war crimes in ICTY and ICTR war tribunals, and there has been a remarkable change in the way sexual crimes are treated in international legislation. It is still noteworthy, that even though rape and SV were explicitly incorporated under allegations for crimes against humanity and war crimes, none of the initial

6 Laviolette 1998.

7 SV has also been processed in Cambodia War Crimes Tribunal since 2006.

8 Cases of Akayesu and Furundzija cited by Talmar 2008.

9 Anto Furundzija subjected a civilian woman of Bosnian Muslim origin to an interrogation at the headquarters in May 1993. The woman was questioned nude in front of soldiers with one of them threatening her with mutilation if she did not tell the truth. The woman was forced by another soldier to perform sexual acts with yet another victim, who was a Bosnian man. Anto Furundzija was present and did nothing to stop SV.

indictments by the courts included sexual crimes. In the ICTY and in the ICTR, the amendments about sexual crimes only occurred in the middle of the trials. The ICTY and the ICTR were also set up without any mechanism of compensation for the victims. Moreover, the trend to link rape to other crimes, such as genocide is sometimes dubious since the proof for attempted genocide is more difficult to attain than a proof for a rape.¹⁰

2.3 Why does international law fail to function?

Although the recognition of seriousness of SV has grown immensely in international law, there are still reports of SV in many conflict zones. Why has the evolution of international law been failed to be transformed into practice? There are several feasible explanations.

First, the outbreaks of SV tell nothing about the effectiveness of international legislation. International law is barely a tool to *prevent* SV. Any laws are responses in retrospect to crimes that have already taken place, and in retrospect the affected people usually say that they never imagined that their home area would one day become a theatre of sexual atrocities.

Second, contemporary wars tend to be *internal conflicts* that involve ethnic and religious elements. In many countries military leaders which are representing states and consequently have the power to ratify or not to ratify international conventions, are replaced by warlords, drug lords and ever-splitting troops in which there is often no clear chain of command. At the bottom of the chain of command in the brigades, the assaulters can be extremely poor, not educated and illiterate and thus out of reach of information about international law. Military leaders, on the contrary, can be well educated, sometimes despite of a misleading guerrilla-*imago*.

In that regard, the international law has actually intervened successfully by bringing at least an important part of these warlords to Tribunals (ICTY, ICTPR, International Criminal Court ICC). International law functions, but there are sometimes too unrealistic expectations about its efficacy.

Third, the *timing* of international intervention to a conflict brings in aspects and well-grounded accusations of partiality. Today's international war crimes tribunals, unlike their predecessors at Nuremberg and Tokyo, are founded on the principle of even-handed justice for all victims of serious violations of international humanitarian law. An important difference to the past examples of Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals were *ex post* tribunals in that they were established after the acute violent situation and military victory. What has arisen in recent years as a second type of international tribunal, a kind of an *ex ante* tribunal, which is established before the international security problem has been resolved.¹¹

Still, the crimes of criminals can be effectively investigated only when the surrounding conflict has calmed down to a level in which all the parties of the conflict can be impartially

judged and witnesses can give their testimony without fear.¹² As for the creation of the ICC and its mandate to intervene in conflicts, The Rome Statute¹³ was created upon an assumption that governments would be reluctant to surrender their criminals to the ICC. This indeed has been the case with ex Chadian president Hissene Habre and the Sudanese president al-Bashir, the latter being accused of being responsible for thousands of rapes of women and girls among other atrocities. The DRC has proven to be a counter example. At the creation of the ICC, the drafters did not even contemplate including cases where a state would voluntarily refer its war criminals to the ICC, let alone that a state would invite the future court to investigate and prosecute crimes that occurred in its territory.¹⁴

This nonetheless has proved to be the policy that DRC has adopted with some of its warlords¹⁵ accused of rapes of civilians in conjunction with other war crimes. In such cases, the ICC prosecutes military superiors that can be held responsible for rapes. At the same time, the international community is addressing a part of a war that is still very much alive and in which the assignor party is claimed to have been involved in some capacity at some stage. In that case, international law does not function in the way it was supposed to.

Fourth, the persons involved in cases of SV tend to remain *silent*. There is reluctance from the sides of the perpetrators, the victims and the witnesses to address the matter during or after the conflict. SV attacks the unspoken moral values about purity, fidelity, motherhood and fatherhood.

Fifth, international law does not yet target the *consequences* of SV. The consequences that are experienced by the victims and their communities are the true problems of SV: this includes masses of rejected women, health problems, and paralysed daily economy. Children conceived out of SV are rejected and they can be deprived of having a name. Reproductive rights are not integrated to international legislation on SV.¹⁶ Forced pregnancy is a war crime in international law¹⁷ and can even be defined as a form of

12 In that regard already the ICTR in Rwanda has been severely criticized for not having failed to indict a single soldier of the Rwandan Patriotic Force for killing or assaulting civilians, which risks to cause the Tribunal to be dismissed as *victor's justice*.

13 <http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/EA9AEFF7>.

14 Arsanjani & Reisman 2008, 329; Quéniévet 2005.

15 Thomas Lubanga and Jean-Pierre Bemba for example.

16 According to WHO definition: "Reproductive rights rest on the recognition of the basic right of all couples and individuals to decide freely and responsibly the number, spacing and timing of their children and to have the information and means to do so, and the right to attain the highest standard of sexual and reproductive health. They also include the right of all to make decisions concerning reproduction free of discrimination, coercion and violence."

17 IHL 7(2). "Forced pregnancy" means the unlawful confinement of a woman forcibly made pregnant, with the intent of affecting the ethnic composition of any population or carrying out other grave violations of international law. This definition shall not in any way be interpreted as affecting national laws relating to pregnancy.

10 Stern & Fouchard 2008.

11 Arsanjani & Reisman 2008.

genocide, but a woman's right to decide to keep or abort the pregnancy depends on national legislation concerning pregnancy. In countries, where abortion is often illegal or access to a legal abortion highly restricted, deaths from abortion are hundreds of times higher than in countries where abortion is legal.¹⁸

Finally, SV often takes place in the so-called *failed or collapsed states*, where the national judicial system has collapsed or is completely unavailable. According to some estimates, in the DRC there are 1250 positions for judges unfilled and about 80 percent of people lack access to any kind of legal system.¹⁹

18 According to WHO report in 2004, 68 000 women die per year due to unsafe abortions.

19 Peter Sampson in *Crafting Human Security* 2008, 49.

3 Gender-based approach and its limits

At first glance, rape is always a gender matter in times of peace as well as during wars. A gender-based approach to SV argues that armed conflict polarizes differences and inequalities that already existed before the conflict. An armed conflict would only exacerbate a traditional setting, one in which men are the aggressors and women are regarded as the supporters of their husbands, fathers and sons. Traditionally in Western laws there has also been a general expectation that women should be protected as mothers or pregnant women. During the Second World War, the international laws stemming from the Hague Conventions contained provisions about protecting family honour.

Assaulting women and young girls in a conflict setting can also be perceived as a phenomenon that logically goes along with the general trend of contemporary armed conflicts in which civilians account for the majority of victims: women and girls most often fit to the civilian category. Nevertheless, SV that occurs in a war setting does not always fit into the stereotypical conceptions of gender violence. Men and boys can also be sexually assaulted. Moreover, women also serve as soldiers and it is not exceptional to say that women in positions of power have also condoned rape as a war tactic.

The UNSCR 1325 written in 2000 and UNSCR 1820 from 2008 both focus on women; women as particularly vulnerable targets of war and on women as potential subjects of peacebuilding by empowerment. The combination of the two viewpoints is likely to draw attention elsewhere from the fact that raped women are victims of war, just as wounded men are victims of war. There is no shortcut from healing to empowerment.

The emphasis of the gender aspect inevitably renders the aspect of violence to a secondary position. As noted above, rape was not primarily seen as violence and torture in the history of legislation, but as dishonouring a woman and her family. Hence the gender-based approach is careful not to victimise women but to empower them, this is paradoxically close to a traditional understanding of rape as a matter of honour because it bypasses the stage of being a victim of violence. If a male soldier is shot in bladder and rectum during war and he loses continence, it is clear that his primary need is to have a surgical intervention. His empowerment and reintegration

into society is a question that will be addressed once he has healed from the wound. His right to a compensation as a war invalid is recognized, although in practice there may be no financial resources. When a woman is wounded in the same way by rape, there is a bias to understand the damage in first as psychological, social and cultural.

Despite the growing awareness about SV in armed conflicts, there has been a general failure of governments to implement a policy of health care for raped women that works. Unlike in war surgery, there are no governmental hospitals specialised in treatment of SV nor are there centralised registers of specialists who have the practical know how to treat injuries caused by rape.

A gender perspective stressing empowerment can also be an excuse to stagnate the actions against SV into a level where the women victims are gathered to women's centres, nursed by women nurses and put next to a sewing machine for training by a woman teacher and grouped to form women's cooperatives. They can have access to consult woman lawyers on their case, but in the absence of mechanisms of compensation, the victim herself will gain nothing by starting a juridical process against her assaulter. In practice a gender perspective can really be used to suppress a woman's rights to choose, as an individual, the medical aid she receives and rehabilitation measures that concern her, whether she wants to carry a pregnancy to full term or whether she has the right to abort, and what kind of vocational training would fit her and what she likes.

In short, the gender perspective can easily be understood as *we know what is best for women*. After all, it is not so surprising that the associations go to children, home, sewing machines, and the like. In sum, there is a risk that the claimed gender perspective marginalises SV to a specific domain of a gender affair or women's affair that does not integrate with the general attempts to strengthen RoL.

4 Magnitude of war-related sexual violence

SV in armed conflicts is an issue which has become documented numerically only recently. During the Second World War, the Japanese government placed approximately 200 000 comfort women in military brothels. In the Tokyo Trials approximately 20 000 women were estimated to be raped in Nanking. Otherwise gender related violations were neither specifically monitored nor enumerated.

Estimations about the numbers of victims of SV since the 1990s suggest an increase in frequency but remain often very irregular by method of collecting, and sometimes carelessly presented. In literature, the most often presented estimate concerning Bosnia and Herzegovina is from 20 000 to 50 000, the margin of error being in tens of thousands. In Rwandan genocide in 1994, the number of rape victims is usually reported as 500 000 victims, without amplitude.

In Eastern Congo (DRC) the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) has conducted data collecting in several posts around the country for more than four years: there was altogether 17 000 reported cases per year. The rape cases were reported both to the police and doctors. Information was collected by survey methods, but the stations around the country were far too dispersed.²⁰

SV is monitored in incoherent manners in different conflict areas, and sometimes the figures may be overestimated or boosted for fund raising. Estimates on "percentages of women being raped" are particularly problematic because they are incorrectly based; being raped cannot be compared to being contaminated by a virus. The estimates also lack accuracy about age and the geographical limits of collection. For instance, according to Physicians for Human Rights, in Sierra Leone "fifty percent" of the women and girls have been subjected to rape, torture or sexual slavery in civil wars from the beginning of the 1990s.²¹ However, as for medical data based on incidences, in Sierra Leone a medical research group published in a study in 2002 according to which 94 of 991 of respondents and 396 of 5001 female household

members in Sierra Leone reported war-related sexual assaults. In percentages this would only be 9 % and 8 % respectively.²²

All in all, there are remarkable inconsistencies on scaling the cases or frequencies of SV in different conflict areas and these differences cause a problem of credibility. Careless estimations can add the risk of fuelling the actual political conflicts because they can be interpreted as propaganda against the accused perpetrators. The inaccuracy in allegations about rape is one reason why rape has not been taken seriously as a war crime. At this point, there has not been much effort between researchers or data collectors to find explanations for very different estimations on the field. For these reasons there is an urgent need for better data.

20 UNFPA 2008.

21 Estimation of Physicians for Human Rights 2002.

22 Amowitz & al. 2002.

5 Cultural dimension of sexual violence

Rape always takes place in context. The present day rape waves during war that are known by the public have occurred in Africa and in South-East Asia. Is the occurrence of war-related rape waves determined by the surrounding culture and its traditions?

In Western countries where surveys have been conducted on SV during times of peace, a general finding is that the perpetrators of SV are in most cases men who are known to the woman. In conflict situations, the perpetrators of SV are more likely strangers to victims. In that sense it already becomes problematic to talk about *rape cultures*, as the parties of the war can be originally from different cultures.

In wars women become vulnerable to rape in occupied territories, when fleeing from conflict areas, and in refugee camps. In displacement, the perpetrators are soldiers, demobilized soldiers or policemen, and they can even be persons who were supposed to aid and protect civilians. From that point of view, SV in armed conflicts does not emerge from local culture, but from a violent confrontation of different groups of different cultural origins.²³

Mass rapes have taken place in near history, the Second World War included, and are geographically scattered: Germany, Japan, South-Eastern Europe (former Yugoslavia), Chechnya, Indonesia and Central Africa. Yet, SV in armed conflicts is associated to prevailing cultural traditions and it is expected that violence against women would be inextricably linked with women's participation to decision making. SV would thus be both a cause and consequence of women's low status. Women would only represent reproducers of culture and religion without being subjects. Systematic neglect of the other parent's kinship is a clear marker of linearity in favour of the noticed party.

For instance, in Bosnia, the mass rapes were sometimes interpreted as emerging from a prevalent patrilinear culture and the general importance of religion in the Balkans. Victims were most often Bosniaks and the perpetrators were non-Muslims. SV was not always limited only to rape, but also forced pregnancies. According to several interpretations, the aim was to force women make children of another religion.

The children were therefore converted to another religion and the culture or religion of the woman was totally disregarded.²⁴

Arguments about women's low status have also been mentioned in regards to Central Africa as one explanation for the current waves of SV. According to popular explanations, women in Africa would be regarded only as property of men, and it is sometimes stated that African populations in general would have very strict controls over female sexuality. In fact, regions affected by war-related rape in Rwanda and Eastern Congo touch the so-called matrilinear belt where women have more liberties than in Northern and in Southern Africa. These liberties concern freedom to divorce, to enhance oneself economically and liberty of movement. It has been common and acceptable for a woman to travel alone and to have her own independent commercial activities. This does not equate for sexual freedom, but the fact that women's sphere of movement has not been as restricted to the homestead like in Northern Africa has its practical implications. Even if women's position is rendered powerless by the war, the argument about the low status of women in Central Africa does not make sense in comparison to the status of women in many other cultural areas.

In the Northern part of the African continent, in the Darfur area of Sudan, the war has been engendered and SV is used war tactic,²⁵ but the family structures are predominantly patrilinear. Although, if patrilinearity²⁶ is cited as an enabling background for SV, it should equally be noticed that patrilineal structures have also been regarded as more restrictive in what comes to sexual freedom, and women's freedom of movement. Thus, in Darfurian culture the threshold to use sexual assault (rape) as a war weapon would be higher since women's sexuality in general is more regulated. Still, systematic rapes have been reported. The dynamics of SV as war weapon in Darfur is still different from Central Africa. In Darfur, rapes are revenged by counter-rapes of women of the enemy, whereas in Eastern DRC rapes are more opportunistic. SV is said to have gone

23 Héritier 1996.

24 Nahoum-Grappe 1996.

25 Prunier 2005; 2009.

26 Patrilinearity is often mixed with patriarchy, which implies that father, or the grandfather has the primary authority of the household.

“beyond the conflict”, which means that random rapes by militias and armed groups would have become an end of the terror itself.²⁷

In Indonesia there have been several reported waves of SV in conflicts on different islands since the 1990s. Indonesian traditional family structures have been marked by important matrilineal predominance despite the scattered geography of the archipelago. In practice, this can be seen in a relatively high level of economic independence that many women enjoy. Women often take care of the family's economic issues and operate their own small-scale business. As such, a matrilineal cultural tradition does not guarantee absence of gender misbalance at the disadvantage of women or absence of women's submission, but it does give a woman rights to her children and property.²⁸

It might be that cultures where women have greater autonomy and more independence, they are especially vulnerable and defenceless when rape is used as a war weapon in an armed conflict. In the DRC one popular explanation model²⁹ compares the risk of death to risk of rape. During war, a couple must decide who performs a task (tend to cattle or to collect water or firewood) with the threat of an armed assault, the risk for a man is to be killed and the risk for a woman is that she will be raped. In comparison it seems that it is better for a woman to be raped than for a man to be killed and thereby the woman is chosen to be exposed to the threat. Furthermore, when a woman is raped in the DRC, a consequence is that she is rejected by the community, often with her children in accordance with matrilineal logic. Traditionally, the society tolerates that women can be rejected, and the assumption is that women can survive alone and make their own livelihood somehow. In a war context this is not possible, and the multitude of stigmatised and rejected women is a particular social disaster, or a gender disaster.

In conclusion, it is possible to find counter arguments to the stereotypical blaming of patriarchy for rape waves. As well it could be claimed that patriarchy protects women more, as opposed to matrilineal cultures that expose women to sexual assaults by providing them a greater freedom of movement and because men (husbands and brothers) have less interest for sanctions and reprisals. In areas where men are traditionally not tasked with the duty of protecting women, women are easier targets for physical assault in a war context.

In practice it is difficult to contest correlations by empirical data between cultural complexity and sexual freedom. As such, there is no reason to claim that in a war situation, a patriarchy or a patrilinear culture are prone to SV than others.

27 See e.g. Amnesty International 2008.

28 McAmis 2002.

29 Told by a local NGO worker in Bukavu in June 2009.

Table 1: Beyond assumptions on culture: risk of sexual violence and woman's freedom

(Risk factor for SV +

Protective factor against SV –)

1) Matrilinear family structure tradition, Central Africa, Indonesia	Risk of SV + / –	2) Patrilinear family structure tradition, Bosnia, Darfur	Risk of SV + / –
Women enjoy greater independence (from men)	–	Women have less independence dependence on men	–
More permissive sex attitudes	+	More restrictive sex attitudes	+

Yet the cultural aspect in rape waves can never be denied because a specific form of cruelty³⁰ is always related to a particular logic of beliefs that is common between the perpetrator and the victim: both share the conception and symbolism about violence, about humiliation and about shame. For instance, in forced pregnancies in Bosnia there was a symbolic message to convert Bosnian women's children into Christians. In Central Africa, the use of wooden instruments in rape symbolizes infertility.

If SV in wars could be explained by local cultures, it should also be asked whether it would have been possible to predict and hence prevent SV beforehand. Explanations referring to a rape-prone culture tend only be pronounced afterwards. For instance, was it foreseeable in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s? In any case, knowledge about the prevailing culture can nonetheless help in anticipating consequences about mass raping. In Eastern DRC, for instance, the manner in which victims of SV are rejected on a mass scale can be explained by the incapacity of the culture to cope with massive stigmatisation, whereas in the patrilineal belt, rapes are more likely to be revenged.

30 Nahoum-Grappe 1996, 287.

6 Risk environments for sexual violence

6.1 Rape patterns

Instead of rape-prone cultures, it is also possible to talk about environments where the risk of rape becomes high. The advantage is that environment is more concrete to describe and easier to document than culture. In practice there is an overlapping which can be called as *rape pattern*.

In so-called classic rape cases, the act of rape is supposed to be an isolated case. The description of the context may refer to the state of drunkenness in a party. Rape in particular is associated to a scenario of forced sex between two individuals, in which the surrounding conditions do not determine the criminality of the act. The critical element in defining rape is the woman's consent. If the victim's means to defend herself were absent, even the classic rape which takes place in time of peace, can also be defined as institutional SV. Marital rape can be regarded sociologically as institutional SV, regardless of whether it is criminalised in the national law.³¹ Nevertheless, generally speaking, rapes are perceived as occasional and random cases during times of peace.

The difference between peace and war is however not clear cut especially in contemporary internal war contexts. A military environment in itself can increase the risk of rape even during times of peace; women risk being harassed or raped in mixed armies. Another specific environment that seems to create an atmosphere where SV is likely to occur more frequently is context of sports: professional sports and sports clubs, football teams having leisure time or similar contexts.³² It is hardly a coincidence that both environments, army and sports, are much based on discipline, physical power and competition. Also, pornography in the form of the commercialised sex industry can banalize and normalize SV.³³

Although in real life there are such border line environments, the context surrounding rape – namely war situation – was founded as the critical factor when rape finally became recognized as a war crime by the international law. SV was still not the in itself the initial subject of concern, but

it became a specific topic later within the general need that arose to re-determine war crimes in the post-Cold War era. In 1992, the UNSC sent a Commission of Experts to investigate grave breaches and violations of International Humanitarian Law that were taking place in the Yugoslav wars. The areas of field investigations were classified in three categories: 1) mass killings and destruction of property, 2) treatment of prisoners and detainees, and 3) systematic sexual assault and ethnic cleansing.³⁴

As for the sexual assault and ethnic cleansing, in 1994 the Final report of the UNSC Commission discovered five patterns of rape cases:³⁵

- 1) Individuals or small groups committing sexual assault in conjunction with looting and intimidation of the target group.
- 2) Individuals or small groups committing sexual assault in conjunction with fighting in an area, often including the rape of women in public.
- 3) Individuals or groups sexually assaulting people in detention because they have access to the people. Reports frequently refer to gang rape, while beatings and torture accompany most of the reported rapes.
- 4) Individuals or groups committing sexual assaults on women for the purpose of terrorising and humiliating them often as part of "ethnic cleansing". Survivors of some camps report that they believe they were detained for the purpose of rape.
- 5) Detention of women in hotels and similar facilities for the sole purpose of sexually entertaining the soldiers. These women are reportedly more often killed than exchanged.

6.2 Why rape?

SV can be classified by its context, the following question that arises is whether there is anything general that could be

31 Adams 2005.

32 Messner 2005.

33 Dines 2004.

34 Talmar 2008, 30–32.

35 Ibid.

stated about the assaulter's motives to rape. In classic rapes that are committed during times of peace, the rapist's motives are understood to be one-time-only, unique and opportunistic, even if the same person commits several rapes. In SV that takes place in armed conflicts, the assaulters' motives are understood to be less – if at all – determined by sexual desire. A war-time rape is about expressing power and domination under a collective strategy to govern by fear and terror. To what extent this motive is personal and individualistic in a war situation, and how individual desire is replaced by a collective motive or by chain of command is unclear. Whether rape is always an efficient strategic weapon for attaining those ends that were initially meant and planned is also questionable.

For as long as it is about describing how rape in war functions as a social phenomenon, there are three major discourses for explanations. They may occur mixed even in the same context, but they go as follows:

- 1) Oftentimes it is stated that war creates social eruption that in turn provides opportunities to rape. War-related SV results from the multiplication of opportunities to take advantage of women who are rendered vulnerable. Rape waves would result from a multiplication of opportunistic incidences. Each soldier can use the war situation as an opportunity. This one could be described as a *normative assumption*.
- 2) Another commonly expressed argument goes that women are raped because men find pride and enjoyment in establishing power over the women of the enemy. One kind of a feminist viewpoint is that in a war situation women's bodies become symbolic battlefields. Forced sex would not be opportunistic, but a manifestation of men's common interest to dominate women. This motive could be conscious, half-conscious or unconscious, but still it is there. Mass-scale SV against women would thus be an exacerbation of SV that already occurs during times of social stability. This could be described as a *feminist assumption*.
- 3) A third way of reasoning is derived from the second, and refers to development. In developing countries women face a double risk of discrimination: they are vulnerable because of the surrounding poverty, and as women they do not enjoy the same rights as men. Gender balance that has become distorted by war, lack of any resources and the lack of RoL would make women more vulnerable to SV. This way of reasoning could be described as a *developmentalist assumption*.

The last assumption mentioned, the developmentalist assumption, is the one that is used most often by the international community and the UN. It does not take a direct stand to the ultimate motives of SV, but claims rather that poverty and lack of legislation catalyse SV. From this a question of legality can be raised that if in times of peace rape is not a clearly illegal act that is prosecuted as other crimes would,

what can be expected during times of war? In that sense it is important to promote the RoL at all times, but in practice, without an acute crisis there is no ground for an international intervention against sexual violence.

6.3 Sexual violence by context

When rape is described as a war weapon, the underlying assumption is that the rapist represents the enemy. Nevertheless, raping can continue in a post-conflict phase by civilians. There is scattered information, but after wars marital and incestuous rapes also tend to become more common, as does domestic violence.

The DRC is an example of internal displacement as a risk factor for SV. The DRC has a huge problem of internal displacement, nearly one million people have been driven from their homes in the provinces of North and South Kivu where SV has been said to be the "worst in the world". This suggests that the mix of any military being close to women who stay in socially disrupted conditions contributes enormously to the likelihood of rape. The importance of the context-factor has been increasingly recognised since the beginnings of the 1990s. As an example of one of the most successful descriptive classifications is a recent Wilton Park conference summary that distinguishes SV in three categories in the following way:³⁶

- 1) Widespread and systematic, where it is deployed as a method by armed groups;
- 2) Widespread and opportunistic, where armed groups and ordinary civilians exploit conflict and chaos to attack women;
- 3) Isolated and random, where SV is a domestic and criminal matter that is unrelated to political strategy or to international peace and security.

The advantage of this kind of an approach is that it leaves aside all assumptions about gender relations, level of development or culture. It leaves out any speculations about the ultimately unknown motives of SV, and it can thus be agreed by a wide public. The inherent problem of the developmentalist assumption is that it combines development, poverty and gender perspective and is that it is apologetic by claiming ultimately that men rape because they are men, or because there is underdevelopment and poverty.

7 Social consequences of sexual violence

Threat of SV creates an obstacle to women's and girls' participation in public life. If one woman is raped, others become influenced by fear. Still, there is a general difficulty to accept that SV may happen to any woman, and women who experience SV are given no credence when they report being assaulted. Rape is not considered as a crime for as long as it can be portrayed like having sex without force. In times of peace, a woman's sexual conduct before the act is examined and pondered in detail.

Although the consent element has been abolished in the international law, and although it is not difficult to agree with a commonsense understanding that during war conditions there is no talk about woman's consent, the basic presumption is that rape is somehow a woman's own fault is difficult to abolish completely. Being raped remains a stigma. Moreover, the absence of compensation, even in symbolic form, to raped women (while still punishing the perpetrators) conveys a message that damage made to women is not worth of indemnifying.

As the war context in itself increases the vulnerability of women and civilians in general to be sexually assaulted, conflicts bring a certain *oversexualisation* of the environment in which sex becomes increasingly sold or exchanged for food or accommodation. There is a saying that goes, in a war situation "violence becomes sexy and sex becomes violence".

In societies where women's networks are based on kinship, a typical consequence for a woman who is raped is that she becomes rejected by her husband and ostracised from her community. It is difficult to get (re)married if rape is known. The rejection of raped women and especially those women who are injured has clearly been documented by individual cases in several medical studies.

When being raped means there is a threat of total rejection for women, it also means that the sphere of their daily tasks becomes narrowed. Going to school equals a threat to be raped, as well as going to water points to bring water, and there is no cultural mechanism for local men to protect women during times of threat. By these kinds of chain reactions, rape waves can paralyse entire villages, towns and regions. Over the course of time, a generation of women may thus have gaps in their basic education. As such, gender relations that have

become dysfunctional by generalised SV can take generations to become balanced again.

In the DRC the most concerned Kivu provinces have suffered not only from large-scale SV, but also the rejection of SV victims has become a mass phenomenon. The hospitals of Panzi in South Kivu and Heal Africa in North Kivu, together with many NGOs that organise vocational training, have become islets of rejected women. The endemic SV that has continued since the beginning of the 1990s has pushed women and girls to the margins of society. It is likely that SV has already had demographic implications on the household level by an increase of single mothers. Unfortunately, unlike in the case of Kinshasa, such research has not yet been done in Eastern Congo.³⁷

In this regard, one branch of the Human Rights-oriented approach calls for *symbolic reparations*. This means that in the absence of possibilities to compensate the damage done to certain groups and individuals that were falsely prosecuted; the state should express a public apology for its mistreatment of citizens and acknowledge its failure to protect them. If this policy is ever implemented, a public apology can play a large role in the later stage of peacebuilding³⁸

In practice, in the DRC many NGOs organise activities that train rejected women to artisanal professions in order to have a livelihood that can help them to sustain themselves economically. There should however be more variation in training; it is striking that most of the vocational training aimed for women are for artisanal and agricultural professions.

37 On Kinshasa see de Herdt 2004.

38 Apology and forgiveness are central values in Christianity, whereas outside its sphere apology from authority can be interpreted as losing one's face, or as a provocation.

8 Physical consequences of sexual violence

During times of peace, physical injuries resulting from rapes are in most cases limited to tearing and bruises.³⁹ In rapes, there is always risk of sexually transmitted infections as well as unwanted pregnancies. Permanent gynaecological harm is rare. Physical traumas of rape tend to be much more severe and common during wars. The injuries may be due to gang rape, detention for sexual slavery, or intruding objects to orifices of the victim. Rape also provokes miscarriages and untimely deliveries. The eventual unwanted pregnancies in their turn lead to abortions and risks of complications. Risks increase immensely in amateur abortions.⁴⁰

The causal relations in between SV, poverty and development are undeniably clear when it comes to physical consequences of rape. In the DRC one of the most difficult consequences of rape is fistula, which is a passageway between two organs or vessels.⁴¹ They result in incontinence of urine and/or faeces. Fistulas are also caused by prolonged child birth. These obstetric fistulas could be prevented by caesarean section. Therefore, the occurrence of fistulas reflects the state of maternal health. Furthermore, the occurrence of obstetric fistulas is also an indicator of development and woman's status in general because they occur more likely at young age and short time spacing between deliveries. When fistula is a result of SV, it is called a traumatic fistula. Fistulas can finally also be caused unintentionally by health care workers. In that case they are classified as iatrogenic fistulas.⁴² The World Health Organization (WHO) estimates that approximately two million women have and an untreated fistula and approximately

100 000 women develop fistula each year. Nowadays, fistula is most prevalent in sub-Saharan Africa and Asia.

In Eastern Congo, where obstetric fistulas and sexual assaults are both common, women may experience both events by coincidence.⁴³ A woman also has a high risk of getting an iatrogenic fistula during the treatment of trauma, during curettage or miscarriage because the health care workers can be unprofessional and hospital technology is of poor quality. In practice, many fistulas that are reported to have been caused by SV are in fact of obstetric or iatrogenic origin. Nonetheless, both iatrogenic and obstetric fistulas are indirectly related to SV because had the woman not been raped, she would not have had a miscarriage, abortion or an untimely delivery. Therefore, it has been suggested by experts of gynaecological fistulas that all fistulas that relate to SV should be classified as traumatic fistulas.⁴⁴

In developed countries, a rape trauma is understood as a psychological one. It is not widely dispersed information that in war rapes, at least in Central Africa, corrective gynaecological surgery is often needed and those operations require surgeons with a lot of experience and sufficiently equipped hospitals. Furthermore, the post-operative phase of fistula repair operations requires specialised care, it has a high degree of complications and the problem of fistulas may still reoccur during the patient's next delivery. Fistulas are complex and unique as any soft tissue trauma. There is still misinformation about the ease and the standard price (\$300 USD) of surgical repair operations even in an UN-funded web-page⁴⁵. Likewise, there are exaggerated figures about the number of repair operations carried out in private hospitals in the DRC.

In many countries, access to a safe abortion is impossible or restricted and illegal abortions are frequent, especially in Africa. The Maputo Plan of Action contains recommendations to guarantee safe abortion, but it is still not ratified by all countries and it has been attacked by a conservative lobby working against it.⁴⁶

39 Loue & Sajatovich 2007.

40 Onsrud & al. 2008.

41 Ahuka Ona & al. 2008; Taback 2008; A fistula may occur between vagina or rectum, which is called a recto-vaginal fistula, or between vagina and bladder which is called a recto-vaginal fistula.

42 The occurrence of iatrogenic fistulas is in direct relation to all other fistulas. As fistulas cause incontinence and an inability to have children, women who get fistulas risk to become abandoned by their husbands and ostracised by their communities. In Europe and in developed countries in general, fistulas are nowadays rare because they have been eradicated by access to caesarean section. It also means that there is not much specialisation to surgery of traumatic gynaecological fistulas.

43 Onsrud & al. 2008.

44 Ibid.

45 <http://www.endfistula.org/donate.htm>.

46 Maputo Plan of Action 2006.

Finally, as for immediate response to rape, there is need for an immediate post-exposure prophylaxis (PEP), a special kit (called Kit-PEP) which is meant for emergency response and has been invented to protect individuals exposed to rape, unwanted pregnancy, HIV and sexually transmitted infections. The medication should be taken within 72 hours of exposure, and the treatment should be followed and controlled within the following months.

9 UNSCR 1820 and its criticism

SV had never been the initial and independent issue for international concern until the UNSC voted for a resolution specifically against SV on June 19, 2008. It was declared to reaffirm Resolution 1325 from the year 2000 and to be a supporting element for its full implementation. It urges the UN to impose sanctions on violators and requests the Secretary General to create a list of measures for minimising the risk of SV and to formulate guidelines for peacekeepers to protect women.

The Resolution presents arguments that are confirmations or reformulations of previous arguments already implicit in UNSCR 1325. The aim of UNSCR 1820 is to specifically target SV by recognising a direct relationship between the widespread and/or systematic use of SV as an instrument of conflict and the maintenance of international peace. UNSCR 1820 compels the international community to regard SV as a self standing security issue that is linked with durable peace, to exclude SV from amnesty proportions, and to make SV prevention and punishment "an obligation and not an aspiration". It also calls for prevention of SV through effective military or police tactics and by efforts to end impunity. Beyond the UNSCR 1820, there are also hopes that it could help as a juridical tool against SV within process of disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, reintegration, and resettlement (DDRRR), in making higher ranking commanders responsible for ending rapes by his inferiors and therefore, ending rapes would be stated as a condition before any compensation would be given to his capitulating troops.

The reception of UNSCR 1820 has not been without criticism. There was no real innovation in it; Resolution 1325 had already taken SV into account and present international law already provides means to intervene SV. In that sense, there was no need for a new resolution. One particular but important point, 1820 even risks to take a step backwards by stating that SV can constitute a war crime. This formulation dilutes the stand of international law that rape committed by a war setting is a war crime. Furthermore, "war tactic" does not fit a post-conflict setting, which is very common to high incidences of rape and where the rapists are civilians. It is impossible to put the blame on a chain of command in absence of a military context. Finally, the scope was almost

solely in relation to Africa: the DRC and Darfur. This in turn can be viewed as a strategy to focus on *demonising* wars in Africa instead of tackling the international connections in those conflicts. The Resolution came through during the US presidency of the Council. One year before, a similar resolution to define rape as a "weapon of war" had failed to pass because of opposition of China, Russia and South Africa.

Redefining rape as a war weapon by UNSCR 1820 will hopefully call for more attention and give support in prosecuting rape in a military superior-subordinate relationship. In certain cases it can also help in putting pressure on warlords in peace negotiations that they order cessation of raping as cessation of use of other arms. Nevertheless, resorting to metaphors that associate rape to something other than a rape – war weapon, strategy, genocide, epidemics, metasthesis, unfortunate by-product of a military conflict, gender disaster – is not in itself a solution. Rather, renaming rape again and again is symptomatic of problems to consider it as a war crime that needs no extra justification.

10 Conclusion

For ages, rape in armed conflicts has been considered as something that has “always” taken place alongside the battle. Alternatively, the issue has been passed and silenced as something “too horrible to imagine”. In recent wars and armed conflicts that are intra state and take place in the close proximity of civilians, SV in conflicts has increased yet again. Another difference is the role of the media; news service has developed and SV is more likely to come into the public discourse through the media. Thanks to international concern and the rapid development of international law, acts of violence against women are considered as legal crimes.

SV has been used as a systematic war weapon with rational aims to govern populations by terror, but SV also represents one of the most irrational sides of human behaviour. War conditions seem to fuel the emergence of environments where cultural rules that regulate sexual behaviour vanish, and the context becomes a risk for SV. Still, no environment can generate behaviour that has no biological basis. Therefore understanding the emergence mechanisms of massive SV in wars would require involvement of the biologic sciences and neurosciences. Little is known about how it is physiologically possible to perform rape by order of a third person. What are the roles of desire, satisfaction, inhibition and guiltiness in that scenario?

Patriarchy or other variations of male dominated culture is often taken for granted to be the impetus for rapes to be used as a weapon. However, according to the same logic, those patriarchist cultural attitudes that regard women as property of men also have an interest to protect women against SV in a war context. The problem of outbursts of SV in wars may have nothing to do with woman's status because the interest is not to rape lower creatures. There is no clear evidence that subordinate women are easier targets to rape in wars, or vice versa, that emancipated and empowered women would be better protected from SV during armed conflicts. Therefore, there should be perhaps better adjustment in the assumptions of the UN Resolutions that link SV with the participation of women in society and development issues.

In other words, the same set of cultural attitudes that in a war context can justify the use of rape as a war weapon is also less tolerant in what comes to being attacked by raping one's

own women. The lack of individually directed compensation for the female victim in the past or in traditional societies only shows lack of individualistic thinking. As such, traditional customs in which the compensation takes form by exchanging goods between families, or where revenge is directed against the assaulter's kin or community, or in which women are just left on their own, does not in itself prove a “low status” of either of the sexes. Development, equality and participation are vital values and aims, but SV as a problem is independent from them.

The fact that the SV worst in the world takes place in an area of Central Africa which is as an area that is not clearly patrilinear should not be overlooked, if cultural aspects are to be linked with the topic. From the point view of diplomacy in peacebuilding, there could be common grounds enough in between different actors – states, INGO's, local authorities – to work against SV as a particular form of violence that is considered as particularly immoral. SV as a war weapon can be outlawed in the same way and for the same reasons as landmines or as chemical weapons can be prohibited because they are cruel and target civilians. It might have been a wiser strategy to go straight to the point of SV without any background theory that can be interpreted as ideological or as feminist – and therefore a provocation.

UNSCR 1325 quite explicitly urged the UN Member States, “to take special measures to protect women and girls from gender-based violence, particularly rape and other forms of sexual abuse, and all other forms of violence in situations of armed conflict” and to “adopt a gender perspective” with regards “special needs of women and girls during repatriation and resettlement and for rehabilitation, reintegration and post-conflict reconstruction”. Special attention to protect women in war and post-conflict is needed, but in the UNSCRs it is not stated who should protect women. Women are the subjects and women are the objects, but there is no message addressed to men in UN resolutions. Strategies to empower women can end up piling more responsibility on women themselves when they become *de facto* victims in wars.

As SV has now been entitled as a “tactic of war” by UN resolution 1820, a parallel change should take place in conceptualizing the victims of rape as war victims, and not as

“raped (women)”. At present in Central Africa, for instance, the victims of SV are conceptualised as a social problem. The attention that is given to victims of SV consists of making them objects of various kinds of counselling, reintegration programmes and charity. In this respect, the intervention of many NGO agendas to “empower women” – by relying on UNSCR 1325 – can also negatively interfere with rebuilding the RoL because they create an illusion that a retraining program or donating a goat for woman can replace juridical compensation.

Thus, together with impunity, the absence of compensation mechanisms for the victims gives a green light for rapes to continue. That, if anything, is a message that a woman has no status or value. She is valueless because she can be harmed without being compensated for the violence she endured by any measure of value. In today's world, value is measured and exchanged by money. In the UN approach that has been adopted in peacebuilding and civilian crisis management, women are considered to have “special needs” in an armed conflict setting. Special needs are mentioned altogether 8 times in UNSCR 1820. Receiving monetary compensation for being a victim of violence in war, be it SV or non-SV is not a special need, but supposed to be a normal practise in RoL. The question arises whether money should be transformed to some kind of gender-money unless it could be paid for women?

In traditional societies, rapes have been sanctioned and it has a price. A price can take form as a violent revenge to the perpetrator and his community (perhaps in the form of a rape) or by reparation measures delivered to the victim's community. These kinds of traditional customs can be seen as backward practises that violate woman's rights as an individual, as a juridical subject and person. Nonetheless, at present, the international community is in fact acting in the same way when it passes over the whole question of compensation for the victim herself. Strengthening RoL will be left half-done for as long as the rights of the victims are not taken seriously. Perhaps it is only by imposing a price on rape and by addressing it to the victim herself or himself that the international community will finally put words into practise in the battle against SV. In practice, as many of the assaulters are indigent by the time of trial, this would require an international compensation fund for victims of SV.

Such an international fund would likely raise questions about the responsibility of the state towards its own citizen-victims. If the international community covers the reparations – under a transitional justice for instance – does it not release the state of its responsibility? The question is legitimate in terms of principles, but in practice it should be seen in contrast to the sums of money already budgeted in peacekeeping and civilian crisis management operations. EU countries are willing to pay risk and hardship allowances to its own crisis management personnel for working in dangerous areas. The idea that risk is to be compensated by money is internalised for the EU citizens. The idea that the demobilised soldiers should get a monetary reward for turning in arms from all sources is equally widely accepted. Both examples are based on thought

that ultimately it is a question of costs of peacebuilding. It is thus only a matter of perspective to include money paid to female victims also as a cost for peacebuilding.

If eradicating SV as a war weapon is to be the priority number one, it is not necessary to link other additional goals about development, gender and women's empowerment in the strategy. The approach of international law to regard SV as an autonomous war crime should have been used as such. UNSCR 1820's formulation to define SV as war tactic still provides an opportunity to associate victims of SV to victims of war or to wounded soldiers who are thereby entitled to compensation. In any case, important progress has already been made in identifying SV as an entity of its own and the link between war and SV has been established enough in order to create at least some constant policies against war-related sexual assaults.

11 Recommendations

It is widely accepted that SV has medical, juridical, social and psychological dimensions. In the scarcity of resources, those fields can end up in a conflict of interests. From the point of view of the victim, the first priority is always medical, and from the point of view of the local government the first priority is to restore RoL and to end impunity. In practice, all actions bring costs: financing is needed to cover surgical operations and to construct hospitals. Financing is equally needed to build penal establishments, to organise correctional treatment and to train prosecutors. It is justified to claim that restoring RoL works as prevention by creating security, and it is equally justified to claim that omitting the victims' rights is a violation of basic rights, corrupts the RoL and adds fuel to SV, which is a threat to human security.

In practice there are different actors with different mandates. Some, like the ICRC and Médecins Sans Frontières

(MSF), concentrate on direct catastrophe aid with exclusively humanitarian missions and the duration of these mandates is meant to be short. The peace missions that target changing certain structures of the society (SSR for instance) have longer mandates. Then there is a wide variety of organisations for development co-operation that are specialised in long term development projects that aim at changing the society in the long run, for example to correct gender-balance in chronic conflict areas by trying to rebalance or to change the gender roles.

In the domain of immediate peacebuilding measures in a post-conflict setting realistic expectations are needed. Table 2 below proposes some likelihoods of success in interventions of civilian crisis management:

**TABLE 2: What is doable in a short term intervention?
Chances of peacebuilding vs. war-related sexual violence**

(– less likelihood to success

+ more likelihood to success)

Guarantee non-repetition of outbreaks of SV	–
Provide monitoring and technological solutions for reporting cases of SV	–
Change local perceptions on SV	–
Ensure delivery and availability of post-prophylaxis kits (Pep-Kits) to villages.	+
Identify cultures that are vulnerable for SV in order to enforce monitoring and protection	–
Identifying environments that are vulnerable for SV in order to enforce monitoring and protection	+
Prevent a raped woman's exclusion from society	–
Guarantee quality of certain dispensaries that provide health care available rape	+
Empower victims of rape who suffer from physical injuries	–
Enforce capacity building of healthy women	+

Faced with the complexity of the war-related SV it is evident that no single strategy can address both its causes and effects. That is why multidisciplinary approaches are necessary. Their use depends naturally on the nature of the crisis area.

11.1 Coordination and critical selection of cooperation partners working against sexual violence

In missions, one of the main problems in efforts to eradicate SV is the lack of coordination in between police departments, health services, prosecutors, eventual social integration providers, INGOs, NGOs and UN-based agencies that all have some kind of agenda to work against SV. Sometimes there is general ignorance about which organisation is undertaking various activities. As SV has become of a fashionable topic for fundraising, the agenda of many NGOs is relation for fighting against SV, but sometimes their claimed "holistic approach" proves to be a veil for non-professionalism. Therefore, in rationalising coordination on the field, a particularly critical attitude should be adopted towards the candidates for co-operation. The principle of supporting the state's ownership to its own crisis should be used as a selection principle for listing organisations that do not have explicit action plans but provide, for instance victim counselling. Another selection principle for determining trustworthy agencies is in relation to research and data collection. Any organisation should be regarded as suspect if they publish data without reporting their methods of collection and are not able to provide documentation when asked.

11.2 Collect better data and work against misinformation on sexual violence

Data on the magnitude of sexual information should be based solely on the incidences of rape cases and never on calculations and estimations derived from epidemiology. The kinds of approximations that are often published in the media about a certain percentage of women being raped do not fulfil the requirements for being considered a quantitative research method to the phenomenon of SV. They can also be regarded as degrading women of a certain country, and finally, they imply that that SV prevalence would be as banal as diabetes or the prevalence of tuberculosis. Misinformation regarding the amounts of rapes should not be tolerated as it has a negative effect on the fight against SV. Once revealed, all the information on SV loses credibility.

In collecting the incident report, cooperation between health care workers and police should be coordinated. Not that hospitals would submit identifiable information on its patients to the police – numerous misunderstandings on the field of local and international workers must be taken into account – but the difference between the statistical, anonymous data and data in which identification is essential (registers) should be clearly defined and understood. Creating practical models for reporting the cases would be another area of capacity building that should be carried out by international actors. There are

many possibilities for improvement in creating better forms for medical reports and crime reports. Translation into local languages would facilitate the administration enormously; however, sometimes the national laws on official languages can create an obstacle for this. Various technical solutions, such as satellite-based communicators could be considered instead of gathering information on paper. Another possibility to be investigated is allowing to the victim of SV to make a crime report regarding the offence at the reception of the doctor's office: either the doctors could be accorded the required juridical rights to write the crime report, or other candidates could be trained as "parajurists". Finally, this kind of knowledge management should be used for coordinating databases between medical experts and police.

11.3 Bringing together local spiritual leaders to search for a common ground

On the field in crisis areas, any multidisciplinary approach against SV requires a minimum common understanding between the local authorities and key opinion leaders about the essence of SV. The actual local authorities should be the first individuals identified and approached. Common ground can be made about identifying SV, but there may be less common ground as for to the reasons beyond SV, about who the assaulters are and about the root causes of the conflict itself. Churches and religious NGOs tend to associate the causes of SV to a breakdown of moral in which people are no more being taught about religion. In finding a common strategy, disputes may arise about whose moral values should be restored in the war-torn region.

In coordinating the many actors that work against SV there should be a conscious effort towards pluralism on the crisis area. No single actor should claim a monopoly in knowing how to eradicate SV or how to heal communities damaged by SV. Ideally, all the local religious leaders and leaders of as many NGOs as possible could formulate a common resolution against SV.

11.4 Encouraging states to ratify international agreements with regard to sexual violence

As for supporting the state authorities in incorporation of rules relating to SV, international law provides an appropriate model for reforming national laws on sexual crimes at national level. In this regard, the DRC's adoption of new laws on SV in June 2006 is an encouraging example that a failed state can carry out progressive law reforms. The DRC's law on SV has been published in modern and clearly understandable language in the form of a small booklet that is easy to distribute. Paragraphs about rape have also been translated into local lingua franca languages.

The states should also be encouraged to ratify international agreements on reproductive rights, namely the international law treaties, and the Rome Statute on Reproductive Rights. Forceful impregnation is mentioned as a specific crime under international law, and logically, banning abortion for those

who have been forcefully impregnated (at least for reasons of ethnic cleansing for example) should also be regarded as crime. However, in the international law as well as in the Rome statute, laws concerning pregnancy are left for national legislation.⁴⁷ Concerning the African continent, the Maputo Plan of Action stands for authorising medical abortion in cases of sexual assault, rape, incest and when the continued pregnancy endangers the mental and physical health of the mother or the life of the mother or the foetus. Still, it is not ratified by all African nations. In practice, the issue is likely to cause many controversies, but a discussion about the fate of women who are forced to carry forced pregnancies to the end should be brought forward and examined.

11.5 Eliminate and/or monitor risk environments for sexual violence

It would be ideal if an early warning system could be developed for rape waves. It would, however, be too difficult to predict it from the basis of the local culture. In recent history there have been outbreaks of SV in Japan, in South-Eastern Europe as well as in Central Africa. Instead, it is possible to identify rape-risky environments.

Since it is known that the proximity of internally displaced women with any military is a combination that is likely to produce SV, anything should be made in order to prevent the creation of such an environment. There is no need to identify early warning signals of SV because an area with single women driven from their homes in proximity of soldiers should in itself be regarded as an early warning. Once a refugee area has been formed, there should be some kind of an immediate response plan that contains a sufficient reserve of kits of post-exposure prophylaxes and juridical counselling.

11.6 Initiate or support national policy in regards to the children conceived of rape

Living conditions of children who are born out of rape are likely to violate Declaration of the Rights of the Child. Any agenda against largely spread SV should thus include a plan in regards to organising adoption counselling. The role of the state in adoption services should be supported in order to strengthen the principle of National Ownership and also in order to avoid the danger of adoption services that are linked to human trafficking.

11.7 Strengthening Rule of Law by emphasising the rights of victims

Enforcement of RoL is always needed to stop SV in conflicts and in dealing with its consequences. In peace operations, as in the process of rebuilding the state, a specific message should be clear that an eventual new legislation on SV or appealing to international law in systematic rape does not justify the assumption that SV was accepted in any given

war zone only until a prohibitive and punitive law was established. Otherwise, there is a risk that local population as well as traditional authorities reject juridical innovations as encroachment. Ideally, in presenting the new law or any message about punishability of here should be a bridging to previous national legislation, religious law or local moral code that used to regulate sexual behaviour.

Victim's rights should be regarded as an essential element of establishing RoL. A person who has experienced SV should be guaranteed the right to be treated as any person injured in an armed conflict. Classifying victims of war-related rapes appropriately as war victims instead of victims of SV or just "raped women" and associating them with the war-wounded could provide the critical impetus to consider victims of SV as individual subjects who are entitled to compensation. This would also require enforcing collection from the sentenced assaulters. In practice, this would necessitate establishing an international foundation by UN or EU for victims of rapes in wars.

11.8 Integrated training on sexual violence to courses on crisis management

Unlike chemical weapons or landmines, SV as a war weapon is barely a subject on which there should be special courses on peacebuilding. Information about SV should be integrated to different courses related to peacebuilding and all pre-mission training where civilians, police or military personnel are trained before going on missions abroad. A course module on SV should contain basic information on international law and the various forms of SV. In pre-mission training there should be information about local administrative practises on SV, such as the procedure with medical certificates, the local context of RoL, as well as the availability of prosecutors and prisons. Ideally it should contain information on local customary laws by a professional anthropologist.

11.9 Raising awareness

Among the first things proposed against SV in peacebuilding is "raising awareness". Yet, there is too many awareness campaigns by radio and by posters which risk trivialising SV. Portraying a certain group (women and children) as a possible target of mistreatment is dubious because it also recreates the stereotype images of victimised women. In the long run it can prolong and perpetuate misbalance in gender relations. In the media there is already hype around the topic of rape in internal battles and it is almost excessively reported as barbaric narratives.

The best straight-to-the-matter approach is to concentrate on informing the public about the law – provided that paragraphs outlawing SV do exist – and if not, about the international law and the punishability of SV. There is still a lot of misinformation about rape being a hopeless crime to be prosecuted.

47 Sackeallars 2005.

In many countries, informing the general public about law reforms requires different approaches in urban and rural areas. It has been found by an NGO in the DRC that in rural areas where people are less literate, pictures and discussion events are more successful in conveying information about SV than written booklets and posters, whereas in towns pictures are no more that efficient. In organising public events on SV is appropriate to be prepared that certain issues can upset the audience and steal attention. Outlawing marital rape can be such an issue, as well as symmetry of SV, whether a woman can rape a man.⁴⁸

48 Kabusa & Mbalamya 2006.

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Reintegration in Aceh Indonesia

Opinions of the Finnish civilian crisis management experts

Tommi Niemi

The purpose of this article is to examine the opinions of the Finnish civilian crisis management experts in Aceh about the reintegration of the ex-combatants in Aceh. This article is based on interviews conducted during autumn 2006. The interviews aimed to find out how the Finnish civilian crisis management experts understood the concept of the reintegration in the light of civilian crisis management (CCM) context, methods and goals. Another aspect analysed in this article is the question about the success of the reintegration in Aceh. Did the Finnish civilian crisis management experts find the reintegration in Aceh to be a failure or success?¹

¹ The article was finished in December 2007.

1 Background and context of the conflict in Aceh

1.1 *Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration*

Peacebuilding in conflict torn societies is always a complicated task. The problem is that one has to work in an environment that is characterised by weak political and social structures, uncertainty and insecurity. In this kind of situation the aim of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration, (DDR), is to strengthen the overall security situation.² In the long run the aim of the DDR process is to create stability in post-conflict societies.³ Today, the DDR processes constitute an important part of many peacekeeping and reconstruction programmes in post-conflict areas.⁴ Despite the fact that disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration are linked to each other, it should not be defined too strictly as a continuum where disarmament is followed by demobilisation and demobilisation by reintegration. DDR should be understood more flexibly because it might be necessary to continue disarmament even if some groups of combatants have already been demobilised.⁵

In the disarmament phase arms, ammunition and explosives are collected, controlled and disposed. The objects of disarmament can be both combatants and civilian population. The aim of the disarmament is to reduce the number of weapons in the society. In this way it tries to diminish the threat of violence. On a wider scale disarmament is seeking to provide an environment that facilitates the transition from conflict to peace. Disarmament is normally taking place during a period when the parties giving up arms and the local population are still partly unsure of the durability of peace.⁶ It should also be kept in mind that by giving up their arms, civilians and especially combatants are also giving up the physical and economic security that the arms have guaranteed so far. When giving up the arms they are hoping that peace

and its possibilities are better options than continuing the conflict.⁷

Demobilisation refers to a formal discharge of active combatants from the armed forces or from an armed group. The numbers of armed forces are cut off or they are disbanded as part of a bigger transition from conflict to peace. To the combatants themselves demobilisation means that they are giving up the combatant identity. By taking off their uniform, if they have one, they become civilians. The target groups for disarmament and demobilisation are in many cases overlapping but they are not identical. Demobilisation can happen in many ways. Mostly the combatants are brought to the camps that are built for the demobilisation. In other cases, demobilisation can simply constitute the delivering of the uniform and a ceremony that symbolises the transition from the military life to civilian life. Demobilisation can also happen without any formal process. After a conflict the members of an armed group can simply leave behind their arms and unit.⁸

The third part of the DDR process is the reintegration. First, the reintegration referred to the programmes dealing with the economic assimilation of the demobilised combatants. Later, more emphasis has been put on the social aspects of reintegration. The integration of the combatants to the local civil society has been considered as important. One of the latest improvements has been the recognition of the importance of political reintegration. Therefore, the goal of the reintegration can be considered as a societal process aiming at economic, political and social assimilation of ex-combatants and their families into the civil society.⁹

Originally, the DDR process was understood as a military question and emphasis was put on the disarmament and demobilisation. This was however insufficient to ensure the integration of the combatants into the civilian society. This is why a development focus was added into the process.¹⁰ Today, reintegration is connected both to the development and security questions. Because of these connections the problems

2 UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations 1999, 16.

3 Stockholm Initiative 2006a, 13–14.

4 Gleichmann et al. 2004, 12; Knight & Özerdem 2004, 499.

5 Nilsson 2005, 31–33; UN Security Council 2000, 8.

6 Gleichmann et al. 2004, 29.

7 Knight & Özerdem 2004, 506.

8 Gleichmann et al. 2004, 45–48.

9 Nilsson 2005, 22–28.

10 Stockholm Initiative 2006a, 9.

and questions raised during the reintegration are more diverse than during the disarmament or the demobilisation. The reintegration touches also on other issues such as economic growth and the retraining of the combatants, the issues that arise when communities are receiving the returning combatants, and the issues that arise with the reintegration of groups that have special needs, for example women and children.¹¹

The main objects of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration are the combatants. For example, the criteria that define who will get the reintegration benefits are based on the definition of combatant. A "combatant" can be a government soldier, a rebel, a cook or a prostitute. In general, peace agreements¹² define which armed groups are part of the DDR process, but they do not define what is meant by combatant.¹³ In cases where the combatants are a clearly distinct group and these groups have their clearly defined command structures, the definition of combatant is not a problem. In the present day "new" wars, this is hardly the case because the same person can be a combatant, a robber or a civilian depending from the point of view.¹⁴

The opinions of how extensively a combatant should be defined can be divided in two. The supporters of the broader definition are saying that the goal, building human security via the DDR process necessitates as broad definition as possible. The definition of the combatant should cover all people who have been part of the fighting forces as combatants, or in supporting roles.¹⁵ These supporting roles can be composed of logistical or administrative functions but also something else outside the present day military organisation. If this is not done, the result could be a situation where a sex slave does not get the benefits that their captors are getting.¹⁶

The narrow definition argues that only the ones who have participated in direct fighting and their families should be considered as combatants who are eligible to the reintegration benefits. Refugees, communities who are receiving the ex-combatants, and the people who have not participated in direct fighting should not be counted as beneficiaries in reintegration programmes or counted as combatants. In conflicts, different groups have different needs and problems. If these different groups are squeezed under the topic "ex-combatant", then the allocation of reintegration benefits is difficult. The broad definition of ex-combatant weakens the effectiveness of the aid. Other groups, than the armed combatants, should be helped via other relief programmes.¹⁷

1.2 Aceh and GAM

Aceh is situated on the north-western part of Sumatra. The population is around four million and the capital is Banda Aceh. The most common spoken language is Aceh and the official language is Bahasa Indonesia.¹⁸ Aceh is one of the richest parts of Indonesia in regard to its natural resources, both oil and natural gas. This turned Indonesia's economy around in the 1970s, but the profits flowed to Jakarta to support Java's development or Jakarta-based politicians and military men.¹⁹ Today oil and gas still account for a significant share of Aceh's GDP but in the future this share will decline due to a major reduction in Aceh's oil reserves.²⁰ Agriculture²¹ is at the moment Aceh's main economical field.²²

The state of Aceh was founded in the early sixteenth century and its "golden age" occurred in the early seventeenth century during the reign of Sultan Iskandar Muda 1607–1636. After this era the Malay-governed cosmopolitan trading state ceased to be a significant force outside the northern tip of Sumatra.²³ By the 1820s Aceh was again expanding as a commercial and political power. During this time it produced over half of the world's supply of pepper.²⁴ Up until the Dutch conquest Aceh's economic and cultural linkages were to the Indian Ocean and Malayan Peninsula, not to the Java sea world dominated first by the Java then the Dutch.²⁵ For the Dutch Aceh was too powerful and wealthy to allow it to continue as an independent state. In 1873 the Dutch started the conquest of Aceh but the Acehenese resistance continued for many decades after the annexation.²⁶

During the Second World War Aceh alongside with Indonesia was occupied by Japanese. The surrender of Japanese Emperor in August 1945 left a power vacuum in Aceh.²⁷ In 1945 Achenese leaders declared the area as part of the Republic of Indonesia. At first the Republican government had a very limited capacity to influence events in Aceh. In late 1948 and early 1949 Daud Bereu'eh, military commander of the province of North Sumatra and an Acehenese religious leader, demanded formal recognition of Aceh as a separate province. During this time the Republican government was in weakened position and accepted the Acehenese demand. From 1950s onwards Republican government sought to reassert its authority in Aceh. In September 1953 Daud Bereu'eh proclaimed Aceh's secession from the Republic of Indonesia, and its adherence to the Indonesian Islamic state of the Darul Islam. This was followed by a series of attacks

11 International Peace Academy 2002, 2.

12 Look for example the peace agreement between the government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone (RUF) from the year 1999 at <http://www.sierra-leone.org/lomeaccord.html>.

13 Eronen & Linden 2006, 8.

14 Specht 2003, 77.

15 Ibid.

16 Gleichmann et al. 2004, 15.

17 Nilsson 2005, 25–26.

18 Reid 2006, 4–5.

19 Taylor 2003, 365; Brown & Cribb 1995, 162–163.

20 The World Bank & Bank of Indonesia 2009; The World Bank 2005.

21 This includes forestry and fishery.

22 The World Bank & Bank of Indonesia 2009.

23 Ricklefs 1993, 32–36.

24 Ricklefs 1993, 143–144.

25 Reid 2003, 1.

26 Ricklefs 1993, 143–145.

27 Reid 2006, 105–106.

on army and government posts.²⁸ The goal of the rebellion was not independence, but rather regional autonomy and proclamation of Indonesia as an Islamic state.²⁹ Daud Bereu'eh and his troops withdrew to the hills and a military stalemate ensued. Eventually Daud Bereu'eh agreed to a ceasefire in 1957 and talks then began with Jakarta for a permanent solution to Aceh. In 1959 the government accepted the creation of what was virtually an Islamic state within the nation by giving the Aceh the status of a Special District (*Daerah Istimewa*). The fighting then stopped.³⁰ This and other concessions the central government made were eroded by the centralisation and authoritarian rule of Jakarta or were simply not implemented.³¹

In 1976 a new rebel group, The Aceh Freedom Movement (*Gerakan Aceh Merdeka* GAM), was founded. Its leader was Teungku Hasan di Tiro. The small-scale initial revolt was quickly suppressed and most of the leaders were killed or arrested, although Hasan di Tiro and a few others managed to escape overseas. A larger rebellion in 1989 was met by a harsh counter-insurgency operation and Aceh was declared to be a Military Operations Zone (*Daerah Operasi Militer*, DOM). This gave wide authority to the Indonesian army to deal with the movement. The GAM rebellion was largely defeated by 1992. The fall of President Suharto in May 1998 led to the collapse of the authority of the central government. This caused a sudden growth in antimilitary and anti-Jakarta sentiment in Aceh. In an effort to restore public confidence in the central government the DOM status of Aceh was lifted. Despite this, violence continued in Aceh. By the middle of 1999 the GAM was better organised and in control of a greater proportion of Acehnese countryside than ever before.³²

Despite the violence there were peace talks between the Indonesian government and the GAM. These talks led to a so called Humanitarian Pause in May 2000. The aims of the agreement were, among others, to deliver humanitarian assistance and promote confidence-building measures.³³ This cease-fire did not rest on firm foundations. Almost as soon as the Humanitarian Pause started there were reports of clashes between Indonesian security forces and GAM combatants. Despite this the pause was a significant achievement and it also set a pattern that was to be replicated throughout the following years of the peace process.³⁴

In 2002, after further negotiations and pressure from the Indonesian government. The Cessation of Hostilities Framework Agreement (COHA) was signed between the government of Indonesia and GAM in December 2002. The announcement of the agreement was greeted with much popular enthusiasm in Aceh, as well as in Jakarta and even internationally. Despite the agreement, clashes continued to

occur and neither of the parties complied with the agreement.³⁵ For example the agreement required the "phased placement" of GAM's "weapons, arms, and ordinance in the designated sites" together with the "simultaneous phased relocation of TNI forces".³⁶ GAM fighters were naturally reluctant to hand over their weapons so long as armed soldiers and police remained in Aceh. In order to save the agreement the two sides met on May 2002. The discussions failed and military emergency declaration was issued to Aceh.³⁷

In 2004 the elected president Yudhoyono wanted to resolve the conflict of Aceh by peaceful negotiations. Also the tsunami of December 26, 2004 changed the political and humanitarian situation in Aceh. Because of the catastrophe, international help was needed, which led to the opening of the previously closed area. These changes gave a possibility to Indonesian government to provide help for the Achenese and in this way to enhance its popularity among the local population. Quickly after the tsunami the government of Indonesia opened unofficial talks with GAM's representatives in Finland, with the help of a Finnish citizen Juha Christensen.³⁸ The peace negotiations were initiated in Helsinki between the Government of Indonesia and the GAM under the auspices of the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI), a non-governmental organisation chaired by the former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari.³⁹ From January 2005 onwards the peace negotiations went through five negotiation rounds. The last of these was concluded July 17, 2005. Both the government of Indonesia and GAM agreed that the member states of both the EU and the ASEAN would be most suitable to form an independent control commission. The tasks of the commission were defined in the peace agreement.⁴⁰

According to the agreement, which was named as a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), the government of Indonesia had to pull out its non-organic⁴¹ military and police forces from Aceh in four stages. This withdrawal was to happen in parallel with the submission of GAM's 840 weapons that also happened in four stages. In the MoU, the parties also agreed that they would draft a new law for the governance of Aceh. After the enactment of the law, local elections were supposed to be held. In addition to this, the MoU covered an agreement about the legal issues of Aceh, human rights, security arrangements, amnesty, and the establishment of Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) and its functions.⁴²

In addition to this, it stated in the MoU that the government of Indonesia and the authorities of Aceh would take measures to assist persons who have participated in GAM activities to facilitate their reintegration into the civil

28 Brown & Cribb 1995, 40–41.

29 International Crisis Group 2001, 3.

30 Ricklefs 1993, 265.

31 International Crisis Group 2001, 3.

32 Aspinall & Crouch 2003, 6.

33 Joint Understanding on Humanitarian Pause for Aceh 2000, article 1.

34 Aspinall & Crouch 2003, 14–16.

35 Aspinall & Crouch 2003, 32–36.

36 COHA 2002, article 3b.

37 Aspinall & Crouch 2003, 37–38, 43–45.

38 Council of the European Union 2005a.

39 Council of the European Union 2005b, 3.

40 Council of the European Union 2005a.

41 Non-organic troops mean troops that were situated in Aceh temporarily from other areas of Indonesia.

42 MoU 2005, 3.

society. These measures included economic facilitation to former combatants, pardoned political prisoners and war-affected civilians. According to the agreement, these groups were to receive suitable farming land, employment or, in the case of incapacity to work, adequate social security from the authorities of Aceh. Also all persons that had been granted amnesty or released from prison or detention were to have all political, economic and social rights. Also the rehabilitation of public and private property destroyed or damaged as a consequence of the conflict was part of the reintegration.⁴³

1.3 The Aceh Monitoring Mission

The Aceh Monitoring Mission was officially launched on 15 September 2005 and the mission ended on 15 December 2006.⁴⁴ According to the MoU, the tasks of the AMM were as follows.⁴⁵

- a) monitor the demobilisation of GAM and decommissioning of its armaments,
- b) monitor the relocation of non-organic military forces and non-organic police troops,
- c) monitor the reintegration of active GAM members,
- d) monitor the human rights situation and provide assistance in this field,
- e) monitor the process of legislation change,
- f) rule on disputed amnesty cases,
- g) investigate and rule on complaints and alleged violations of the MoU,
- h) establish and maintain liaison and good cooperation with the parties.

The parties responsible of the AMM were EU together with five ASEAN contributing countries (Brunei, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand) and Norway and Switzerland. At most it numbered 227 international personnel.⁴⁶ About thirty Finns worked in the mission from the beginning. Of these thirty, fifteen were mainly working with disarmament, and fifteen as monitor, reintegration or human rights experts or in other functions. In my research I have focused on the latter group because they were engaged in the reintegration issues. Those who were involved in the disarmament accounted for only one part of the DDR.

AMM's Decommissioning Branch that included an office at the AMM Head Quarters and four Mobile Decommissioning Teams, was responsible for the disarmament in Aceh. According to the peace agreement, GAM had to hand over 840 weapons to AMM. This happened in four stages and in every stage 210 weapons were submitted.⁴⁷ Disarmament ended December 20, 2005 by which date GAM had handed over these 840 weapons. In practice, disarmament happened in places that GAM had previously announced. In these places

GAM submitted their weapons to AMM. AMM then checked the functioning and condition of the weapons. Also the representatives of the Indonesian army approved the weapons. After this the guns were destroyed by cutting them into three pieces. AMM also took care of the disposal of explosives and ammunition.⁴⁸

When the last weapons were submitted, Indonesia pulled out 25 890 soldiers and 5 791 police. Officially, GAM demobilised itself and ceased to be an armed actor in December 2005.⁴⁹ Therefore, disarmament can be regarded as a success in Aceh. Despite of the GAM's official declaration of its demobilisation it is still unsure whether the demobilisation was a success. In DDR, demobilisation means that a combatant gives up their fighter identity and old military command structures disappear.⁵⁰ In some cases the members of GAM spent their time as a separate group and did not want to assimilate to the normal population.⁵¹ According to the interviewed Finns, the group's identity among the members of GAM remained strong.

The MoU provisions on reintegration cover assistance to three groups: GAM ex-combatants, amnestied political prisoners, and affected civilians.⁵² To achieve this, a governmental implementing body of the MoU reintegration, *Badan Reintegrasi dan damai Aceh* (BRA) was established. AMM monitored the work of BRA both at provincial and district level. At district level eleven AMM district offices monitored and reported on the field situation, to ensure that the agreed assistance was received by the beneficiary groups.⁵³ AMM was reorganized on 15 September 2006 when AMM's Banda Aceh office, with its two mobile teams, took up the monitoring responsibility.⁵⁴

1.4 The method and the research question

One of the main methods used in conducting research about DDR is by interviews.⁵⁵ My own research uses this technique. The first selection of the interviewees was initiated via the Finnish Ministry of the Interior. Originally there had been fifteen Finns working in Aceh as monitors, reintegration or human rights specialists. From the Ministry of the Interior I received a list of twelve people. From these twelve I finally interviewed eight. Reasons for the missing interviews are that some of these people worked abroad during the research, or the interview was not possible for other reasons. The interview method that was used to gather information for this article is the theme interview⁵⁶ and the tool for the arrangement and

43 MoU 2005, 3.2–3.2.7.

44 AMM homepage.

45 MoU 2005, 5.2.

46 Council of the European Union 2005a.

47 AMM HQ Decomm Office 2005.

48 Merikallio 2006, 167–169.

49 The World Bank 2006, 2.

50 Gleichmann et al. 2004, 45–48.

51 The World Bank 2006, 26.

52 MoU 2005, 3.2.3.

53 AMM homepage.

54 AMM 2006.

55 Look for example Conaway & Martínéz 2004; Brett & Specht 2004.

56 In theme interviews the themes that have previously been decided on guide the process of the interview.

description of interview material was the content analysis⁵⁷. With the interviewees it was agreed that they would remain anonymous. Referencing of interviewees is by using abbreviations such as I1, I2 etc.

One might question the decision to concentrate on the opinions of the Finnish experts. The main reason for this selection was economical. This article is based on a thesis work on international politics for the University of Tampere, Finland. As a student one's financial situation didn't allow interviews made abroad. It should also be reiterated that the Finnish contingent in AMM was the biggest among the participatory countries.⁵⁸

Most of the texts about reintegration are case studies and compilations of lessons learned without emphasis on building a reintegration theory.⁵⁹ Therefore, the themes discussed here did not emerge from some theory on reintegration, but from literature about the reintegration. The first theme, the *goal of the reintegration*, emerged because there is still some disagreement about it.⁶⁰ I wanted to find out how the Finns saw it. The second theme was the *subjects of the reintegration* which is also extensively discussed in the reintegration literature⁶¹. Thirdly and most significantly, there is always discussion about *the methods of the reintegration* in the reintegration literature.⁶² What should be done and how? As for the fourth and fifth themes, *the success and failures of the reintegration*, I wanted to know how the interviewees felt about the reintegration in Aceh.

One tries to find valuable answers in the light of the research question of theme interviews. The interview themes are based on the frame of a research and on the previous knowledge about the research subject. The theme interview is not a formula that has to be followed precisely. The relation of the interview questions to the research frame do vary from allowing the intuitive findings to keeping to the questions previously decided. (Tuomi & Sarajärvi 2002, 76–78)

57 Content analysis is the verbal description of the content of the analysed documents. The material of the research represents the phenomenon in question. The purpose of the analysis is to create a verbal and clear presentation of the phenomenon in question. The aim of the content analysis is to organise the material into a compact and clear form without losing its information. With a well structured analysis it is possible to make clear conclusions about the phenomenon in question. The qualitative treatment of the material is based on logical reasoning and interpretation, where the material is divided into smaller parts, conceptualized, and coded in a new way to a logical entity. (Tuomi & Sarajärvi 2002, 109–110)

58 The Ministry of the Interior 2005.

59 Nilsson 2005, 35.

60 Nilsson 2005, 22–29; Stockholm Initiative 2006b, 20–28.

61 Look for example Nilsson 2005, 14; Specht 2003, 76–81; Stockholm Initiative 2006b, 28–32.

62 Look for example Gleichmann et al. 2004, 77–90; Specht 2003, 94–102; Stockholm Initiative 2006b, 33–45.

2 Understanding the reintegration in Aceh

*I think it was and it is a quite good mission, but we have a lot to learn from it and if we especially speak about this reintegration side then this is one of those things.*⁶³

The AMM operation lasted from August 2005 to December 2006.⁶⁴ One of the tasks of AMM was to monitor the process of the reintegration which was under the responsibility of the government of Indonesia. Because AMM was there only for a year, it could not monitor the whole reintegration process. Results of the reintegration process should be controlled for at least ten years from the beginning of the process. Because of lack of time, the opinions of the Finnish civilian crisis management experts give a picture of what they understood and saw of the reintegration in its infancy. Because of the length of AMM's mandate it was considered important inside the mission that it should help to build a working reintegration system in Aceh before its exit.⁶⁵

2.1 The objective of the reintegration and its targets

The aim of the reintegration is social, economical and political inclusion of the combatants and their families into civil society.⁶⁶ The MoU is ambiguous about the targets of the reintegration. Strictly interpreted it says that reintegration is only meant for the ex-combatants of the GAM.⁶⁷ According to the MoU

the government of Indonesia and the authorities of Aceh will take measures to assist persons who have participated in GAM activities to facilitate their reintegration into civil society. These measures also included economic facilitation to former combatants, pardoned political prisoners and affected civilians.⁶⁸ It should be noted that AMM's mandate was only to monitor the reintegration of active GAM members.⁶⁹ In this light it is easy to understand that the interviewees placed emphasis especially on the reintegration of the combatants. All but one agreed that inclusion of GAM's members and the combatants was part of the reintegration. *"It was like; place these combatants back to civil society."*⁷⁰ On the other hand some of the interviewees did not separate the objects and means of the reintegration. In this situation the object of the reintegration was, for example, to provide economic help and support to the combatants returning to society. One of the interviewees thought that the aim of the reintegration was stated in the MoU: *"Officially the things mentioned in the Memorandum of Understanding were understood as reintegration. To the guerrillas, coming from the mountains, was promised money, land and education."*⁷¹ Generally, amongst the interviewees there was a consensus that the aim of the reintegration was the integration of the combatants back to the society. Also within the UN there is a growing consensus that focusing on the combatants is essential in the reintegration process, despite the fact that the combatants may get disproportionate benefits after the conflict.⁷²

The opinions of the interviewees were split on significance of the reintegration. They can be divided into two opposite groups according to how extensively and within what time frame the reintegration is viewed. According to the first

63 I5, translation by the author.

64 AMM homepage.

65 AMM Special Report 074, 7.

66 Nilsson 2005, 26-28.

67 GAM's members were not only combatants that carried guns. GAM was also a civilian organisation. Some of the active GAM members were responsible for the logistics, part of them were a kind of a police and part of them trained to be combatants. Major part of the combatants, 75 %, was from age group from 18 to 35. Pardoned political prisoners were older, although major part of them were also from the age group from 18 to 35. In GAM there were hardly any combatants that were under eighteen. Some of the combatants claimed that they had joined GAM when they were sixteen or seventeen, but when the World Bank was conducting its research, combatants under eighteen were not

found. GAM used children as messengers, guards or as certain kinds of scouts for gathering the information. About 4 % of GAM's combatants were women. The women combatants were also younger than the male combatants, because 60 % of them were under 25 years old. (The World Bank 2006, 12-14)

68 MoU 2005, 3.2.3.

69 MoU 2005, 5.2.

70 I3, translation by the author.

71 I5, translation by the author.

72 United Nations Development Programme 2005, 34.

opinion the reintegration in Aceh should be looked at through the MoU. Reintegration should be understood as the parties have agreed to be in the peace agreement and no external elements should be introduced. This view sees reintegration more as a technical process and as a work that has to be done immediately. Reintegration ties the fighters into work and gives them something else to think about. From this point of view reintegration is seen as a rather narrow field that is followed by another kind of help. The other view sees reintegration as a wider process that is connected to other events and changes in society. Reintegration is understood as a long time process and results cannot be achieved in a short time.

According to the MoU the targets of the reintegration were people that had taken part in GAM activities. Part of the reintegration was the economic facilitation to former combatants, pardoned political prisoners and affected civilians. These groups were to receive an allocation of suitable farming land, employment, or, in the case of incapacity to work, adequate social security from the authorities of Aceh.⁷³ All the interviewees consider the ex-combatants of GAM or those who had participated in the fighting as participants of the reintegration. At the same time the majority of the interviewees believed that the pardoned political prisoners and affected civilians should also be the targets of the reintegration. Although in the case of affected civilians it is not possible to talk about reintegration in the same way as with the combatants and the pardoned political prisoners because they were never separated from society as the latter two groups were.

The question about women caused the biggest difference amongst the interviewees. The opinions were split in two and this separation followed the separation that existed previously on the question about the length and object of the reintegration. The question about women was problematic in a sense that in the MoU combatants are mentioned but there is no definition of the content of this definition.⁷⁴ The parties of the MoU, (the government of Indonesia and GAM), in practice excluded women outside the reintegration process. They did not bring out the status of women combatants although there were women combatants in Aceh.⁷⁵ Because of this the reintegration focused on men combatants and women combatants did not receive the reintegration benefits. About half of the interviewees thought that the exclusion of women was a problem: *"In my understanding the women combatants having been left out of this whole reintegration process as beneficiaries is a central problem."*⁷⁶

Part of the interviewees did not discuss the issue of women combatants. To these interviewees, women were mainly thought of as affected civilians. One saw that the women combatants had adapted as men had. Another interviewee was not sure if there had been women combatants in Aceh. Also, these interviewees did not consider the issue important

in the reintegration. It was thought that reintegration is part of the first phase in the containment of the crisis. The women issue should only be presented in the most acute phase of crisis. *"It is difficult to strengthen the status of women in this stage. It doesn't bring a good result."*⁷⁷

Another difference among the interviewees was the issue of how well the target group was defined. At the beginning it was intended that reintegration benefits would be given to 3 000 combatants. In addition, benefits would be given to the pardoned prisoners and affected civilians. GAM and the Indonesian government had decided these numbers already during the negotiation phase of the MoU, after which it was written in the MoU. So the number of the beneficiaries had been decided before launching the reintegration programme. According to the interviewees, the GAM combatants who had surrendered before the signing of the MoU were not included in these numbers. The conflict had continued at different levels of intensity for about 30 years, so a large number of combatants were in danger of being excluded from the reintegration assistance that was meant for the combatants. A confused process in the distribution of the reintegration funds and in the organisation that was responsible for it, the BRA, led to an increase in the number of beneficiaries. In March 2007 the groups that had received or were to receive integration benefits were the GAM combatants, the civilian members of GAM, political prisoners, the GAM members that had surrendered before the signing of the MoU, the militia that had fought against GAM, and the affected civilians. The affected civilians did not receive the money directly but the money was distributed to different villages. Also separate assistance was given to invalids in housing and to those using health services. In total, the government of Indonesia was to use about 150 million US dollars for these benefits during the period of 2005–2007.⁷⁸ So the target group for the integration benefits had widened from what was originally agreed in the MoU.

When it was asked was the definition of the subject group for the reintegration in the MoU a success or failure, the minority of the interviewees considered it a success. *"It should be clearly defined what is the target group."*⁷⁹ The majority though it was a failure. Those who thought it was a success said that in the reintegration process there should be a clearly defined target group like there was in Aceh. In this way the reintegration process was easier to observe from the monitors' point of view. The measurability of the reintegration was thought to be important. Also the lack of distinct target group was considered as making the possible reintegration more difficult.

From another point of view the definition had been a failure because the target group had grown during the reintegration process. *"First of all the number of the combatants had been agreed to be 3000 in the MoU that was total nonsense and*

73 MoU 2005, 3.2.5.

74 MoU 2005, 3.2.3–3.2.5.

75 AMM Special Report 074, 6–7.

76 I8, translation by the author.

77 I6, translation by the author.

78 World Bank & DSF 2007, 4.

79 I4, translation by the author.

everybody knows that there were a lot more."⁸⁰ In the same way a categorical definition was not considered as the best starting point for the reintegration because there were a lot more that needed the help. Part of the interviewees thought that it would be better if the assistance had been given to communities. The communities and villages would have been given the money and they could have decided how to use this money. In the end this happened when the BRA gave economic assistance to villages.⁸¹ This approach was considered as more important because after a long conflict majority of the population can be regarded as victims. Also this kind of approach was thought to help prevent problems caused by envy. Part of the Achenese saw the reintegration benefits that were given to the combatants as rewards and this did cause envy. For a reintegration programme to be successful, the benefits should be balanced so that it fulfils the expectations of the combatants but it is not seen as a reward. In conflicts where the combatants have committed atrocities the supporting of combatants is easily seen as rewarding. Then it would be hard for the local population to accept the distribution of the reintegration benefits to the combatants.⁸²

According to one of the interviewees, an option to the categorical approach would be an idea where the starting point would not be different groups of people but the needs of the people. First step would be a survey of the needs that people have. The reintegration programme or programmes should be based on these needs. Those interviewees that did not think the categorical approach was the best possible solution, were the same people that supported the wider definition of the combatants and saw the exclusion of women as a problem. Despite this some of these interviewees said that they understood the categorical definition through the budget logic because the resources of the government of Indonesia were limited.

2.2 The methods of the reintegration

The methods of the reintegration in general were investigated in the interviews. Despite this, all interviewees linked their answers to their experiences in Aceh. Many of them said that they cannot generalise about the AMM, only about experiences they had in Aceh. Nevertheless, many of them proposed methods excluded from the MoU's framework. The methods that were most strongly presented were employment, education and financial help.

According to the MoU, part of the reintegration was economical assistance, but also the allocation of suitable farming land, employment, or, in the case of incapacity to work, adequate social security provided by the authorities of Aceh.⁸³ In AMM it was also thought that part of the reintegration was the vocational training and health care. In practice, employment, vocational training and health care

were not emphasised enough and they did not have a big impact on reintegration. In AMM it was thought that the low overall level of the social security and poor employment situation in Aceh were the main reasons for this. In the MoU it was also stated that the people who had renounced their Indonesian citizenship during the conflict had the possibility to regain it. In the interviews this did not come out because the question of citizenship was not important to the parties. The biggest Acehenese community abroad was in Malaysia and they had not given up their citizenship. The Acehenese living in Europe and the United States did not have immediate need to come back. In practice, the MoU's main focus in the field of reintegration was on economic assistance.⁸⁴

A research made by the World Bank found that the biggest need the GAM combatants had was the capital. Housing, health care, vocational training, and elementary schooling came in order of importance after this. They also needed money for their everyday life. However, the biggest need was the capital that they could use to buy land or to start up their own businesses.⁸⁵ Other research, coordinated by the International Organization of Migration, discovered that 85 % of the people, whose minority were the ex-combatants, had problems in supporting their families and 90 % had difficulties in finding work. Also 72 % had problems in finding enough food. In this research, 600 people were interviewed in the districts of Pidien, Bireuen and Aceh Utara.⁸⁶

In the end, economical assistance was not considered as a very important tool in reintegration. This was mildly surprising because the majority thought that the biggest problem with the distribution of the reintegration assistance was the major downfall and in practice the main focus was in the economical assistance. The assistance was thought to help the ex-combatants to survive immediately after the conflict. *"In the first stage the economical assistance that people don't need to steal or do other crimes in order to get the daily food."*⁸⁷

On the other hand, the reintegration was criticised for being too focused on the distribution of the money. Many saw the poverty as a problem, but considered that it could not be fixed only by giving economical assistance. So the criticism was not targeted at the fact that money was given. It was thought, however, that economical assistance diverted the focus from other kinds of help and it would not help to create longstanding prerequisites for the reintegration. Other forms of action were needed. Also the amount of money was thought to be relatively small and this could be one explanation for the fact that the interviewees did not think that the economical assistance was very significant. It was thought that wider actions were needed to alleviate the poverty. These actions were not very precisely identified but emphasis was put on the perseverance of the reintegration work.

Giving jobs was a theme that came up in most of the interviews. This is supported by the fact that combatants

80 I8, translation by the author.

81 World Bank & DSF 2007, 4.

82 International Peace Academy 2002, 4.

83 MoU 2005, 3.2.5.

84 Tardioli 2007.

85 The World Bank 2006, 40–41.

86 International Organization for Migration 2006, 19.

87 I4, translation by the author.

saw unemployment and the lack of money as their biggest problem.⁸⁸ Normally, the armed conflicts affect the functioning of the employment markets. Especially “new wars”⁸⁹ diminish domestic and foreign investments. The markets are disturbed by the destruction of the infrastructure and the industry may stop functioning. These effects may not disappear after the peace. For example, different kinds of physical and mental injuries can make working harder and reduce the amount of work force after the conflict. Unemployment rates are normally very high in areas where there has been a conflict.⁹⁰

There was some variation in the opinions of the interviewees of why they saw employment as important. The first viewpoint considered it important to create jobs because a vast unemployed group of people can cause problems. By giving them jobs it would be possible to give them something else to think about. *“That is like the foundation of everything, when a person is employed in some way then he doesn’t have time to think about what to do.”*⁹¹ Also the other viewpoint agreed that employment was important in reintegration. But the main value was that it made possible for the people to integrate into society. With a job it was possible to earn money and get a hold of a normal life. Employment was a way of keeping the ex-combatants out of trouble.

Normally, many of those who earn because of conflict are unemployed after the conflict. This is particularly the case with the combatants. What increases the problem is that these people do not necessary have education and those mechanisms that could provide education and training have disappeared or been destroyed.⁹² All the interviewees mentioned that education was one way to reintegrate the people. Special emphasis was put on training that would give people professional skills, for example apprenticeships in work places. This kind of training was seen as giving the possibility of reintegration through work. Training programmes that have been done after a conflict have shown that vocational training in itself does not create jobs but it improves people’s possibilities to find them. Typically, insufficient attention is given to training in post-conflict societies.⁹³ This came out in the interviews by way of emphasis on the importance of education and its civilizing value. Importance was given mostly to vocational training. The majority of the interviewees thought that the level of education of the combatants was low. In reality, the education level of the GAM members did

not differ from the education level of an average Acehenese.⁹⁴ In this case, the interviewees thought that higher education would be one method of reintegration. *“Firstly the best way is to educate them in some way, train them in some profession and this is the way to reintegrate them to society.”*⁹⁵

Some of the interviewees introduced the idea of economical counselling along with the employment and training. In Aceh, support was given to the combatants to start economic activities. According to the interviewees the fighters had established fish farms and other types of small businesses. These new small businesses were seen to have problems because the fighters did not have enough knowledge of the markets or adequate business skills. Thus, economical counselling was considered important. Also market research that would give information to the combatants and training that had to do with marketing was considered important.

According to the MoU, the government of Indonesia was to allocate funds for the rehabilitation of public and private property destroyed or damaged as a consequence of the conflict.⁹⁶ Many of the Achenese had problems with housing.⁹⁷ Some interviewees presented the idea of rebuilding the destroyed homes. Many people had been forced to leave to other areas of Aceh. They said that for the Achenese it was shameful to live in other people’s homes. It was seen that the abolition of this problem would be important for social reintegration.

Farming land was to be allocated according to the MoU.⁹⁸ Aceh is mainly an agricultural community and the allocation of the farming land is an easy way to employ people. Those interviewees who considered that the work would keep people out of trouble also thought the allocation of the farming land to be an important way to employ people. Some of the combatants who had made their living previously from farming did not want to go back to agriculture after the conflict.⁹⁹ Therefore, some of the interviewees saw that the efforts to get the combatants back to farming were problematic. In practice, the question was theoretical because according to those interviewees farming land was not allocated during the time when AMM was there.

The interviews included ideas about strengthening the civil society, providing adequate information and making the MoU better understood among the combatants. Also building trust was thought important. Those who understood reintegration broadly were also supporting the change of those structures in society that were seen as causes for the conflict. In the end the main focus based on the interviews was put at work, training and financial assistance.

2.3 Two viewpoints

88 The World Bank 2006, 41.

89 According to Mary Kaldor during the 1980s and 1990s a new type of organised violence developed especially in Africa and in Eastern Europe. These wars she describes with the term new war. What is new is the blurring of the distinctions between war, organised crime and large-scale violations of human rights. (Kaldor 1999, 1–3.) It can also be said that there is not that much new in these ‘new wars’. Same kind of things can be found throughout the history of conflicts. (Newman 2004, 174–175)

90 Krishnamurty 2003, 53–55.

91 I4, translation by the author.

92 Krishnamurty 2003, 56–57.

93 Barcia & Date-Bah 2003, 211.

94 The World Bank 2006, 15.

95 I7, translation by the author.

96 MoU 2005, 3.2.4.

97 International Organization for Migration 2006, 19.

98 MoU 2005, 3.2.5.

99 The World Bank 2006, 41–42.

Two viewpoints emerged clearly from the interviews. Different opinions are easier to bring out with this kind of separation, which may have affected the analysis. Also the differences in opinions may have been caused by the fact that some interviewees looked at the reintegration process from inside the AMM's mandate, while some interviewees looked at reintegration more generally. Despite this, two points of view can be found in the results. None of the interviewees are in the extremes of the scale. However, the scale does not represent normal distribution and the differences in opinions are clear.

The views are labelled here as "technical" and "broad" view. According to the technical view, reintegration is a process that happens within a certain timeframe. The technical view sees reintegration as a shorter process than the wide one. According to it, the targets of the reintegration should be clearly defined. Prime targets are then the combatants. Also the reintegration itself has to be defined, its length, targets and so on. In reintegration, the targets should be bound to work and training, so that they do not have time to cause trouble. Issues concerning sex and helping physically and mentally sick are important, but they should not be included in the actual reintegration instead follow after it. This view is supported by the controllability of the process and the possible limits of the reintegration budget.

The broad view understands reintegration more widely. It also sees the reintegration as a longer process than the technical view. Further, the targets of the reintegration are not only the combatants but also other players that have supported the armed action even if they did not actually carry weapons during the conflict. The issue of women and children was also considered as important. The methods of the reintegration were also seen more widely and the distinction between the reintegration and development aid becomes blurred.

This separation can be partly understood by the way the technical view group saw the reintegration strictly through the mandate of the operation. It did not consider the women issue to be important because it was not mentioned in the mandate. On the other hand, the question about what is pursued with the reintegration is probably more significant. If the goal of the reintegration is to simply strengthen the overall security situation, then the fast employment of the combatants without thinking of their real needs can be a justified way to proceed. If the goal of the reintegration is economical, social and political reintegration, then the technical view cannot be considered adequate. In this case a broader view is needed, where the needs of the combatants and their families are taken into consideration.

As mentioned earlier, reintegration is also about security. According to Bill McSweeney, security can be seen as positive or negative. Negative security sees security as the absence of something negative, for example as an absence of war or violence. Negative security is security from something to which it is connected: objects that can be seen, weighted or measured. In this case the objects are protecting and preventing something from happening. Positive security is freedom from something. It is a question of making something possible. In

this case it is referring, for example, to human security.¹⁰⁰ In the technical and broad views these same features can be found. The technical view emphasises the measurability of the reintegration. It also sees that the success of the reintegration is more about the absence of negative things, like the absence of violence. This is indicated by the idea that people should be employed in a way that doesn't cause trouble. Then again, the broad view has more in common with the positive security. It emphasises the tackling of structural problems, wider definitions of the subjects of the reintegration, and including the communities as part of the process.

100 McSweeney 1999, 14-15.

3 The successes and failures of the reintegration in Aceh

Most of the interviewees returned from Aceh during the early autumn 2006. Since then, some of the problems that were brought out in their interviews have been solved. When I asked in the interviews whether the reintegration was a success or a failure, at the time the failures and problems of the reintegration were of main concern, which was surprising. Before the interviews I had been under the impression that the beginning of the reintegration process had been a success. One reason for this can be that the EU wanted to build a success story out of Aceh. During the interviews I got a dimmer picture of the situation. However, the opinions of those civilian crisis management experts who had been in Aceh for longest were more positive. This suggests that the reintegration process had created some progress in Aceh.

One reason for the negativity can be the fact that the official reintegration process had not really started during the interviewees' stay in Aceh and they mainly brought up problems that were related to this. On the other hand, the social reintegration had been successful. The combatants had returned to their villages and towns and they had mainly been received well. There had been incidents between the parties after the signing of the MoU but these had been resolved with the help of the AMM. Peace has lasted. The majority of the interviewees were concerned about the future of the reintegration process. However, it has to be kept in mind that the success of the reintegration should be estimated ten years from now rather than only after the first year.

The definition of the subjects of reintegration is wide in Aceh, because combatants, pardoned prisoners, and affected civilians are part of it.¹⁰¹ One way to go through the successes and failures of the reintegration is to go through it separately, one group at a time. Now, I have to admit that this separation was not made in these interviews and only one of the interviewees made this separation in his answers. Because of this, I will discuss the problems that emerged from the interviews one at a time.

The government of Indonesia demanded that the members of GAM should register before they would provide reintegration assistance to this group. This caused problems

because the members of GAM considered the lists as a security risk if the peace process turned out to be a failure. This dispute led to a stop in the distribution of the government's reintegration assistance. About half of the interviewees brought this up. At the same time the dispute about the name lists was seen as part of a wider structural problem in Indonesia's administration. However, the interviewees did not elaborate on this problem. Partly, because some interviewees had been in Aceh for so long that this problem had already been solved. It was an issue of trust. Because of the distrust, GAM was too afraid to give up the names. After the trust had been rebuilt, the lists were not an issue anymore. Then the reintegration could proceed with the combatants.¹⁰²

BRA was the organisation of Indonesia's government that had been established for the distribution of the reintegration assistance. Also, it was meant to work in cooperation with a common forum called Forum Bersama. Members of this common forum were representatives of the government of Indonesia, GAM, international organisations, and local civic organisations.¹⁰³ In June 2006 the representatives of government, GAM, and civic organisations withdrew from this agreement because of a growing tension between them.¹⁰⁴ Many of the interviewees brought out the problems connected with the functioning of BRA as major stumbling blocks in the reintegration. Inside BRA there had been, among others, a political power struggle. At the same time there were problems in BRA's reintegration programmes that were caused by poor planning and corruption.¹⁰⁵ The interviewees particularly emphasised the problems with the distribution of the reintegration assistance. When the news about the possibility of getting reintegration financial assistance from BRA reached the people, about 40 000–50 000 applications were submitted. The organisation of BRA could not handle these applications and it became paralysed. Also it was clear that some of these applications were unfounded. Among the

101 MoU 2005, 3.2.3.

102 Kokkarinen 2006.

103 AMM Special Report 058, 4–5.

104 World Bank & DSF 2006, 2.

105 AMM Special Report 087, 4.

interviewees BRA was seen as a bureaucratic organisation that was hard to take measure of and did not work properly.

The majority of the interviewees saw that the problems connected with the local administration was making the reintegration harder. These problems were slow, ineffective administration, corruption, and bad communication. This was seen particularly with issues connected to BRA, and also the interviewees considered this a wider problem. Bad administration and the lack of good governance were seen as making the reintegration more difficult. Also the interviewees were unsatisfied with the slow progress of the reintegration: *"You are always left with an impression that someone is always foot-dragging and there is always some explanation why something hasn't happened."*¹⁰⁶ Related to this issue, some brought up the bad communication. There was not enough discussion and information sharing about the reintegration. Also the information and public relations work of BRA was considered weak. The information did not spread from BRA's central office to the district offices and in small villages they were not always aware of the progress of the reintegration. Also the flow of the information inside GAM was seen as a problem.

As discussed before, women were neglected in the official reintegration and they were not part of the institutions that made decisions about the reintegration, even though there had been women fighters in Aceh.¹⁰⁷ Because of the reasons stated before, the interviewees were divided whether this was a problem in Aceh or not. If the reintegration process is looked at from outside the AMM's mandate, this can clearly be considered as a problem in the reintegration. Themes that were almost always brought out in the interviews, although in different ways, were poverty and difficulties in finding work. The majority of the combatants were unemployed, and some interviewees considered that because of the unemployment and the lack of other basic needs crime was growing. Since the signing of the MoU, the crime rate had been growing and this growth concentrated on the areas that were previously pivotal to GAM.¹⁰⁸

Many interviewees emphasised the lack of housing.¹⁰⁹ Homes had been destroyed during the conflict, which forced many to move to other places in Aceh and to live with their relatives or rent an accommodation. This was seen as a problem of the social reintegration because people did not have a home or they had to live in unfamiliar environment.

According to the interviewees one of the problems was the lack of trust between the ex-combatants of GAM and representatives of the government, the police and army. Also there was a lack of trust between civilians and the police and army. It was seen that one of the reasons for this was the fact that the main part of the military personnel and the police in Aceh were from other parts of Indonesia. In spite of peace there still was no real trust between the parties: *"Of course the*

*trust to the government and officials was really bad, amongst the civilians and GAM."*¹¹⁰

As brought out earlier, the lack of economic knowledge or help was seen as a problem in the reintegration. In Aceh it was possible to get reintegration assistance to different kinds of common projects that the combatants had established with this money, for example, fish farms. The interviewees saw that the lack of knowledge about the markets and economy caused failures in these projects: *"These combatants needed this kind of support. A grass-root level support about what is reasonable and what kind of economic activity would have prerequisites for long-lasting entrepreneurship."*¹¹¹

Also some interviewees were concerned about the way the economy of Aceh and the former combatants were steered. Firstly, the way the combatants were directed to agriculture was set in doubt. In a research done by the World Bank, 27 % of the combatants wanted to find new kind of work. 30 % of the combatants and 43 % of the political prisoners had been farmers, which had been the biggest occupational group.¹¹² With this background it is understandable that not everyone wanted to be a farmer. Some interviewees argued that in a place where agriculture was dominant the people should be directed to agriculture because this is one of the easiest ways to employ a person.

The problems that the interviewees presented were similar. The majority of the interviewees especially considered, as the biggest problems, the name lists and the action of BRA. Those who brought out the status of women combatants saw this as a central problem in the reintegration. Things presented only by one interviewee were rare.

The only large scale successful thing that the interviewees brought up was the return of the combatants to their communities. So the social reintegration can be regarded as a success in Aceh. Almost 90 % of the combatants had not faced problems in their return to their homes.¹¹³ During the conflict many of the combatants kept contact with the local population. Therefore, the differences between the local population and GAM were not big, which explains the successful return to the communities.¹¹⁴ The opinions of those who had stayed in Aceh for the longest were more positive than the opinions of those who had left earlier. These interviewees saw that the reintegration had made some progress. There were also territorial differences and in some areas there had been lesser progress. A concrete example of the progress was the rebuilding of the houses that had been destroyed during the conflict: *"The BRA built a lot of houses during the end of the year. They built quite a lot in the villages. This BRA started to work finally."*¹¹⁵

106 I8, translation by author.

107 AMM Special Report 074, 6–7.

108 World Bank & DSF 2006, 2.

109 International Organization for Migration 2006, 19.

110 I1, translation by the author.

111 I8, translation by the author.

112 The World Bank 2006, 41–42.

113 The World Bank 2006, ix.

114 The World Bank 2006, 23.

115 I1, translation by the author.

The targets of the reintegration in Aceh were three groups: political prisoners, ex-combatants, and affected civilians. The reintegration of the pardoned political prisoners was seen as more successful than the reintegration of the combatants. The issue about the name lists that delayed the distribution of the reintegration assistance had not touched the prisoners. The majority of the interviewees were not in Aceh during the local elections in December 11, 2006.¹¹⁶ The feelings of those interviewees that stayed until the elections were generally positive about the political process and the reintegration of the combatants. According to them, the political statements had been conciliatory before the elections. Closer to the elections the importance of the political reintegration was increasing. The combatants were considered as being well informed about the political situation. The political reintegration can be regarded as a success during that time, because in Aceh successful elections were held where the Acehenese and among them the combatants and the pardoned political prisoners were able to vote.

If the reintegration is looked at as a whole in Aceh then according to the interviewees the economic reintegration can be considered as a failure during the time when AMM was there. On the other hand, the political and social reintegration were successful. The successful social reintegration here means that the combatants had returned to their villages without considerable problems. Without work or earnings and in an atmosphere of possible mistrust, the success of the social reintegration can be threatened in the future. Due to reintegration being a long process only the passing of time can give the right answers to these questions.

116 International Crisis Group 2006.

4 Conclusion

What were the results of this article? First, I wanted to find out how the Finnish civilian crisis management experts understood the concept of the reintegration in the light of its subjects, methods and goals. The goal of reintegration was generally understood to be the return of the combatants to society. The question of who were the subjects of the reintegration evoked disagreement. Especially the status of women divided the opinions. The broad view also saw the gender issue as significant to the reintegration. According to the interviewees, the main methods for the reintegration were employment, training and economical assistance. The opinions about the reintegration can be divided roughly into two categories: the broad and the technical views. The technical view saw reintegration more as a clearly defined process where the subjects and time schedule of the reintegration should be clear. This view had points of contact with the negative security where the security is seen as an absence of some threat. The broad view did not emphasise clear categories as the technical did. Furthermore, they emphasized the connection of the reintegration to the whole society. In this case their view has more in common with the positive security where security is seen as a freedom to do something.

Another question for which I wanted to find an answer was did the Finnish civilian crisis management experts find the reintegration in Aceh as a failure or success? Those civilian crisis management experts that left Aceh in September 2006 saw the reintegration in a negative light. Those who left Aceh in December 2006 saw the reintegration more positively. The biggest problems in reintegration were seen in the economic side. The distribution of financial assistance had continued but unemployment was high. Nonetheless, many interviewees brought out examples how the combatants had started small businesses, with varying success, with the funds they had received from the reintegration programme. The interviewees, who were in Aceh during the elections, considered it successful. So the political reintegration had proceeded well. Social reintegration had been a success, at least in the beginning, because the combatants had returned to their villages and cities mainly without problems. The lack of employment and money was seen as a problem that can cause problems in the future. The economical reintegration was the least successful of the three parts of the reintegration.

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Appendix

The interview outline

1. What did you do and how long were you in Aceh?
2. How do you understand the reintegration?
 - What is the goal of the reintegration?
 - Who are the subjects of the reintegration?
 - If the interviewees didn't bring out the issue of women I brought it out intentionally.
 - What are the means of the reintegration? How the reintegration should happen?
 - Quite often I also asked that what do people need after the conflict.
3. Was the reintegration a success or a failure in Aceh?
 - With additional questions I tried to clarify reasons for this.

An introduction to Integrated Crisis Management

Cedric de Coning

Integrated Crisis Management is one approach to manage crisis and enhance peacebuilding in a coordinated and sustainable way. This article analyses the conceptual framework of peacebuilding and crisis management activities as well as describes different approaches and conceptual definitions related to these activities. The major outcome of this article is the critical analysis on the limits of coordination and different approaches in a challenging environment of international peacebuilding and crisis management operations.¹

¹ This article was written to serve as a reader for the Integrated Crisis Management Course in October 2009. The course was organised by the Finnish Centre of Expertise in Comprehensive Crisis Management which was founded jointly by the Finnish Defence Forces International Centre (FINCENT) and the Crisis Management Centre Finland (CMC Finland) in November 2008.

1 A change from peacekeeping to peacebuilding

The international response to conflict, as developed in the context of the United Nations, is to try first to prevent conflict (conflict prevention). If that fails, the next step is to make peace, by facilitating negotiation among the parties with a view to reaching a cease-fire or peace agreement (peacemaking). In some cases, a stabilisation operation may be deployed to protect civilians and secure the delivery of humanitarian assistance whilst negotiations are underway to secure a peace agreement. If a ceasefire or peace agreement is reached that includes a neutral third-party monitoring role, the UN, or a regional organisation authorised by the Security Council, would typically deploy a peacekeeping mission to monitor the ceasefire, and to support the implementation of the peace agreement. Once the conflict zone has been stabilised and a peace process has been agreed upon, the international community would shift its focus from emergency assistance to post-conflict reconstruction. This phase is focused on rebuilding and reconciliation, with the aim of consolidating the peace process by addressing the root causes of the conflict so as to prevent it from re-occurring again (peacebuilding).

In the post-Cold War era, the focus of international crisis management is increasingly shifting from peacekeeping, which was about maintaining the status quo, to peacebuilding, which has to do with managing change. The nexus between development and peace has become a central focus of peacebuilding thinking and practice over the last decade.

Peacebuilding operations are international interventions that support the process of reconciliation and reconstruction in post-conflict societies. In the short term they are designed to assist and consolidate peace processes, and prevent a relapse into conflict, but their ultimate aim is to address the root causes of a conflict, and to lay the foundation for social justice and sustainable peace.

It is clear, however, that despite a growing awareness in the last two decades that the security, socio-economic, political, and reconciliation dimensions of post-conflict operations are inter-linked, the agencies that undertake these operations have been finding it extremely difficult to meaningfully integrate these different dimensions into coherent country strategies. Coherence can be understood as the effort to ensure that the peace, security, humanitarian, and development dimensions of

a peacebuilding intervention in a particular crisis are directed towards a common objective.

The failure to effectively coordinate the political, governance, development and security dimensions of peacebuilding systems, has been identified as a serious cause for concern by most major evaluations and best-practice studies undertaken in recent years. For instance, the *Joint Utstein Study of Peacebuilding*, that analysed 336 peacebuilding projects implemented by Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Norway over the last decade, has identified a lack of coherence at the strategic level – what it terms a “strategic deficit” – as the most significant obstacle to sustainable peacebuilding. The Utstein study found that more than 55 % of the programmes it evaluated did not show any link to a larger country strategy.

Integration and coordination are thus critical elements in any peacebuilding process, without which it would be impossible to achieve an overall state of mutual coherence among the different policies and actions of the various agencies engaged in a given peacebuilding operation.

2 Definition of peacebuilding

Peacebuilding is a holistic concept that provides for simultaneous short, medium and long-term programmes to prevent disputes from escalating, to avoid relapse into violent conflict and to build and consolidate sustainable peace. It requires a coherent and coordinated multidimensional response by a broad range of role-players including government, civil society, the private sector and international agencies.

These various actors undertake a range of interrelated programmes that span the security, political and governance, socio-economic development and reconciliation dimensions of society, and that collectively and cumulatively addresses both the causes and consequences of the conflict and, in the long-term, establish the foundations for social-justice and sustainable peace and development.

The UN Policy Committee, in its May 2007 deliberations, approved a useful definition of peacebuilding, namely:

Peacebuilding involves a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict, to strengthen national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundations for sustainable peace and development. Peacebuilding strategies must be coherent and tailored to the specific needs of the country concerned, based on national ownership, and should comprise a carefully prioritised, sequenced, and therefore relatively narrow set of activities aimed at achieving the above objectives.

Peacebuilding aims to consolidate and institutionalise peace by undertaking a range of actions that go beyond preventing violence (negative peace). It aims to address the underlying root causes of conflict and to create the conditions for a just social order (positive peace). In this context, it may be useful to revisit the distinction between preventative peacebuilding and post-conflict peacebuilding, as much of the conceptual confusion comes about when these two distinct perspectives of peacebuilding are muddled together.

Preventative peacebuilding refers to activities, or programmes, aimed at addressing short to medium term conflict factors that may result in a lapse, or relapse into violent conflict. Some donors now have funds specifically earmarked for peacebuilding, and those funds would most likely be used to fund specific programmes in this category.

The time frame for preventative peacebuilding is necessarily short- to medium-term, because it is focussed on immediate or imminent threats to the peace process. Examples of preventative peacebuilding programmes include conflict resolution training and capacity building. The development of institutional capabilities needed for conflict prevention, such as the Peace Commission in southern Sudan or a local capacity, such as the Ituri Pacification Commission. Support for civil society or women's groups to participate in peacemaking initiatives, and support for national reconciliation initiatives, including aspects of transitional justice. Some donors would also support specific programme activities that form part of, or support, Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR), Rule of Law (RoL) and Security Sector Reform (SSR), out of their peacebuilding funds.

Some donors do not earmark funds specifically for peacebuilding, but prefer to encourage a Conflict Sensitive Development approach when working in conflict-affected countries. Conflict Sensitive Development programmes have a developmental objective, for example, poverty reduction, but is sensitive to the conflict environment within which they operate, in that specific steps are taken in the design and management of the programme to either avoid aggravating the situation, or to proactively support conflict prevention efforts.

An important pre-requisite for a Preventative Peacebuilding approach is an understanding of the risks to the peace process, and the conflict factors that characterise the conflict system. A Post-Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA) is, or should be, typically undertaken as part of the process leading up to the design of appropriate Preventative Peacebuilding programmes. It is thus important to work towards a common understanding of what the conflict factors in a particular context are, from the earliest planning stages and continuously throughout the life cycle of the peacebuilding system. Funding for, and capacity building towards, effective participation in a PCIA approach would also be regarded as a Preventative Peacebuilding activity.

Post-Conflict Peacebuilding on the other hand refers to the total combined effort of the peacebuilding dimensions (e.g. those listed below), and may exist in the form of an overall agreed process that are usually described in a strategic framework. There may be specific processes and structures that facilitate the development, management and

monitoring of such peacebuilding frameworks, and these may be specifically funded, but in general support for Post-Conflict Peacebuilding occurs in a highly fragmented manner in that the various agencies that participate in, and contribute to, the overall process, each independently design, manage, monitor and evaluate and secure funding for their activities. These activities are not necessarily identified as, or funded as, peacebuilding activities at the programme level. Instead, they would, for instance, be considered and funded as independent peacekeeping, development, human rights, or Rule of Law activities. Including some specific Preventative Peacebuilding activities that would be explicitly programmed and funded as peacebuilding activities, such as the ones described in the previous section. It is when these activities are considered together, in the context of their combined and cumulative effect, over time, that their Post-Conflict Peacebuilding identity emerge.

A strategic or integrated framework, that is aimed at an overall strategic vision for the post-conflict peacebuilding process, such as a conflict sensitive Poverty Reduction

Strategy (PRS), or similar frameworks, such as the earlier Results Focussed Transitional Framework in Liberia and the more recent Integrated Peacebuilding Framework in Burundi, sketch out the overall priorities and objectives of the post-conflict peacebuilding strategy for a particular country. The individual activities described above become part of the Post-Conflict Peacebuilding process when they contribute to, and is considered as part of the overall effort directed towards achieving the objectives set out in the strategic vision. In some cases the individual agencies and activities may be conscious of their role in the overall framework, but in most cases this linkage is drawn only at the systemic level, for instance in strategic evaluations or in annual PRS reports. This does not imply that the connections are artificial, but rather that those at the programme level are not always aware of the degree to which their individual activities contribute to an overall Post-Conflict Peacebuilding framework.

Table 1: A list of peacebuilding dimensions

Security & Rule of Law	Providing a Safe and Secure Environment
	Protection of Civilians
	Security Sector Reform
	Disarmament & Demobilisation
	Police, Corrections & the Judicial Reform (Rule of Law)
Political & Governance	Support the Peace Process & Oversee the Political Transition
	Political Participation, National Dialogue & Reconciliation
	Government institutions & Civil Service Capacity Building (Governance)
	Extend State Authority Throughout the Territory
	Conflict Management Capacity
Socio-economic Recovery	Physical Infrastructure: Roads, Ports, Airports; Electricity; Telecommunications
	Social Services: Health, Education, Social Welfare, Population Registration, Civil Society
	Stimulating and Facilitating Economic Growth
	Strengthen Civil Society
Human Rights	Human Rights Education, Advocacy and Monitoring
Humanitarian Assistance	Emergency and Early Recovery Services in the areas of Food, Water & Sanitation, Shelter, Health, Refugees/IDPs and Protection

3 Peacebuilding phases

Peacebuilding is situated in the time-period between the cessation of violent conflict and the return to a normal development process. It is possible to identify three phases that may be generally applicable to most peacebuilding processes: namely, the stabilisation phase; the transitional phase; and, the consolidation phase. However, these phases should not be understood as clear, distinct phases with identifiable boundaries. They are rather loosely identifiable phases through which most (not all) post-conflict transitions progress. They overlap and one country can experience different phases at the same time in different regions, e.g. one can argue that the peace process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is in the transitions phase, but that the Kivus are still experiencing many characteristics of the stabilisation phase. The Sudan can be argued to be in the transitional phase in the context of the North-South Comprehensive Peace Agreement, but in the stabilisation phase in the context of the Darfur conflict. Afghanistan should be in the transitional phase, but has regressed back into the stabilisation phase.

Stabilisation phase

The stabilisation phase is the emergency period that precedes, or follows immediately after the formal ending of hostilities, and typically focuses on: (1) establishing a safe and secure environment; and, (2) responding to the consequences of the conflict through emergency relief operations. In some cases, for instance in the case of the AU (African Union)/UN Hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID) or the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), the stabilisation mission has been deployed prior to a cease-fire or peace agreement in order to protect civilians and secure humanitarian assistance whilst a political process seeks an end to the conflict. In others, for instance the UN missions in Liberia (UNMIL) and Burundi (ONUB), peace operations has deployed to assist with the implementation of a peace agreement, but even in these cases the initial phase of the mission will be focused on stabilisation.

Transitional phase

The transitional phase typically starts with the appointment of an interim government, followed by, in the shortest reasonable period, some form of election or legitimate traditional process to elect a transitional government, constituent assembly or some other body responsible for writing a constitution or otherwise laying the foundation for a future political dispensation. The transitional stage typically ends with an election, run according to the new constitution, after which a fully sovereign and legitimacy elected government is in power.

Consolidation phase

The consolidation phase is aimed at supporting the newly elected government and civil society with a broad range of programmes aimed at fostering reconciliation, boosting socio-economic recovery and supporting ongoing processes of change and development. An example could be security sector and judicial sector reform processes.

The transition from the peacebuilding process to a normal development process is gradual and it will typically be very difficult to pinpoint the exact period when such a transition occurred. The peacebuilding process can generally be said to have come to an end when a newly elected government is in a position to ensure the human security of all its citizens without extraordinary external assistance; the government has extended its control and protection throughout its territory; and, the foundation of the rule of law and social justice has been firmly established. The new society can thus reasonably be expected to continue on the path to sustainable peace and development without undue internal or external threats to its stability.

4 Peacebuilding actors

When considering the different actors in peacebuilding operations we can make a distinction between internal and external actors.

INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL PLAYERS

The internal actors are comprised of the government of the day, the parties to the conflict, the private sector and civil society in all its different varieties.

The external actors are the peace operation, the UN Country Team, international NGOs, regional and sub-regional organisations like the EU, AU or ECOWAS and donor agencies.

4.1 External actors

There are a number of external actors that need to be considered in the peacebuilding context. Key among these is the peace operation, the UN Country Team, international NGOs and donor agencies.

In many post-conflict situations the UN, the AU or a sub-regional organisations like the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), or the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in the Horn of Africa will deploy a peace operation to stabilise the situation and to monitor and support the peace process. The bulk of a peace operation's effort and resources will be focused on ensuring a safe and secure environment so that the rest of the peacebuilding work can be carried out without fear of disruption.

UN COUNTRY TEAM
UNCT typically includes:

- RR/RC/HC
- UNDP
- World Bank
- UNHCR
- WFP
- UNICEF
- WHO
- UNIFEM
- OCHA
- ... and others.

The different members of the UN System in a given country are commonly referred to as the UN Country Team (UNCT). The UNCT is headed by a Resident Representative. The Resident Representative (RR) is also the Resident Coordinator (RC) of the UN System in the country and usually also the Humanitarian

Coordinator (HC). The members of the UNCT may include the UN Development Programme (UNDP), World Bank (WB), UN High Commissioner of Refugees (UNHCR), World Food Programme (WFP), UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), World Health Organization (WHO), UN Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and others.

All of these agencies, funds and offices have their own mandates, budgets and programmes and the RC/HC's function is to ensure that the UNCT develops a coherent programme in support of the needs of the country where they are based. The members of the UNCT meet on a regular basis and use various coordination mechanisms to harmonise their policies and programmes.

The members of the UNCT and the Government of the country where they operate usually agree on a common strategic framework, called the UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF), that specify how the UN system will support the Government over a given time-frame, typically 3 to 5 years. The UNDAF is typically aligned with an even broader strategic framework that encompass the Government and all the external actors, including beyond the UN the International Financial Institutions (IFIs), like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the donor countries. This overall strategic framework is usually called the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP).

The international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) include a broad range of independent not-for-profit organisations that work in the humanitarian assistance and development spheres. Most NGOs have developed a specific field of specialisation. Some like Médecins sans Frontières (Doctors without Borders) focus on the health sector. Oxfam is known for its work in the water & sanitation and preventive health sectors. Others, like Care International and World Vision have a more cross-cutting approach and may be involved in food distribution, agriculture projects and support of refugees or internally displaced persons. In some cases, these NGOs will execute programmes for which they have obtained their own funding, whilst in others they may act as implementing partners for UN agencies like UNHCR (refugees) or WFP (food distribution).

The donor community includes multilateral donor agencies such as the European Union (EU) and European Commission (EC/ECHO), and bilateral donor agencies like JICA (Japan), USAID (USA), DFID (UK), GTZ (Germany), NORAD (Norway), SIDA (Sweden), CIDA (Canada), GOAL (Ireland). Most of these donor agencies are usually present at the country level, but they don't execute programmes themselves. They provide the resources for the UN system and the NGOs that do the actual work. Many UN agencies subcontract the actual work to NGOs, so approximately 80 % of all the programmatic activity in the field is carried out by NGOs.

4.2 *Internal actors*

The internal actors are comprised of the government of the day, the parties to the conflict, the private sector and civil society in all its different varieties. In principle, the host government and other internal actors should play the lead role in the reconstruction process, since it is their own future that hangs in the balance. Unfortunately, in many cases, the capacity of the internal actors has been so severely diminished by the conflict that they are unable to fulfil this role. As a result, the international aid community often, by default, plays more of a leading role than would otherwise be desired. At a minimum, coordination processes should ensure that the host community participates in all decisions that effect them, and that there is a process in place to support them to develop the capacity to play their rightful role. As the peacebuilding process develops, the internal actors should play an increasingly important role.

5 Tools of peacebuilding

A key characteristic of the peacebuilding process is that all its dimensions are inter-linked and interdependent. The various programmes and activities, and the agencies that carry them out, are interdependent in that no single programme can achieve the goal of the peacebuilding operation – addressing the consequences and causes of the conflict and laying the foundation for social justice and sustainable peace – on its own. It is only if their combined and sustained effort proves successful in the long term that the investment made in each individual programme can be said to have been worthwhile.

governmental, and regional and international organisations have each begun to develop specialised capacities to manage different aspects of these emergencies, and together they have been able to respond with a broad range of interlinked activities.

The distributed nature of this multi-dimensional and multi-disciplinary response has been able to manage some of the highly dynamic crisis environments reasonably well. In others, however, the degree to which the international conflict management system lack coherence and coordination

Table 2: Convergence around three core dimensions of peacebuilding

Whole-of-Government	NATO Counterinsurgency Doctrine	World Bank	United Nations
Defence	Clear	Security	Security
Diplomacy	Hold	Governance	Political
Development	Build	Development	Economic and Social Reconstruction

The project cycles of the different dimensions, clusters and programmes need to be synchronised with each other and with the overall peacebuilding strategy. Individual programmes need to continuously adjust their planning to the feedback received from elsewhere in the system, to ensure that the combined effect on the society is positive, consistent and produced at a rate that can be absorbed by the internal actors.

It is the total collective and cumulative effect of all the programmes undertaken in all these dimensions and sectors that slowly builds a positive momentum towards sustainable peace. The timing, prioritisation and sequencing between these dimensions and sectors are thus very important. This is why integration and coordination is a critical success factor in peacebuilding operations.

The search for a Comprehensive Approach should be understood in the context of an increasingly complex and interdependent international conflict management system. The scope of the crisis faced by the international community is often of such a scale that no single agency, government or international organisation can manage it on its own. In response, a wide-range of agencies, governmental and non-

among the diverse international and local actors that make up the system, resulted in, amongst others, inter-agency rivalry, working at cross-purposes, competition for funding, duplication of effort and less than optimal economies of scale. All of which, taken together, contributed to an overall poor success rate, measured in the sustainability of the systems that came about as a result of these international interventions.

In order to address these shortcomings and improve the overall success rate of the international conflict management system, various agencies, governments and organisations have started exploring, independently from each other, with a range of models and mechanisms aimed at improving the overall coherence, cooperation and coordination of their conflict management systems. All these initiatives have a similar aim, namely to achieve greater harmonisation and synchronisation among the activities of the different international and local actors, across the analysis, planning, implementation, management and evaluation aspects of the programme cycle. The core aim is to bridge the security-development divide and to integrate the political, security, developmental, economical and other dimensions required to ensure a

system-wide response to any specific conflict system. The term Comprehensive Approach is used here as an umbrella concept for these different initiatives.

At the national level, a number of Governments have been experimenting with improving the cooperation among their own ministries or departments, both with a view to improving the management of their respective national and international challenges. These initiatives are now collectively known as so-called Whole-of-Government approaches. The United Kingdom's (UK) joined-up approach under the Blair years is probably one of the leading examples of the emergence of this trend at the national level.

In the context of international conflict management a number of national-level Whole-of-Government approaches should be mentioned. The Canadian Government developed the so-called 3D (diplomacy, development and defence) concept, and many others have since used the 3D model as the foundation of their own approaches. In fact, the 3D concept has become a general catch phrase for the Comprehensive Approach because it so concisely captures the main security-development axis and the need for an inter-connectedness among these different dimensions of Government.

The UK also applied its 'joined-up' approach to the international arena and created an inter-agency unit, first called the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit (PCRU), and later re-named to the Stabilization Unit. It brought together the Ministry of Defence, the Department for International Development (DFID) and the Foreign Ministry, and, amongst others, managed a joint funding pool. The United States of America developed something similar, namely the Office for the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), but it has not, to date, achieved the same degree of inter-agency cohesion and participation as the UK initiative. Instead it is now focused on coordinating the different civilian agencies of the US Government engaged in international crisis management, and the development of a civilian standby roster or resource pool that is aimed at improving the ability of the US Government to deploy civilian experts.

Various other Governments such as Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands have experimented with their own national coherence initiatives. Most of them involve inter-departmental coordination meetings, some at various levels ranging from the Ministerial to the working level. In some cases more Ministries or departments, such as Justice, Correctional Services, the Interior/Home Affairs, etc. have been engaged, and in many cases these initiatives have been aimed at better managing specific deployments. In fact, all of the countries mentioned thus far are deployed in Afghanistan, and most participate in, or lead, a specific Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT). The PRT concept is, in itself, a Whole-of-Government experiment, in that each PRT is meant to consist of, apart from its security (military) element, political advisors, development advisors and police advisors. The PRT concept thus provides for the combined deployment of several Government departments, with the premise that this will result in an improved Whole-of-Government approach, that will have a more system-wide or multi-dimensional impact on the stabilisation and

reconstruction goals and objectives of the international intervention, within each PRT's area of operation. We will come back to the success, or rather lack of success, that the PRT model, and thus the Whole-of-Government approach has had in the case of Afghanistan in the next chapter, when we will analyse the coherence dilemma and related challenges experienced by the international community.

At the multilateral level the United Nations, European Union, African Union and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) are each also engaged in various initiatives aimed at improving the coherence within the different parts of their own organisations, as well as between their organisations and the other international and local stakeholders they work with in the international conflict management context.

The European Union has developed a sophisticated Crisis Management capability, including military, police and civilian capacities, but have not yet deployed integrated missions where these three dimensions operate together as one mission, with one budget and one mandate. Instead, they have until now been deployed in parallel missions, alongside other EU presences in the same countries, such as election monitoring missions, development and humanitarian missions, and political/diplomatic EU Council and EU Commission representations. The EU has, however, developed a specific civil-military coordination tool (CMCO) to manage the coordination among these Crisis Management actors. It has not yet, however, developed a capacity to integrate its Crisis Management, development and humanitarian missions, and it will be unable to do so until the new treaty comes into force, as it requires the integration of Council and Commission responsibilities, which is not possible under the current system. The EU has established a working relationship with the UN, especially in the context of the operations where it has a close working relationship with UN peacekeeping operations. The European Union Force (EUFOR) operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and in Chad/Central African Republic are the two most recent examples. Cooperation in this context included joint assessment missions, joint planning, joint after action reviews and close cooperation for the handover of the EU mission's responsibilities to United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) in March 2009.

NATO has developed the Effects Based Approach to Operations (EBAO), but it is still unclear whether NATO regards the EBAO as its "comprehensive approach" doctrine, or whether NATO sees EBAO as the military component of a larger international 'comprehensive approach' effort. However, NATO is essentially a military alliance, and can only deploy as such. Any civilians, e.g. political and developmental advisors it deploys are there to serve and advice the Commander, so that (s)he can better fulfil the military mission. NATO can thus only participate in a larger 'comprehensive approach', as it is incapable of achieving a system-wide effect on its own. NATO has entered into a working relationship with the UN and efforts are underway, for instance in the Afghanistan context, to work more closely under UN leadership to achieve a more comprehensive effort. This represents a marked

departure from the past where the United States and NATO actively worked to undermine and limit the role of the United Nations in Afghanistan, and is reflective of the realisation that has emerged among the NATO member states in 2007 and 2008 that it will not be able to achieve its objectives in Afghanistan through military means alone. Instead, there is a growing recognition that it is only through a system-wide, multidimensional response – the so-called Comprehensive Approach – that the international community can assist Afghanistan to achieve greater stability and work towards a sustainable political future, and it is in this context that NATO has now formally agreed to coordinate its work under the overall direction of the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General (SRSG) in Afghanistan.

The African Union is also committed to a Comprehensive Approach in its policy positions and overall strategic relations, but it is constrained in realising such an approach for a number of reasons. Firstly, the AU is primarily a political and security organisation with very limited capacity to play a meaningful role in the humanitarian, developmental and peacebuilding areas, except for mustering political support and participating in enabling frameworks. Secondly, the three peace operations that the AU has undertaken to date, in Burundi, Darfur and Somalia, has been primarily military operations, with a sizeable police component in Darfur and small civilian components. This is both because the civilian dimension of peace operations is still underdeveloped in the AU, and because these have all been stabilisation-type operations that have less scope for civilian roles. Thirdly, in the African Standby Force (ASF) context there is a concerted effort underway to develop the civilian dimension of the ASF, but these efforts have to be understood in an environment where peacekeeping is still viewed primarily as a military responsibility. For instance, the ASF initiative is steered by the AU Ministers of Defence and Security, and whilst they are broadly supportive of the civilian dimension, their natural interest and focus lies with the military dimension of peace operations. Lastly, the AU has developed and adopted a policy on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development, but this policy has not resulted yet in tangible action, mainly for the reasons highlighted in the first point raised above, and has also not yet been integrated into AU operations for the second reason discussed earlier. The AU has a good working relationship with the UN, EU and NATO, both in terms of support and cooperation with existing operations, e.g. in the context of the hybrid UN/AU operation in Darfur, and in terms of capacity building for the future in the context of the ASF.

Among the various multilateral bodies discussed here, the United Nations has perhaps made the most progress with achieving a Comprehensive Approach to date. It has developed a sophisticated multidimensional and Integrated Approach model that has been refined over the last two and a half decades in more than 20 peacekeeping operations. These initiatives have gained further momentum since the World Summit in 2000. On the one hand the UN system is piloting – under the slogan “Delivering as One” – recommendations by the high-level panel on system-wide coherence that

has looked into coherence among those members of the UN family working in the humanitarian, development and environmental areas. On the other hand, the UN has been implementing an initiative to integrate the UN's political, security, developmental, human rights and humanitarian agencies under one Integrated Missions structure when the UN deploys a multi-dimensional peacekeeping operation. These developments deserve closer scrutiny, and as the UN's experiences with coherence and coordination will form a major part of the empirical information that will be addressed throughout this study, the next section will deal with the UN's experiences in this regard in greater detail.

6 The United Nations Integrated Approach

The United Nations (UN) system has responded to the series of complex challenges it was facing by the late 1990s by commissioning a series of high-level panels and working groups that considered various aspects of this dilemma, and by experimenting with a number of strategic and operational coordination models. These efforts culminated, over the last half-decade, in the Integrated Approach. The Integrated Approach refers to a specific type of operational process and design, where the planning and coordination processes of the different elements of the UN family is integrated into a single country-level UN system, when it undertakes complex peacekeeping operations.

UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan first described the concept as follows:

An Integrated Mission is based on a common strategic plan and a shared understanding of the priorities and types of programme interventions that need to be undertaken at various stages of the recovery process. Through this integrated process, the UN system seeks to maximize its contribution towards countries emerging from conflict by engaging its different capabilities in a coherent and mutually supportive manner.²

The Note of the Secretary-General on Integrated Missions establishes the Integrated Approach as the guiding principle for the design and implementation of complex UN peace operations in post-conflict situations and for linking the different dimensions of peacebuilding (political, development, humanitarian, human rights, rule of law, social and security aspects) into a coherent support strategy. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon has reaffirmed the Integrated Approach as the guiding principle for all conflict and post-conflict situations where the UN has a Country Team and a multidimensional peacekeeping operation, or a political or peacebuilding office, regardless of whether these missions are structurally integrated or not.

The Integrated Missions concept refers to a type of mission where there are processes, mechanisms and structures in place that generate and sustain a common strategic objective, as

well as a comprehensive operational approach, among the political, security, development, human rights, and where appropriate, humanitarian, UN actors at country level.

The 2008 Secretary-General's decision on integration introduces the notion of the Integrated Approach. It differs from the Integrated Missions concept in that it does not require structural integration, although it provides for it, where appropriate. Instead, the Integrated Approach refers to a strategic partnership between the UN peacekeeping operation and the UN Country Team that ensures that all components of the UN system operate in a coherent and mutually supportive manner, and in close collaboration with other partners.

An Integrated Approach requires:

- (1) A shared vision of the UN's strategic objectives,
- (2) closely aligned or integrated planning,
- (3) a set of agreed results, timelines and responsibilities for the delivery of tasks critical to consolidating peace, and
- (4) agreed mechanisms for monitoring and evaluation.

The core features of the UN's Integrated Approach can be summarised as follows:

- Context: Multidimensional and system-wide UN family support to the stabilisation of a conflict or the implementation of a comprehensive peace process in a post-conflict setting, i.e. actions to establish a meaningful peace process, or where such a peace process is in place, support to the parties with the implementation of this process;
 - Purpose: The main purpose of the integrated approach is to maximize the individual and collective impact of the UN's response, concentrating on those activities required to consolidate peace;
- Dimensions: Recognition that a comprehensive approach requires a system-wide process, that covers the political, security, development, human rights, rule of law and where appropriate, humanitarian, dimensions;
- Participating UN Agents: Understanding that in order for all these dimension to be brought into

² UN 2006a, 4.

play in a synchronised, appropriately sequenced and coherent fashion, the UN family, which consist of a diverse range of departments in the Secretariat, independently constituted funds, agencies and programmes, and the Bretton Woods institutions, need to operate as one integrated UN system at country level;

- Operational Coordination: Establishment of a range of processes, mechanisms and structures that will generate common assessments, integrated plans, operational coordination mechanisms, common monitoring tools and an ability to evaluate the overall effect and impact of the Integrated Approach that has been brought about among all the relevant elements of the UN system.

The assumption of the Integrated Approach is that a more coherent model, that manages to produce a comprehensive and coordinated UN system-wide effort, will have a more relevant, effective, efficient and sustainable impact on the peace process.


Within the UN system there are various semi-autonomous agencies, funds, offices and programmes that have a humanitarian and development mandate, as well as departments of the UN Secretariat that has the responsibility for peace operations. Although the core of the UN integration effort will be aimed at achieving system-wide coherence among these members of the UN system, the comprehensive approach is not meant to be limited to the members of the UN family. The members of the UN system that participate in the UN Integrated Approach, should facilitate and participate in, various other coordination initiatives aimed at promoting overall harmonisation among the external actors, and alignment between the internal and external actors in any given country or regional conflict system.

The Integrated Approach thus need to be understood in a wider international context where coherence is being pursued at national level among government departments (Whole-of-Government), and internationally among donors (harmonisation), between donors and recipients (alignment), within the UN development, humanitarian and environment dimensions (system-wide coherence), and between the peace, security, human rights, humanitarian and development dimensions of the UN system at country level (Integrated Missions).

Integrated Missions has now been officially accepted in the UN System as the mission structure of choice. It will be the dominant management structure for UN peacekeeping operations in the near- to mid-term, and it may have a significant influence the way the European Union (EU), NATO, and the African Union (AU) are managing their own respective integration and comprehensive approach initiatives.

However, one needs to be mindful that integration in a non-UN context refers to multidimensional integration, rather than system-wide integration. For instance, the AU's Integrated Planning Task Force (IPTF) refers to a mechanism where the military, police and civilian planning functions are integrated, as opposed to the UN's Integrated Mission Task Force that refers to the coming together of planners from the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), UN Department of Field Support (DFS), UN Department of Political Affairs (DPA), UN Development Group, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and others in the UN system. The former remains a peace and security focused process, although it is now multi-dimensional, where as the latter refers to the integration of the political, peacekeeping, humanitarian and development dimensions, thus working towards system-wide integration.

Table 3: A typical UN Integrated Mission where one of the DSRSGs is also the RC/HC3



7 Coordination

7.1 *Coordination with the military*

The primary role of the military component of a peacebuilding operation is to ensure a safe and secure environment within which the rest of the external and internal actors can operate. The secondary role of the military component is to make its resources available to external and internal actors in support of the overall mission objectives. For instance, in the context of a DDR programme, the military component may be in a position to provide transport, medical services, camp-building, weapons storage and/or weapon destruction services, over and above its security function. Similarly, in the context of an UN-supported election, where a UN peace operation is deployed, the military component may be in a position to assist with the identification of suitable sites for polling stations; engineering support in terms of building or re-habilitating structures that can be used during the election as well as rehabilitate or build roads and bridges that provide access to polling stations; and the provision of transport, manpower, and equipment – over and above its security function.

The use of military assets in the peacebuilding context differs from the use of military assets in the humanitarian context. Humanitarian actors operate on the basis of the humanitarian principles – humanity, neutrality and impartiality – and these principles are meant to ensure their independence from political interference. Their work is purely focused on assisting those affected by the conflict. They are not in any way involved in resolving the conflict itself. Humanitarian-military coordination thus needs to be undertaken in such a way that it does not harm the humanitarian principles. In the peacebuilding context, however, the civilian agencies that undertake peacebuilding work are directly engaged in resolving the conflict and there is thus no assumption of independence. This does not necessarily mean that they are not impartial, but it means that they are openly working to manage or resolve the conflict, and that these civilian actors should not be confused with humanitarian actors.

In the peacebuilding context, for example in a DDR or elections programme, both military and civilian partners are understood to be engaged in an activity aimed at bringing about a specific outcome that will fundamentally change

the dynamics of the situation. Those opposed to an election, for instance, will be opposed to all that are involved in the electoral process, regardless of whether they are civilian or military. The close cooperation between military and civilian partners in the peacebuilding context does thus not have the same implications for the security of the civilian partners, or beneficiary population, as it would have in the humanitarian context. One must thus be careful, when referring to civil-military coordination, to distinguish between humanitarian-military and peacebuilding-military coordination.

Civil-Military Coordination (CIMIC) refers to a specific branch of the military force that is responsible for liaison between the military force and its civilian partners, as well as for coordinating the support provided by the force to its international partners and the local community. CIMIC actions should be integrated into the larger mission effort and should be coordinated with all partners and stakeholders. For instance, community support actions should be aimed at helping the local community. They must be based on the need of the community (needs driven as supposed to supply driven) and the community should be encouraged to take ownership of, and direct, these projects. CIMIC actions should be coordinated with all partners and stakeholders (e.g. in the case of a military unit rehabilitating a school, such services should be coordinated with the appropriate civilian authorities: local education authorities; local community leaders; UNICEF; OCHA; NGOs working in the education field, that may be active in the area, etc.) so that the actions of the military unit are complementary to the actions (humanitarian and development) that are being undertaken by appropriate civilian and humanitarian actors. For instance, a CIMIC school rehabilitation project should not be in competition with, or undermine, the activities of these civilian actors. It should be undertaken in support of a larger school rehabilitation programme, so that the school that is rehabilitated through CIMIC action will be integrated into, and supported by, the larger programme – the larger programme may, for instance, support the national and/or local education authorities and ensure that there are teachers and school material available – thus ensuring longer-term sustainability.

7.2 What does coordination mean?

The Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English explains that cooperation means "working together for a common purpose," whilst coordination means "making things, people and parts function together efficiently and in an organised way." The Collins English Dictionary provides an insight into coordination that seems even more relevant for our purpose. It defines coordination as "the organisation of the activities of two or more groups in such a way that each may work more efficiently and be aware of what the other group(s) are doing."

The most authoritative definition of coordination appears to be that coined by Minear & Chellia:

Coordination is the systematic utilization of policy instruments to deliver humanitarian assistance in a cohesive and effective manner. Such instruments include: (1) strategic planning; (2) gathering data and managing information; (3) mobilizing resources and ensuring accountability; (4) orchestrating a functional division of labour; (5) negotiating and maintaining a serviceable framework with host political authorities; and, (6) providing leadership. Sensibly and sensitively employed, such instruments inject an element of discipline without unduly constraining action.⁴

7.3 The dimensions of coordination

There are many factors that frustrate coordination, but two deserve particular attention. The first is the sheer number of international and local actors involved, and the second is the wide-ranging scope of activities undertaken by these actors. The interaction among this large number of actors and the interplay among the multiple dimensions explain the complexity inherent in post-conflict reconstruction operations. To these we can still add an infinite number of complicating factors including, amongst others: the language and socio-cultural gaps between those undertaking post-conflict reconstruction programmes and the beneficiaries they are intended to assist; and, the inconsistencies and selectivity of the neo-liberal international policy regime that serve to compound existing global inequalities⁵.

The information revolution has multiplied the number of actors involved in post-conflict reconstruction operations. It has amplified the influence of the media, nurtured a more educated and better informed public, and increased the number of institutions and agencies engaged in peace, security, relief and reconstruction actions.

7.4 Separating coordination and management

There should be a clear distinction between management and coordination. Decision-making takes place in the management function, whilst the coordination function is used to exchange information. If these two functions are separated, coordination will not pose a threat to any unit or programme. This is because each individual agent will retain full control over their own decision-making function.

For coordination to be palatable to defensive institutional cultures, it has to be non-threatening. And for it to be non-threatening it has to be voluntary, and free of any decision-making power over the participating agency.

4 Minear & Chellia 1992, 3.

5 Pugh & Cooper 2004, 197.

8 From strategy to evaluation

8.1 *Strategic direction*

One of the prerequisites for a coherent peacebuilding operation is a clearly articulated overall strategy against which individual units, offices and programmes can benchmark their own plans and progress. The overall country strategy is produced by the cumulative and collective planning efforts of all the units, offices and programmes in the system.

The peace and security aspects of such an overall strategy are derived from the UN Security Council resolutions that determine the mandate of the mission and the strategic plans developed by the SRSG to implement that mandate. The humanitarian and development community's strategies are derived from common assessment and appeal processes that may result in a Common Humanitarian Action Plan (CHAP), a Common Country Assessment (CCA), a UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) or a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) – depending on the specific case.

The peace operation, the UN Country Team and other external actors, such as the NGO and donor community, need to work closely with the internal community, including both government and civil-society representatives. This is done with a view to developing one common country strategy.

8.2 *Planning and assessments*

In order to achieve the desired level of synergy it is now becoming common practice to enrich planning at the higher or home headquarters level through integrated planning mechanisms and joint assessment missions. For example, in the UN Secretariat in New York, planning for peace operations now benefit from an Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP) system that bring various UN departments and agencies together to provide input into the planning process. It is also now common practice to undertake joint assessment missions that assist in ensuring that there is a common understanding of the problems that need to be addressed.

At the field headquarters or mission management level, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) and other senior managers coordinate with the representatives of government, parties to the peace process, heads of the various

agencies, organisations, diplomatic missions and international organisations. They use various regular and ad-hoc meetings to achieve their coordination objectives. The senior managers also make use of a number of strategic planning instruments to encourage a broadly cohesive approach within the peace, security, humanitarian and development community – and to ensure that this approach supports the needs and priorities of the host community.

Apart from the common strategic planning frameworks introduced above, missions also use various other mechanisms to exchange information and ensure integration among components at the mission HQ level. The Joint Mission Analysis Cells (JMAC) is one example. The JMAC is a jointly staffed unit where the information gathered by various components (military units, military observers, police, political affairs, civil affairs, human rights, etc.) is collated and analysed. In this way the mission management benefits from one consolidated information picture about the mission and the peace process that has been informed by all the different perspectives within the mission.

8.3 *Mobilising resources*

The international community has developed various tools to mobilise resources. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) coordinates the Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP). The CAP is first and foremost a strategic planning and coordination tool. The humanitarian community sees the CAP as the main strategy-setting tool in responding to man-made and other slow-onset disasters.

In the development dimension, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) or the World Bank will typically take the lead to coordinate fundraising for common priorities through donor conferences. The donor conference for Afghanistan in January 2001 and the conference for Liberia in February 2004 are two such examples.

In some cases transitional appeals are launched on the basis of a Common Country Assessment (CCA), and then serve as the foundation for a UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) and/or a Poverty Reduction Strategy

Paper (PRSP), as appropriate. Once the funds have been allocated the coordination shifts to implementation and operational coordination.

In the case of UN peace operations, the missions are funded through assessed contributions. Part of the work of the CIMIC Officer will be to understand how these different funding mechanisms work, and which mechanisms within and outside the mission budget can be accessed to facilitate specific projects, e.g. Quick Impact Projects.

8.4 Monitoring and evaluation

The country strategy initiative should be supported by a monitoring and evaluation system. Such an inter-agency initiative should not only provide feedback on individual and overall progress, but also encourage programmes and agencies to participate in the overall coordination process. All actors should be requested to report on the steps they took to synchronise their plans and operations with the others in the system, and with the overall objectives of the mission. In this way the evaluation process becomes normative: it encourages and rewards behaviour that enables coherence; it discourages and sanctions behaviour that inhibits coordination.

Another important element is the ability of the system to monitor the effect it is having on its environment. The project-cycles of the different programmes and agencies need to be synchronised, to ensure that their combined and cumulative effect on the host society is positive. Projects must be consistent and delivered at a rate that can be absorbed by the local communities. When the ultimate aim of the international operation is sustainable peace, then the overall strategy and the pace of its implementation has to reflect the optimal relationship between delivery and absorption.

9 The limits of coordination, integration and the comprehensive approach

Those that favour a comprehensive and integrated approach share a number of broad, not always explicitly stated, policy assumptions, such as:

- (a) Following a comprehensive approach will result in more efficient and more effective interventions, with a more sustainable outcome;
- (b) It is possible to integrate the political, security, human rights, developmental and humanitarian dimensions because, at the end of the day, they have the same goals and objectives;
- (c) There is sufficient willingness amongst the different agencies to work together to achieve a comprehensive approach; and
- (d) There is sufficient structural flexibility to allow the different agencies to work together, and where obstacles are identified, there is a willingness to address any such impediments.

Although these initiatives are all fairly recent, initial indications from the field, and past experiences with coordination, indicate however, that at the operational and tactical levels many of these assumptions are, at best challenged, and at worse, flawed. In the next few sections we will look into some of the major challenges that a comprehensive of integrated approach will need to manage.

9.1 *Conflicting values and principles*

The practical application of the comprehensive approach concept differs widely depending on the actual context, but one can conclude that one of the most important indicators of the degree to which meaningful coherence can be achieved, is the degree of hostility that is present in the conflict system. The organisational values and operating principles that guide the human rights and humanitarian actors, for instance, are more likely to be in conflict with the values and principles of the political and security actors, in contexts where some of the international and local actors are hostile to each other. This tension will be especially acute in situations where an international intervention has to deal with a hostile host Government, e.g. in the case of Darfur in Sudan, or where an international intervention has to deal with an insurgency,

e.g. in the case of Afghanistan, or is engaged in forcefully disarming rebel or militia groups, e.g. in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).

This implies that coherence may be more difficult in the early phases of an intervention where there is a dual security (stabilisation) and humanitarian focus. However, this tension is equally in evidence in situations that have developed into the transitional and consolidation phases, but where pockets of instability remain, or where instability flairs up after a period of relative calm. The phase of the intervention is thus not as much of an indication as the degree of hostility.

The tension is derived from the fact that the operating principles of the humanitarian agencies require them to demonstrate their neutrality between all parties perceived to be in dispute, including those parts of the international community that are, or are perceived to be, using force or other coercive means against one or more of the parties in the conflict system.

Such fundamental differences in values and principles are not, however, limited to hostile environments. There are also other instances where the values and principles of the various actors could be in conflict. The different actors may have different views with regard to which aspects to prioritise. Political and security actors may typically prefer to focus on stabilising a situation before addressing human rights violations, or to deal with corruption, black market trading, racketeering or narcotics, especially if actors they perceive to be the key to stabilising the situation is suspected of being responsible for such human rights atrocities or criminal behaviour.

In some cases the timetable of one dimension may be in conflict with the principles of another. One case in point is the election time-table in Liberia (2004–2006) which motivated those responsible for the election to encourage the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Monrovia to return to their original communities so that they can be registered there to vote. The UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) pressurised those agencies responsible for reintegration to persuade the IDPs to return, and to start offering them reintegration support. However, these agencies disagreed with the return timetable suggested by UNMIL, because their assessments

informed them that the conditions was not yet sufficient to provide alternative sustainable livelihoods for the returnees in their home locations. This situation caused tension between the political and developmental/humanitarian actors because their respective goals, short term vs. long term, and operating values and principles brought them into direct opposition with another.

Another example would be situations where political and security actors may wish to reward certain political or military actors for their cooperation with humanitarian assistance or developmental projects. In some contexts, for instance in counter insurgency doctrine, communities that cooperate with the Government and international forces should be rewarded with aid to show them that cooperation with the Government and international forces bring them more benefits than cooperation with the insurgents. Such a *winning the hearts and minds* approach could result in the political and military actors placing undue pressure on the development and humanitarian actors to provide services in selected areas, or the political and security actors could use their own means to provide services that appear to be developmental and humanitarian in action. At the same time the Government and international forces may discourage those developmental and humanitarian actors that provide services in areas under the control of the insurgents. All of these variations will result in blurring the distinction between political/military and humanitarian action, and thus undermine the independence, neutrality and impartiality of the humanitarian actors, in the eyes of the local communities and the insurgents, and this will result in severe tensions within a comprehensive approach community, or in the inability to achieve a comprehensive approach.

The assumption that there is a sufficient level of shared values, principles, goals and objectives is thus not supported by the evidence from the field. This is not to say that it is impossible to achieve meaningful coherence and coordination across the various dimensions under a comprehensive approach umbrella. Rather, the point is that there will be times and situations where it is not possible to have a common approach. Instead of assuming that there will always be room for a common approach, reality dictates that there will have to be trade-offs, second-best solutions, compromises and even sometimes an inability to come to any kind of agreement. In all of these circumstances, however, it is preferable to have pre-agreed mechanisms for dialogue and coordination – even if only aimed at de-confliction – where the different view points can be raised and where the different actors can inform each other of their respective principles, goals, objectives and approaches, so that when these tensions occur they can be discounted in a transparent and well informed manner.

9.2 *Conflicting rules, regulations and resource management processes*

There are also structural impediments to coherence and cooperation that, although technical, are significant obstacles at the field-level as they are:

- (a) typically imposed by higher order processes and thus not changeable in the field,
- (b) they require considerable political will and institutional effort to change,
- (c) they typically take a long time to change as they are subject to negotiation among various stakeholders and the decision-making processes required to change them usually takes place only once a year, or even less.

These structural impediments fall into two broad categories, namely administrative rules and regulations, and resource management processes. In the rules and regulations category we find organisational procedures that discourage cooperation. These are typically instances that, for instance, prohibit UN peacekeeping personnel from allowing any non-UN peacekeeping personnel into UN vehicles, due to insurance coverage and indemnity issues, or prohibit personnel from a military force from moving around without arms, which impede the ability of liaison personnel to attend civilian meetings, etc. In other words they are often tactical level practical arrangements that have a high impact on the ability of people to work together in the field, but the rules or regulations themselves have been established at a higher level, typically at the higher-headquarters level, and for different reasons, e.g. insurance or security of personnel, and it is thus very difficult to change in the short term.

Another example, in the UN context, is the lack of flexibility that agencies have to share resources. For good operational reasons, most UN agencies will have their own telecommunications, information technology, transport and other resources. However, each of these agencies have developed these over the years independently from the others, and the interoperability of these various systems is a problem in the field. Often, especially in the early stages of a crisis, some agencies have resources in the field whilst others are still waiting for theirs to arrive. In these circumstances better cooperation among the agencies to share the resources available would seem logical, but organisational rules and regulations, and complicated reimbursement processes has resulted in sub-optimum sharing of resources. Another case in point is air services.

Very often the underlying cause in these cases relates to financial management issues. For good and sound financial reasons, organisations have to budget for resources, and once allocated, have to use the resources as planned. Where deviations occur they have to pre-clear and reported. Although these systems make for good financial management, and need to be especially vigorous as public funds are at stake, they do not make it any easier for field level managers to operate in highly dynamic situations. Each agency has its own budget and financial rules and regulations, and these typically do not easily provide for pooling of funds or resources, sharing resources, or other forms of cooperation. One area that is particularly sensitive relates to the remuneration of personnel. People from all kinds of agencies and background work closely together, but are rewarded at different scales and have different benefits. In some cases these differences

are significant, especially among local and international staff. This causes tension, resentment and mobility among people working together, but is very difficult to harmonise as these benefits are determined at higher-headquarters, and as the people involved fall into so many different categories. It is, for instance, very difficult to compare the remuneration and benefits of a military officer, who is employed nationally, and thus only receives an additional field allowance, with that of a civilian UN staff member who is employed on a short-term contract, and whose field-level salary represents their total income.

Those organisations that rely on voluntary funding also often need to be able to show the funding agency how their specific contributions have had an impact, and as this becomes very difficult in cooperative ventures, such organisations are often under pressure to act independently.

There are thus a range of structural issues that discourage coherence and cooperation among agencies in the field, and many of these are very difficult, or may take a long time, to change. Many personnel in the field are on short-term contracts and have been hired specifically for field-level positions without prior service at the headquarters level, and they feel disempowered to influence these higher-level decision-making processes. This is one of the reasons why personality, or individual leadership, plays such an important role in these contexts. Some managers, especially those that have long-term career ambitions in a specific organisation, choose to follow the organisational rules and regulations, regardless of their side-effects, and are afraid to alert their higher-headquarters of such negative side-effects, in case it affects their future career prospects. Others choose to fight the system, and may make short-term gains, but generally seem to become frustrated with the system and leave. The most successful group seem to strike a balance between these extremes, and seems to develop coping mechanisms to find ways around some rules and regulations whilst, at the same time, maximising the leverage they can get out of others. These managers learn how to use the system to their advantage, and are capable of coping – or even to thrive – in these highly challenging environments.

9.3 *Inappropriate management philosophies, processes and tools*

Such personalities are, however, in short supply and we cannot rely on them to overcome the shortcomings of the system. We need to recognise the inadequacies of the current dominant management philosophies, policies and processes to deal with the highly dynamic, complex and interdependent comprehensive approach context, and develop new management models designed to cope with the particular management needs in this environment. The current model is based on independent inward looking closed-loop project cycle and budget-based systems. Managers are meant to ensure that projects are managed against goals and objectives, according to pre-approved budgets and inputs, to produce pre-determined outputs. Any deviations from the project plan are

frowned upon, will draw unwanted scrutiny, and will require thorough motivation. The model ensures that the project is carried out according to plan and within budget. It makes no or little provision for coordination with other projects, or adaptation to a highly dynamic environment.

A comprehensive approach context requires, however, that each programme understands not only its independent reality, but also its interdependent reality. Each programme is independent in that it is executed under the auspices of a certain bureaucratic organisation that exist as a legal entity, that has its own budget and the authority, and responsibility, to manage the programme. The traditional project management model has been designed to serve this independent reality. Each programme is, however, also interdependent in that its meaning is derived from its part in the larger system, i.e. it contributes to achieving a specific effect that only makes sense if you take into account that others are contributing towards other effects, and the total combined effect is necessary to achieve momentum towards peace. For instance, a specific developmental programme may provide vocational training as part of a larger DDR programme in a post-conflict context, but that programme only makes sense (have meaning) if it is understood in its overall context as being part of a larger peace process that includes a DDR programme, in which several organisations are taking part, and the vocational training programme can only be considered to be a success if others identify, register and disarm combatants, and if others work toward sustained livelihoods and economic recovery which will create the environment within which the vocation can be applied. In such a context a programme manager needs to be able to establish and maintain a network that ensures that the particular programme is connected with other programmes that may have an influence on its outcome, and that will result in it being able to adjust to changes elsewhere in the system. In other words it is not just about managing the independent reality, but also the interdependent reality of being part of a highly dynamic complex system, that requires that the individual programme needs to be coherent with, at least some aspects of the larger system and that coordination with others, and adaptation to changes elsewhere in the system, become additional requirements. In this context changes to the plan should not be frowned upon but expected, and managers should be expected to plan for and report on their efforts to ensure coherence, coordination and adaptation.

The comprehensive approach also requires a culture change within the higher headquarters that would require those responsible for developing policy, as well as those planning and managing specific interventions, to recognise and counter the tendency of their own bureaucracies to be self serving, and to be pre-occupied with self-preservation, and instead to encourage an organisational culture, both at headquarters and in the field, that embraces both the independent and interdependent realities of working in this highly dynamic and complex environment.

9.4 *Unintended consequences*

It is also important to recognise that no intervention in a complex system can have only one effect. Complex systems are dynamic and respond to interventions in a nonlinear fashion. We may be able to anticipate some of the ways in which a complex system will respond to an intervention, including the responses we intended to stimulate through our actions. However, the system will also respond in ways that we could not anticipate. If we accept that unintended consequences are a natural outcome of the dynamic nature of complex systems, then we also have to recognise that they cannot be avoided altogether. Some unintended consequences should have been foreseen or anticipated, especially if they have occurred under similar circumstances in the past, whilst others may be totally unexpected. We have to recognise that unintended consequences are a predictable side-effect of peacekeeping operations, i.e. the likelihood that there will be unintended consequences is predictable, but the specific unintended consequences are not always predictable. This possibility should therefore be factored into the planning, coordination and monitoring of peacebuilding systems.

10 Conclusion

Integrated Crisis Management and Peacebuilding is an all-encompassing concept that incorporates a wide variety of responses aimed at supporting the rehabilitation, recovery and reconstruction of the many facets of a society recovering from conflict. It seeks to alter the conditions that led to the conflict in the first place. Ultimately, peacebuilding is aimed at establishing the conditions necessary to ensure social justice and sustainable peace and development.

The key characteristic of peacebuilding operations is that all the different dimensions are interrelated and interdependent. It is the total collective and cumulative effect of all the programmes undertaken in these different dimensions that slowly builds positive momentum towards sustainable peace. The timing, prioritisation and sequencing between these dimensions are thus very important. This is why coordination is a critical success factor in peacebuilding operations.

Good coordination requires a web of coordination structures at all levels, working both from the bottom up, and from the top down. This is necessary to ensure feedback in both directions. At the strategic level coherence among the UN, AU, ECOWAS and the donor community is key. At the operational and tactical level a vast network of liaison and coordination mechanisms exist. The network is feeding the system with the information it needs to remain focused on those areas that require the most effort, whilst staying true to the overall goals and objectives of the mission.

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